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Abstract 
This PhD thesis is a collection of three independent essays in the area of 
experimental economics. The first investigates the effects of singling out an 
individual on trust and trustworthiness. The second essay studies the role 
played by the punishment technology, and the experience and cultural 
background of the subjects in driving emotions and behavior in power-to-
take game experiments. The third essay investigates the preferences of 
voters over the trustworthiness and competence of candidates in public 
elections. 
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Introduction 
This doctoral thesis consists of three independent essays which 
utilize experimental methods to investigate different topics relevant to 
economics. There is a general link between the first and the third chapters as 
they both use the trust game as a vehicle of research to examine the 
preferences of people for the individual characteristics of economic agents. 
However, besides this connection, each chapter focuses on a different theme 
and deals with different research questions. Hence, each chapter can be read 
as a standalone piece of work.  
The first essay investigates what are the effects of singling out an 
individual on trust and trust fulfilling. Singling out occurs whenever a 
subject, who has specific attributes that make him or her potentially 
different from the others, ceases to be an ordinary and usual person, and 
becomes a distinct one in the eyes of other subjects. More precisely, 
singling out can be defined as an inter-group situation in which one group is 
a singleton group made up of a single individual - the singled out individual 
-, whose social identity is perceived as different by a second group that is 
larger in size. The starting point of our investigation is the fact that singling 
someone out is a pervasive phenomenon of social and economic life, both at 
a micro and macro level. For example, people are singled out in 
organizational and workplace settings, as well as countries and firms are 
selected and treated differently in political and economic alliances. Despite 
the fact that singling a member out is a common phenomenon of social and 
economic groups, it has received no attention so far in economics. In the 
first essay, we try to fill this gap focusing on the implications of singling out 
an individual, at the micro level, in the context of trust games. This 
investigation is particularly important for organizations. For example, an 
employee may be object of social recognition (or reproof) for his or her 
desirable (or undesirable) socio-economic characteristics or because he or 
she belongs to a privileged (or disadvantaged) group. As result, he or she 
may lose the status of ordinary member, and acquires a positive (or 
negative) aura of uniqueness in the eyes of his or her colleagues or 
superiors. Similarly, a worker who is promoted or sanctioned may start to be 
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perceived and treated differently by his or her colleagues. All these 
situations may entail positive or negative consequences in terms of group 
cohesion and trust, which, in turn, may affect the productivity of an 
organization.  
To conduct this investigation, we run a lab experiment. We 
artificially induce a status of being singled out in the lab by asking the 
subjects to express their preferences for the other participants based on the 
individual characteristics of the subjects. We assign either a positive or a 
negative frame to the condition of being singled out. Under a positive frame, 
subjects singled out the most preferred match in the experiment, whereas 
under a negative frame, they singled out the least preferred match in the 
experiment. We also manipulate the subjects’ responsibility in the selection 
of the singled out individual. Identification effects are controlled by varying 
the extent to which the status of being singled out is identified by non-
singled out subjects. Furthermore, we test the implications of having a 
random assignation of such status under a neutral frame. Finally, we 
conducted some ex-post analyses where we ruled out the possibility that 
singled out subjects behaved differently because of the individual 
characteristics that made them singled out. As such, this study provides 
evidence of the ‘pure’ effect of singling out an individual from a group, both 
on the singled out side and on the non-singled out side. The main findings 
are that the effect of singling out on trust is negligible but its effect on 
trustworthiness is negative when it is significant. In particular, singled out 
subjects, under a negative frame, return less than non-singled out subjects, 
while those under a positive frame behave bimodally either selecting very 
low or very high return rates. In addition, we find that non-singled out 
subjects negatively discriminate the singled out subject but only when they 
are not responsible for his distinct status. Finally, trustworthiness decreases 
if there is a singled out subject.  
In the second essay of this thesis, we investigate an important 
methodological issue that characterizes the study of emotions and behavior 
in power-to-take game (PTTG) experiments, and whose implications have 
not been so far consider in the literature. More specifically, we study the 
extent to which the punishing behavior observed in previous PTTG 
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experiments is explained by a non-constant “fine-to-fee ratio”1 instead of 
negative emotions, and, in particular, anger, irritation, and contempt. In the 
PTTG, this parameter is in fact increasing with the offence. This means that 
subjects may punish simply because it is cheaper to punish and not because 
they experience negative feelings. Hence, previous PTTG experiments 
might have overstated the role played by negative emotions on the 
punishment decision (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005; 
Ben Shakhar et al., 2007). It is thus important to investigate whether the 
findings of previous studies on the PTTG are driven by this potential 
confound and to what extent the punishment behavior observed can be truly 
attributed to emotions. 
In addition to this, we also investigate the impact of the cultural 
background and experience of the subjects on emotions and behavior in the 
PTTG. The psychological and anthropological literature has in fact shown 
that there are cultural differences in the elicitation and manifestation of 
emotions (see, e.g., Mesquita and Frijda, 1992). In addition, it is reasonable 
to expect that subjects with more experience of the environment and the 
dynamics of laboratory experiments are more aware of what they should 
expect in an economic experiment and, therefore, they might experience less 
strong emotions and/or be better able to cope with their emotional urges 
than inexperienced subjects. The previous literature on the PTTG has not 
examined these important issues. 
To carry out this investigation, we design an experiment, building on 
the 2002 EJ seminal paper by Bosman and van Winden and the following 
literature on the PTTG, where we vary the extent to which the punishment 
technology is characterized by a variable or constant “fine-to-fee” ratio. In 
addition, we run separate sessions for UK students and non-UK students, 
and control, in a systematic way, for the experience of the subjects in our 
statistical analysis. The main findings of the second chapter indicate that a 
large part of the punishment behavior observed in previous PTTG studies is 
explained by the technology of punishment adopted, and that the role played 
by emotions is overstated. When the potential confound is removed from the 
                                                          
1
 The ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is defined as “the income reduction for the targeted subject relative 
to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment” (Casari, 2005:107). 
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punishment technology, negative emotions do still play an important role, 
but much smaller. With respect to the experience and the cultural 
background of the subjects, we find that previous experience mediates how 
contempt impacts on the decision to punish, and that non-UK students 
experience similar emotions to UK students, but generally take more 
resources from the counterpart than UK students. 
In the last chapter of the thesis, we present an experiment aimed at 
measuring the extent to which voters care about the competence and 
trustworthiness of candidates in public elections,
2
 and at establishing 
whether one of these characteristics matters more than the other. Despite the 
topic is very important for both economists and political scientists, whose 
aim is to understand the voters’ decision making in public elections, only 
little attention has been so far paid to how people weigh the two 
characteristics – trustworthiness and competence – that define the quality of 
a public official. In particular, one of the most significant current 
discussions in political economy is whether voters care only about the state 
of the economy when they make their voting decisions. In our experiment, 
we are able to shed light on this by looking at whether there exist any biases 
in the voting behavior of people towards a specific characteristic of the 
candidates or whether people simply favor the contender who provides the 
highest expected payoff, irrespectively of her or his competence or 
trustworthiness. In addition, the results of this study may provide an 
explanation of why democracies may at times suffer from dishonesty and 
corruption at the public level. If people in fact display a rational and profit-
maximizing voting behavior or a preference for competence over 
trustworthiness, the existence of corruption and dishonesty in modern 
democracies may be explained by people's voting preferences. 
To conduct this investigation, we run a lab experiment where we ask 
voters to select a public official, on the competence and trustworthiness of 
which their final payoffs depend. We measure the competence of the 
candidates in a real effort task and their trustworthiness in a trust game, and 
                                                          
2
 We define trustworthiness as the attitude of the potential public official to fulfil the trust 
that her electors have placed on her. Competence refers instead to the ability of the 
potential public official to get the job done. 
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provide this information to voters when they make their voting decision. By 
looking at cases where there is a competence-trustworthiness trade-off, we 
can then measure the extent to which competence and trustworthiness 
matter in electoral decisions. We find that, in general, most voters tend to 
select the candidate rationally, based on who provides the highest expected 
payoff irrespectively of trustworthiness and competence, but there is a bias 
towards caring about trustworthiness when the difference in expected 
payoffs between the two candidates is small enough. The findings of this 
chapter provide evidence of the fact that voters mostly behave rationally and 
care only about their final monetary payoffs quite independently of which 
trade-off between trustworthiness and competence they face. In other words, 
it is the final state of the economy that matters the most for voters. This may 
explain why people may be willing to support untrustworthy candidates and 
why democracies may at times suffer from dishonesty and corruption at the 
public level. When however the candidates are not that dissimilar in terms 
of their contribution to the welfare of the voters, the information about the 
trustworthiness of the candidates becomes crucial to determine which 
candidate will be elected. In these occasions, trustworthiness seems to be the 
aspect that matters more.   
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Chapter 1: What Happens If You Single Out? 
An Experiment
3 
1.  Introduction 
We present the results of an experiment to test the effect of singling 
out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. The act of singling out an 
individual from a group based on his or her socio-economic categories (e.g. 
gender, race, age, income, political view) is a pervasive phenomenon of 
economic and social life. It occurs whenever a subject, who has specific 
attributes that make him or her potentially different from the others, ceases 
to be an ordinary and usual person, and becomes a distinct one in the eyes of 
the other people. More precisely, singling out can be defined as an inter-
group situation in which one group is a singleton group made up of a single 
individual - the singled out individual -, whose social identity is perceived 
as different by a second group that is larger in size.  
Someone can be singled out because he or she possesses some 
desirable qualities; therefore, the status of being singled out can be 
associated with a positive social standing. For instance, in organizational 
and workplace settings, an employee may be object of social recognition or 
appraisal for his or her desirable socio-economic characteristics (e.g. age or 
experience) or because he or she belongs to a privileged group, such as in 
the case, reported by Heikes (1991), of white-male nurses working in all-
female environment. As result, he or she loses the status of ordinary 
member, and acquires a positive aura of uniqueness in the eyes of his or her 
colleagues or superiors. A subject can also be singled out by others because 
he or she possesses undesirable qualities; therefore, the status of being 
singled out can coincide with a negative social standing. In line with the 
previous example, an employee may be singled out by his or her colleagues 
or a superior for reproach or because he or she is disliked within the team or 
belongs to socially disadvantaged minorities, such as women or racial/ethnic 
minorities. The literature in social psychology offers several examples of 
solo or token individuals who have been singled out in the workplace by 
                                                          
3 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Prof. Daniel Zizzo. 
7 
 
colleagues or superiors because of their undesirable qualities (e.g. see 
Kanter, 1977; Yoder and Aniakudo, 1997; Niemann and Dovidio, 1998; 
DePaulo and Morris, 2006). When the status of being singled out is 
attributable to something undesirable about the socio-economic 
characteristics of the subject, the latter may also be object of social 
exclusion, marginalization, stigmatization, negative stereotypes, bullying, 
or, more generally, negative discrimination (e.g. Heatherton et al., 2000; 
Abrams et al., 2005). In other words, the status of being singled out can be a 
precondition for these social mechanisms. 
While in some cases there may be a consensus among the members 
of the group on who is the singled out individual, in others the latter is 
selected by a specific individual, such a manager in an organizational 
setting:
4
 an agent who has the right and power to enforce the status of being 
singled out. 
This chapter presents an experiment designed to test specifically the 
behavioral implications of singling out. We do so in the context of trust 
games. A trust game is a standard stylized setup used in the economic 
literature to study trusting behavior and trustworthiness. Economists are 
aware of the importance that both trust and trustworthiness play in economic 
interactions, especially with respect to the formation of social capital (e.g., 
Putman, 2000). In particular, they reduce the costs of transacting (Frank, 
1988), promote efficiency in markets (Arrow, 1974), improve cooperation 
(Smith et al., 1995) and increase firms’ ability to adapt to complexity and 
change (Korsgaard et al., 1995). Trust and trustworthiness are also 
considered to be “at the core of group life” (Hogg et al., 2005, p. 193). In 
particular, they play a fundamental role in ensuring the stability of a group 
or a team, and, therefore, are important in organizational and workplace 
settings. Anything that perturbs the stability of the group or team may affect 
the way in which the members trust and fulfill each other’s trust. As 
singling out may have important consequences in terms of group and team 
cohesion in organizations, it may then also affect trust and trustworthiness. 
                                                          
4
 Other examples are a teacher in a classroom or a superior in an army force (for instance, 
think of the overweight, and bumbling marine soldier who was named ‘gomer pyle’ by the 
drill instructor, in the Kubrick’s movie Full Metal Jacket). 
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For this reason, the trust game appears to be a natural environment where to 
test, as a starting point, the economic implications of singling a member out 
in a group.  
To test these implications, we artificially induced a status of being 
singled out in the lab. Under a positive frame, the most preferred match in 
the experiment is singled out, whereas, under a negative frame, the least 
preferred match in the experiment is singled out. We controlled for 
identification effects by varying the extent to which the status of being 
singled out could be identified by non-singled out subjects. That is, in 
certain sessions, the singled out individual was identified with a mark (i.e. 
an asterisk), and, therefore, recognizable by the other subjects, whereas in 
other sessions the singled out participant was not marked with an asterisk, 
and, therefore, could not be identified by the other participants. 
Furthermore, we tested the implications of having a random assignation of 
such status under a neutral frame. In particular, rather than having the status 
of being singled out assigned by the participants, it is randomly assigned by 
the computer and, therefore, is not associated to being the least or most 
preferred match. We also investigated the effects of singling a member out 
under a negative frame when one specific individual rather than the whole 
group is responsible of such decision. To check the robustness of our results 
against what we refer as the individual characteristics hypothesis, we tested 
and rejected the possibility that singled out subjects behaved differently 
because of the individual characteristics that made them singled out. As 
such, this study provides evidence of the ‘pure’ effect of singling out an 
individual from a group, controlling for the individual characteristics of the 
singled out individual. 
Our key finding is that singling out individuals has a negligible 
effect on trust and is potentially negative in terms of trustworthiness. More 
specifically, we find that singled out subjects in the negative framework 
return considerably less than non-singled out subjects, probably because 
they do not feel any bond with the other members but anger and resentment 
for the attribution of a lower status. In contrast, the singled out subjects in 
the positive framework display a bimodal behavior, returning either more or 
less, probably depending on whether they perceives themselves as insiders 
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or outsiders. We also find that non-singled out subjects return substantially 
less to the singled out subject but only when they do not feel responsible of 
the distinct status of this person. Finally, we find that trustworthiness 
generally decreases if there is a singled out subject. Section 2 briefly 
reviews some of the related literature. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design. Section 4 presents the alternative behavioral conjectures about the 
implications of singling an individual out. Section 5 reports the main results. 
Section 6 provides a discussion of the findings and concludes. 
2.  Related Literature 
In the economic literature, we did not locate any papers that 
specifically analyze the economic implications of singling an individual out 
based on socio-economic categories.
5
 However, an area of economic 
research somewhat related to our study is the one that examines 
experimentally the impact of group identity. In our experiment, we 
manipulate the social identity and status of one member, the singled out 
subject (and, therefore, indirectly that of the other members, the non-singled 
out subjects), within the reference group, thus creating de facto two 
potential distinct units: a majority group and a singleton group, i.e. a group 
represented by only one individual. Hence, our manipulation may have 
implications in line with the main findings of the economic literature on 
group identity. Although there are several experimental works that looked at 
group identity in economics (e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2002; 
Tan and Bolle, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo, 2009; 
Chen and Chen, 2011), none of them has considered a case of social 
fragmentation like the one implemented in our experiment, in the context of 
                                                          
5
 There is a recent and interesting literature, in particular on public good games, that looked 
at how “conferring status” to one or few members of the group affects plays of the game. 
However, none of these studies considered the implications of a subject being disliked or 
liked, hence singled out by the others, within a group. In particular, in that literature, status 
is usually conferred to subjects who obtained the highest/lowest score in unrelated quizzes, 
and implies additional changes on how, for example, information is transmitted to the 
players (e.g. Eckel et al., 2010); or it is conferred at the end of a play to top contributors as 
a form of incentive to stimulate competition and promote cooperation (e.g. Pan and Houser, 
2011). Other early studies explored more broadly the implications of social status, for 
instance, in markets (e.g. Ball et al., 2001), and bargaining games (e.g. Ball and Eckel, 
1998). However, differently to our study and the literature described above, status was not 
conferred to only one individual but to groups of subjects. 
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a trust game. Two recent papers of this literature are however particularly 
relevant for our study. The first is Tsutsui and Zizzo (forthcoming). In this 
study, the authors investigated the role played by majority versus minority 
groups, and high status versus low status groups in the context of trust 
games.
6
 They observed that minority and low status subjects dislike being in 
such condition, and discriminate generally less. The second study is 
Chakravarty and Fonseca (2012), who studied the effects of social 
fragmentation and group identity on public good contributions. While their 
vehicle of research (i.e. a six-player public good game) differs from the one 
used in our experiment (i.e. a two-player trust game), in one treatment they 
induce a social fragmentation resembling that of our experiment (i.e. one 
subject experiencing solo status). They found that minority group subjects 
contribute more to the public good than majority group and middle-sized 
group subjects.
7
 
Another stream of research that is to some extent related to our study 
is the one that looks at status, social recognition and ranking as a form of 
incentive in organizations (e.g. Eriksson et al., 2012; Neckermann et al, 
2012; Charness et al., forthcoming). This type of mechanisms might evolve 
in or conceal a ‘singling out’ phenomenon insofar as the allocation of the 
immaterial award or the implementation of the ranking is not based solely 
on performance but it is, for example, based on subjective evaluation (see, 
for instance, Neckermann et al., 2012) or the awarded individual starts to be 
perceived differently by the others. All these studies have only considered 
the impact of such managerial tools on performance, without looking at 
their potential side effects (in terms of inducing ‘singling out’) on trust and 
trustworthiness in the workplace. On similar grounds, singling out may be 
also related to leadership, insofar as the leader acquires uniqueness in the 
eyes of the others. Most of the economic literature on leadership focused on 
the implications of having a leader making a public decision (e.g. 
                                                          
6
 The group size varied from 4 subjects (minority) to 8 subjects (majority). Group status 
was manipulated by labeling the high status group in terms of Blue group, whereas the low 
status group in terms of subjects who do not belong to any group (Tsutsui and Zizzo, 
forthcoming). 
7
 These results might be affected by reputational effects. In particular, largely in treatment 
5-1, and weakly in treatment 4-2, minority group individuals are easily detectable even if 
the software randomized the display order of the individual contributions.  
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contribution to a public good) or sending a public message before the 
decisions of the other players (e.g. Güth et al., 2007; Potters et al., 2007; 
Gäcther et al., 2012). Some of these studies also compared different 
mechanisms of appointing the leader (e.g. Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Brandts 
et al., 2011; Arbak and Villeval, 2013). None of these studies have however 
considered the potential implications in terms of group cohesion from 
having a leader whose social identity is perceived as different by his or her 
followers. 
Finally, some of the behavioral implications which might result from 
singling an individual out might also be linked to psychological phenomena 
which has been studied in the psychological research with respect to social 
exclusion/inclusion, marginalization, stigmatization, and stereotyping (for 
an overview of this literature, see Heatherton et al., 2000; Abrams et al., 
2005). This literature usually focuses on attitudes rather than behavior (e.g., 
Sekaquaptewa and Thompson, 2002; Thau et al., 2007), and extensively 
uses deception as a way to manipulate the behavior when the latter is the 
object of interest (e.g., Twenge et al., 2001; Twenge et al. , 2007; Derfler-
Rozin et al., 2010). 
3.  Experimental Design 
A. Outline 
The experiment was conducted between March and July 2011 at the 
University of East Anglia with a total of 324 subjects divided into 54 
sessions; there were 6 subjects per session.
8
 The participants were mostly 
students with a variety of different backgrounds.
9
 The experiment was fully 
computerized with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects 
received both computerized and printed instructions at the beginning of each 
                                                          
8
 We ran sessions with only 6 players in order to have enough variation in characteristics 
between sessions and minimize the possibility that specific characteristics were 
systematically associated to the singled out subject. Further advantages of running the 
sessions with only 6 players were that of reducing the chances of subjects knowing each 
other; minimizing the likelihood of subjects seeing and interacting with each other as they 
arrived, as they were immediately seated, avoiding people queuing at the entrance of the 
lab; and minimizing the likelihood of the subjects seeing each other as they left; partitions 
ensured that subjects did not see each other during the experiment. 
9
 Details of the socioeconomic background of the experimental participants, and 
experimental instructions can be found in the appendix. 
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experimental task. The presentation of the experimental instructions was as 
neutral as possible avoiding terms such “trust”, “truster”, or “trustee”. The 
experiment employed a fictional currency, the experimental credit, which 
was converted to pounds at the end of the experiment at the rate of 20 UK 
pence per experimental credit. Subjects earned on average £11.78 (around 
18-19 US dollars), including a show-up fee of £1.50. Earnings were paid 
privately and anonymously at subjects’ stations at the end of the experiment. 
Each session lasted around 35 minutes. Subjects were allowed to participate 
in no more than one session. 
The experiment consisted of seven treatments, described below: the 
baseline (B), the black sheep treatment (BS), the golden sheep treatment 
(GS), the random sheep treatment (RS), the privately informed black sheep 
treatment (PIBS), the privately informed golden sheep treatment (PIGS), 
and the authority and black sheep treatment (ABS). We ran eight sessions 
per treatment (seven in PIBS and PIGS).  
B. Beginning of the Experiment and Ranking Phase 
In each session, subjects were randomly assigned to computer 
terminals, which were separated by partitions in order to avoid facial or 
verbal communication between subjects. After being assigned to computer 
stations, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire with their personal 
information. In particular, we asked subjects to indicate their gender, age, 
current university status, country of origin, whether their main field of 
studies was related to Economics or not, their religion, whether they used 
Facebook or not, their current relationship status, and whether they smoked 
or not. After completing the questionnaire, subjects received the instructions 
for the first experimental task (i.e. trust game).  
Once everyone had finished reading the instructions, each subject 
was informed about these characteristics for the other participants, and 
asked to rank them according to how much she or he would like to be 
matched with them in the experiment (from the most preferred match to the 
least preferred match).
10
 Without informing the participants ex ante, the 
                                                          
10
 Ties in the ranking were not allowed. 
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computer allocated to each subject a certain number of points corresponding 
to the rank assigned by each other participant to that specific individual (i.e. 
five points for being ranked first, four for being ranked second, and so on), 
and ordered the subjects from the participant with the most points (the most 
preferred match) to the one with the least points (the least preferred 
match).
11
 In other words, the computer applied a Borda count to the 
individual rankings in order to determine a consensus-based preference 
ordering of the participants. 
A disadvantage of the Borda count is that it may induce strategic 
behaviors or a false revelation of own preferences. This is not a problem in 
our experiment because subjects were not informed ex ante about the 
aggregation procedure and why they had to rank the other participants (i.e. 
selection of the singled out subject). Furthermore, we are not interested in 
the results of the Borda count per se, but only as a framing tool to induce 
singling out.   
C. The Baseline (B) Treatment 
The experimental treatments differed in what followed the ranking 
phase.
12
 We first describe the B treatment. After all the subjects submitted 
their rankings, they were not told how the computer processed these data. 
The participants simply proceeded to the next phase. In particular, they 
filled in a control questionnaire designed to check their understanding of the 
instructions. Clarifications were individually given to subjects with incorrect 
answers. The experimental task was a standard Berg et al. (1995)’s trust 
game. In this set-up, a truster (the first mover) must decide how much to 
invest/keep of an endowment X (48 experimental credits in our case). 
Calling the amount invested T, the investment gives 3 × T. This 
investment's return is sent to the trustee (the second mover) who must 
decide how to share the received amount with the truster. If she keeps Y, the 
total payoffs will be (X – T) + 3 × T – Y, for the truster, and Y for the 
trustee, respectively. T measures the amount of trust, 3 × T – Y measures 
                                                          
11
 Ties in the ranking were dealt with by the computer with a random draw. 
12
 A critical reader might argue that the ranking phase might change later trust game play. 
However, all we are interested in this chapter is across-treatment differences, and these 
cannot be explained by the ranking phase, which equally preceded all treatments. 
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trust fulfilling and therefore, trustworthiness. There were 4 rounds of the 
trust game. In each round, each subject was matched with a different co-
participant (absolute stranger matching). In this way, we avoided reputation 
building, which could stem from re-matching the same subjects more than 
once. Each subject was also randomly assigned the role of trustee for half 
the time and truster for the other half. The randomness of the order in which 
roles were assigned to subjects enabled us to rule out any effect due to 
playing first as truster or trustee. In addition, any across-treatment 
differences cannot be explained by the fact that individuals played both 
roles since this equally occurred in all treatments. No information about a 
co-participant (e.g. participant’s ID, gender, nationality, and so on) was 
revealed to the subjects. At the end of each round, each subject was 
informed about the decision of the counterpart and the experimental credits 
that he or she could earn if the round were to be selected for the payment. 
Once subjects completed this experimental task, a new set of 
instructions for an incentivized individual task was given. This new task 
was a standard Holt and Laury (2002) questionnaire in the domain of 
gains.
13
 The aim of the task was to measure risk attitude by counting the 
number of times subjects chose the safer option. The task details are in the 
experimental instructions. A further questionnaire was then given, in two 
parts. The first part was the 17-item Social Desirability Scale (Stöber, 
2001). This scale measures the desire to present oneself in a positive light. 
For each item of the scale, a subject has to decide if the statement describes 
himself/herself or not (true-or-false type of scale). The second part of the 
questionnaire was the Rosemberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale, widely used in 
psychology to measure state self-esteem. For each of the ten items of the 
scale, a subjects has to indicate how much he or she agree with the 
statement on a four-point scale (from strongly agrees to strongly disagree). 
Final payments were based on the earnings of one randomly chosen trust 
game round, plus the earnings from the Holt and Laury (2002) task. 
 
                                                          
13
 Houser et al. (2010) found no evidence for order effects from having the Holt and Laury 
task played after the trust game  and vice versa. 
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D. Other Treatments 
Now we turn to the description of the other treatments. These were 
identical to the B treatment except in what follows. In the black sheep (BS 
treatment), after all the subjects submitted their rankings, the computer 
explained how it processed these data to determine which one was 
considered the least preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant 
that everyone else least wanted to interact with in the experiment. Subjects 
were also told that whenever a participant was matched with the least 
preferred match during the experiment, the least preferred match would be 
identified with a mark (i.e. an asterisk). The real identity of the least 
preferred match was not revealed at any point of the experiment.
14
 Through 
this procedure, we artificially induced an identifiable status of being singled 
out which was based on consensually undesirable attributes.  
The golden sheep (GS) treatment was similar to the BS treatment 
except that the computer explained how it processed the data on the 
individual rankings to determine which participant was considered the most 
preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant that everyone else 
most wanted to interact with in the experiment. Each subject was then 
informed whether he or she was the most preferred match. The most 
preferred match was identified with an asterisk during the trust game. In 
contrast to the BS treatment, the aim of the GS treatment was to induce an 
artificial identifiable status of being singled out which was based on 
consensually desirable attributes. 
In the privately informed black sheep, PIBS (privately informed 
golden sheep, PIGS), treatment, after the ranking phase, the computer 
informed the subjects about how the least (most) preferred match was 
selected from the individual rankings, and told the least (most) preferred 
match about his or her status. However, the singled out participant was not 
                                                          
14
 Our subjects were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) from the UEA 
subject pool of over 1,000 potential participants, thus ensuring a systematic randomization 
of the participants while at the same time minimizing the probability that among the 6 
subjects there were acquaintances that could pick up on specific combinations of 
characteristics to identify co-participants. Importantly, while information was provided on 
subjects during the ranking phase, once a singled out subject was picked up, we did not 
reveal his or her individual characteristics on the screen. Overall, there is therefore good 
reason to believe that subjects did not know who the singled out subject was. 
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marked with an asterisk during the experiment. In other words, the singled 
out subject could not be identified by the other participants during the trust 
game. This treatment was designed to disentangle the “pure” effect of being 
singled out, which comes from the personal recognition of the singled out 
subject to be consensually disliked (liked), from the effect of being 
identifiable as the singled out subject by the others.  
In the authority and black sheep (ABS) treatment, after the ranking 
phase, the computer informed the subjects that the individual ranking of one 
randomly selected participant from the experiment (i.e. the authority) 
determined who was considered the least preferred match in the experiment. 
In particular, the least preferred match was the participant that the authority 
least wanted to interact with in the experiment according to his or her 
individual ranking. As in the BS treatment, the least preferred match was 
identified with an asterisk. Subjects were also told whether they were the 
authority or not, and that the authority could not be matched with the least 
preferred match during the experiment. This is because we wanted to isolate 
the behavioral reaction of the singled out subject towards those who were 
not responsible of his or her status. Note that in the ABS treatment we were 
not interested in identifying and inducing a real status of being authority. 
Indeed, what we refer as the authority is simply an individual randomly 
selected by the computer.  Here, we simply wanted to investigate the effects 
of singling a member out, under a negative frame, when a specific 
individual rather than the whole group is responsible of such decision. This 
treatment, together with the RS treatment, enabled us to test the implications 
on trust and trustworthiness of shifting the responsibility for the condition of 
the singled out individual to someone else. 
Finally, in the random sheep (RS) treatment, subjects were simply 
told that one of them was going to be randomly singled out by the computer 
and identified with an asterisk for the rest of the experiment. Hence, here the 
status of being singled out was not associated to a negative or a positive 
social standing. This treatment was designed to pick up the effect of a 
random attribution of distinctiveness under a neutral frame, and when no 
participant was responsible for such attribution. 
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As noted earlier, these treatments were identical to the B treatment 
except for the points noted above, e.g. subjects filled in an initial control 
questionnaire designed to check their understanding of the instructions, and 
had a Holt and Laury (2002) and a psychological questionnaire at the end. 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of our treatments. In BS, we 
artificially induced a negative identifiable status of being singled out in 
order to study its implications on trust and trust fulfilling within a group of 
individuals. GS was identical to BS except that we artificially induced a 
positive identifiable status of being singled out. In PIBS and PIGS, we 
controlled for the possible effect that being identifiable as singled out 
subject has on the behavior of this latter individual. In other words, we 
removed the effect of identification. RS tested whether the identification 
mark per se affects the behavior of the singled out subject, when no other 
subject is responsible for his or her status. Finally, in ABS we investigated 
the implications of having a singled out member within a group of subjects 
when a specific subject is the only one to blame for the status of the singled 
out individual. 
Table 1: Features of the Experimental Treatments 
Treatment Sessions Asterisk Social standing Being responsible 
B 8 NO NO - 
BS 8 YES Negative YES 
GS 8 YES Positive YES 
RS 8 YES Neutral NO 
PIBS 7 NO Negative YES 
PIGS 7 NO Positive YES 
ABS 8 YES Negative NO 
4. Behavioral conjectures 
To understand the consequences of singling an agent out, we 
consider the following individual’s utility function that linearly depends on 
the own (  ) and counterpart’s (  ) monetary payoffs:
15
  
 
  (     )            
                                                          
15
 This utility function was proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002) to capture social 
preferences and extended by Chen and Li (2009) to incorporate group identity.  
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   and    are the weights that the individual puts on the own and 
counterpart’s payoffs respectively, with        . We assume that the 
weight that the individual places on the own payoffs depends on a series of 
elements (e.g. fairness, reciprocity) including the social distance of the two 
individuals, by which we mean the degree of demographic similarity 
between the two agents (Buchan et al., 2006).
16
  
To formalize this, let    be the social distance of the individual with 
respect to the counterpart and   all other elements that affects the weight. 
We can rewrite the utility function as 
  (     )    (     )        (     )    
where wO /IO ≤ 0 and wO /O ≥ 0 for any IO  and O. O is a 
parameter that captures the distribution and other-regarding preferences of 
the individual, other than those related to social distance. O can, for 
example, identify the charity concern of the individual when his or her 
payoff is higher than his or her counterpart's payoff or the envy when his or 
her payoff is lower than his or her counterpart's payoff (see Charness and 
Rabin, 2002; Chen and Li, 2009); it can also capture reciprocity concerns. If 
wO /O = 0, the individual does not care about other-regarding preferences 
not captured by IO. 
If wO /IO = 0, the individual does not care about social distance; 
the more negative wO /IO is, the more the individual cares about social 
distance and the more he or she will weigh the own payoff compared to the 
counterpart’s payoff. In terms of our manipulation, this means that non-
singled out subjects will weigh the payoff of the singled out subject less 
compared to other non-singled out individuals. This is because they will 
perceive the singled out subject as socially distant from them. As a result, 
non-singled out subjects will treat the singled out subject worse than other 
                                                          
16
 Two individuals may differ in many demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, 
ethnicity, social status, class, etc. Social distance captures the extent to which they are 
overall different. It can be also measured in terms of group identity (Charness et al., 2007; 
Buchan et al., 2006). In particular, two individuals are socially closer if they belong to the 
same social group and more distant if they do not belong to the same group (Buchan et al., 
2006).  
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individuals (see, for example, Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009), especially 
if the subject is singled out because of his or her undesirable qualities. At 
the same time, the presence of a singled out subject will strengthen the 
feelings of in-group inclusion of the other members (Pickett and Brewer, 
2005), thus inducing reciprocal favoritism among those individuals. 
Similarly, the member who has been singled out will give and return less 
compared to other individuals because he or she no longer feels any bond 
with the other members. Hence, the first two conjectures (social distance 
conjectures) are as follows. 
Conjecture 1. When the condition of singled out is made salient, 
non-singled out members will give and return less (more) to the singled out 
individual (to other non-singled out individuals). 
Conjecture 2. The singled out individual will be less trusting and 
trustworthy compared to other individuals. 
Conjecture 1 may be sensitive to whether the responsibility of 
singling a member out is attributable or not to the non-singled out individual 
interacting with the singled out member. In particular, in the former case, 
non-singled out subjects might experience guilt and distress for the singled 
out subject’s condition. This is what Charness (2000, p. 375), in a different 
context, called the responsibility-alleviation effect, i.e. a mitigation of 
“internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity” because of 
“shifting the responsibility for an outcome to an external authority”. In the 
context of singling out, this means that non-singled out individuals, who can 
be held responsible for the condition of the singled out individual, might 
feel guilty, and, therefore, less inclined to treat him or her worse than the 
others. In other words, this psychological effect counterbalances the effect 
of perceiving the singled out individual as an outsider (Conjecture 1). The 
result is that, when the non-singled out individuals can be held responsible 
for the status of the singled out individual, the two effects may cancel out 
and therefore we should observe no discrimination. On the other hand, when 
they cannot be held responsible, there is no guilt involved, and, therefore, 
we should observe negative discrimination that stems from perceiving the 
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singled out individual as an outsider. Hence, in complement to Conjecture 1, 
we also consider the following conjecture (responsibility conjecture). 
Conjecture 3. Non-singled out members interacting with the singled 
out individual will give and return less to him/her than non-singled out 
individuals, only when they are not responsible for his or her condition. 
In opposition to Conjecture 2, it is also possible that the member, 
who has been singled out because of his or her undesirable qualities, will 
trust and fulfill trust more in order to demonstrate his or her social value to 
the others. Such behavior would be consistent with some studies in social 
psychology showing that individuals who are at the risk of exclusion engage 
in pro-social behavior in order to reconnect with the others (e.g. Derfler-
Rozin et al., 2010). In terms of our utility function, this means that the 
individual who is consensually disliked in the group will weigh the payoff 
of the counterpart more than other individuals will do. In a similar fashion 
but for a different reason, the weight that the consensually liked member put 
on the payoff of the counterpart may be larger than the weight put by other 
members. This is because he or she may perceive his or her relationship 
with the others as an intra-group relationship where he or she fulfill a 
special role, with a greater responsibility for the wealth of the group due to 
the higher status’ attribution. Hence, consistently with some of the findings 
of the psychological research on leadership theory (e.g. Hogg, 2001), the 
positively singled out individual may display in-group favoritism towards 
the other individuals and, therefore, be less selfish or adopt pro-social 
behaviors. Taking these considerations into account, we can devise the 
following conjecture, opposed to Conjecture 2, regarding the behavior of the 
singled out individual (social standing conjecture): 
Conjecture 4. The negatively (positively) singled out individual will 
be more trusting and trustworthy compared to other individuals. 
Note that all the aforementioned conjectures are related to the pure 
effect of singling out and abstract from the individual characteristics of the 
singled out individuals. As our experiment induces the status of being 
singled out artificially, we are able to provide a powerful test of these 
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conjectures ruling out any explanations that stem from the particular 
individual characteristics of the singled out individual. In particular, we can 
test for Conjecture 1, by comparing the behavior of non-singled out subjects 
towards the singled out individual and other non-singled subjects with the 
behavior of baseline subjects. If Conjecture 1 is sensitive to the 
responsibility-alleviation effect (Conjecture 3), we should observe a drop in 
trust and/or trustworthiness of non-singled out subjects towards the singled 
out individual only in ABS and RS. Finally, Conjectures 2 and 4 can be 
tested by looking at the behavior of the singled out subject compared to 
baseline subjects. On this respect, our control treatments PIBS and PIGS 
allow us to test the “pure” effect of being singled out, removing any effects 
that stem from being identifiable as the singled out subject by the others. 
5.  Experimental Results 
A. Bivariate Tests 
Our focus in this chapter is on the results of the trust games.
17
 The 
giving rate identifies the proportion of endowment that the truster transfers 
to the trustee, while the return rate measures the amount returned by the 
trustee to the truster as a fraction of the total amount received from the 
truster (i.e. three times the amount given by the truster). 
Cooperation towards singled out subjects (Conjectures 1 and 3). 
Tables 2 and 3 show average giving and return rates for each experimental 
treatment, while Figure 1 displays giving and return rates for each 
experimental treatment. Note that, while Table 3 provides information on 
most and least preferred subjects in the baseline for comparison with the 
other treatments, most and least preferred subjects in this treatment were not 
singled out.   
 
 
                                                          
17 
We have also analyzed matching preferences as revealed in our unincentivized initial 
ranking phase. These are presented in the appendix. Throughout the chapter, except where 
otherwise specified, session averages are used as the unit of observation for bivariate 
statistical tests (the reported p values are two tailed), and individual averages as the unit of 
observation for the regression analysis.
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Table 2: Giving and return rates to singled out and non-singled out 
 B BS GS RS PIBS PIGS ABS Tot. 
Giving rate 0.400 0.387 0.398 0.402 0.367 0.405 0.400 0.394 
To  Singled Out -- 0.354 0.318 0.284 -- -- 0.387 0.336 
To  non-Singled Out* -- 0.422 0.421 0.456 -- -- 0.432 0.414 
Return Rate 0.244 0.138 0.210 0.204 0.162 0.195 0.184 0.191 
To  Singled Out -- 0.216 0.198 0.142 -- -- 0.100 0.165 
To non-Singled Out* -- 0.147 0.212 0.201 -- -- 0.246 0.206 
Notes: *Giving/return rate of non-singled out subjects to non-singled out subjects. Tot.: 
Total. 
Table 3: Giving and return rates from singled out, non-singled out, and authority 
 
B BS GS RS PIBS PIGS ABS Tot. 
Giving rate 0.400 0.387 0.398 0.402 0.367 0.405 0.400 0.394 
From ‘Singled Out’* 0.500a 0.413b 0.280 0.385 0.307 0.412 0.329 0.387 0.349 
From non-Singled Out** -- 0.422 0.421 0.456 0.358 0.420 0.432 0.414 
From Authority -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.331 0.331 
Return rate 0.244 0.138 0.210 0.204 0.162 0.195 0.184 0.191 
From ‘Singled Out’ 0.320a 0.283b 0.037 0.211 0.260 0.073 0.204 0.211 0.164 
From non-Singled Out** -- 0.147 0.212 0.201 0.185 0.193 0.246 0.206 
From Authority -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.078 0.078 
Notes: *Giving rate from most preferred and least preferred subjects to non-singled out 
subjects; most preferred or least preferred subjects were singled out in all treatments except 
the B treatment, for which values are provided as controls. **Giving/return rate of non-
singled out subjects to non-singled out subjects. 
a
 Giving/return rate from the least preferred 
baseline subject. 
b
 Giving/return rate from the most preferred baseline subject. Tot.: Total. 
B = baseline. 
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Figure 1: Giving and return rates by session per each treatment  
 
Notes: the middle bar refers to the median value; the edges of the box correspond to the 25
th
 
and 75
th
 percentile; whiskers extend to 1.5 times the inter-quartile range; circles identify 
any other observation. 
 
Result 1. Subjects who have not been singled out gave less on 
average to singled out than non-singled out individuals, in all the treatments 
where the status of being “singled out” was revealed to all the participants 
(BS, GS, RS and ABS).  
Result 1 achieves statistical significance (Wilcoxon p = 0.011) in 
aggregate, and in the RS treatment where the difference is largest (Wilcoxon 
p = 0.036). This preliminary evidence for Conjecture 1 will be verified in 
the regression analysis presented later. 
Turning to the return rate, there is no evidence of discrimination in 
aggregate (Wilcoxon p = 0.399). A closer examination of the RS and ABS 
treatments suggests that return rates in the two treatments exhibit a similar 
pattern. We find no statistically significant evidence of a different mean 
return rate to singled out subjects between the two treatments (Mann-
Whitney p = 0.676). The singled out subject is selected by the computer (i.e. 
through a random draw) in RS, and by the authority (i.e. the participant 
whose individual ranking determined who was considered the least 
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preferred match) in ABS: in both treatments subjects matched with the 
singled out individual were not responsible for her/his status.  
To test the responsibility conjecture (Conjecture 3), we analyzed the 
mean return rate of RS and ABS sessions pooled together. In 10 out of 15 
sessions of RS and ABS,
18
 the mean return rate was lower when interacting 
with a singled out than with a not singled out subject (Wilcoxon p = 0.038). 
In contrast, the mean return rate to singled out subjects did not differ from 
the mean return rate to non-singled subjects in both BS and GS treatment 
(Wilcoxon p = 0.176 and 0.866 respectively). This analysis leads to the 
following result that supports the responsibility conjecture with respect to 
trustworthiness. 
Result 2. There is preliminary evidence that, when subjects were not 
responsible of the distinct status of the singled out individual, they were less 
trustworthy towards him or her. When they were responsible, 
trustworthiness was the same as towards non-singled out subjects.  
Of course, the return rate may depend on the amount sent by the 
truster, i.e. the giving rate of the trustee’s counterpart. This is because of 
several psychological reasons such as inequality aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999), reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), and trust 
responsiveness (Guerra and Zizzo, 2004). This problem will be controlled 
for in the regression analysis presented later in the chapter. 
We can compare giving and return rates towards singled out and 
non-singled out subjects
19
 against giving and return rates in the B treatment 
in order to determine whether the discrimination is positive or negative, i.e. 
whether they are treated better or worse than baseline subjects. The 
aggregate mean giving rate to singled out subjects did not differ from that in 
the B treatment (Mann-Whitney p = 0.417). This result is also robust across 
treatments. The aggregate mean return rate to singled out subjects did not 
                                                          
18
 One session displayed identical mean return rates, whereas four sessions displayed higher 
mean return rates when interacting with a singled out individual. Note also that one 
observation in the RS treatment is missing because in one session the singled out individual 
did not trust at all the other subjects. This explains why we have 15 observations instead of 
16.   
19
 Giving and return rates towards non-singled out individuals do not include those from 
singled out individuals. 
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differ in aggregate from that in the B treatment (Mann-Whitney p = 0.214). 
However, if we compare the mean return rates of RS and ABS with the 
return rates of the B treatment, we mildly reject the hypothesis that return 
rates to singled out subjects are the same as in the baseline (Mann-Whitney 
p = 0.059). This will be investigated further in the regression analysis since, 
as noted earlier, the return rate may depend on the giving rate received by 
the trustee. 
Behavior of singled out subjects (Conjectures 2 and 4). We now 
consider the behavior of singled out subjects. A first result concerns the 
trusting behavior of singled out subjects. In 30 out of 46 sessions mean 
giving rates from singled out subjects were lower than non-singled out 
subjects (Wilcoxon p = 0.040).  
Result 3. In aggregate, there is evidence that singled out subjects 
trust other people less than non-singled out subjects. 
Relatively to trust, this preliminary result appears to support 
Conjecture 2 against Conjecture 4. Also note that, as shown from Table 3, 
least and most preferred subjects in the B treatment did not exhibit this 
pattern,
20
 which is consistent with Result 3 as in this treatment most and 
least preferred subjects were not singled out.  
We do not detect any statistically significant difference in mean 
return rates between singled out and non-singled out subjects (Wilcoxon p = 
0.214). As shown by Figure 1 (Panel D), two different behavioral patterns 
seem at work respectively in BS and PIBS treatments, and GS and PIGS 
treatments relative to the return rate of singled out subjects.
21
 There is 
preliminary evidence that singled out least preferred matches returned 
significantly less than subjects who had not been singled out (Wilcoxon p = 
0.003)
22
 and baseline subjects  (Mann-Whitney p = 0.004), including 
                                                          
20
  If we focus on the baseline subjects, and compare the behavior of both the least and most 
preferred baseline matches with the behavior of the other baseline participants, we do not 
detect any statistically significant difference in mean giving rates (Wilcoxon p = 0.161 and 
0.263 respectively). 
21
  Return rates in BS and PIBS display a similar pattern (Mann-Whitney p = 0.464), as do 
the return rates in GS and PIGS (Mann-Whitney p = 0.952). 
22
 This result is robust if we conduct a test on each treatment separately. The Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks p-values are respectively 0.017 and 0.063 for BS and PIBS.  
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specifically baseline least preferred matches (Mann-Whitney p = 0.002); 
they also returned less than subjects in RS (Mann-Whitney p = 0.009) and 
ABS sessions (Mann-Whitney p = 0.007).  
Result 4. Least preferred singled out matches, i.e. singled out 
subjects under a negative frame, return significantly less than non-singled 
out subjects. 
Result 4 is in contrast to Conjecture 4 but in line with Conjecture 2. 
In contrast, differences in central tendency between the return rates of the 
most preferred matches and those of non-singled out subjects were not 
significant (Wilcoxon p = 0.798). Equally, there is no evidence that mean 
return rates from the most preferred matches in GS and PIGS treatments 
were different from the mean return rate of the B treatment (Mann-Whitney 
p = 0.696), nor from other treatments (Mann-Whitney p > 0.100). Hence, we 
would be tempted to reject both Conjectures 2 and 4. However, a closer look 
at the distribution of the mean return rates (Figure 2) reveals why the 
statistical tests for GS and PIGS provide null results. In BS and PIBS 
singled out subjects display only low return rates (between 0 and 0.117 in 
BS, and 0 and 0.167 in PIBS), while Figure 2 shows a different, bimodal 
pattern for GS and PIGS, with either high or low return rates.
23
 We can 
therefore derive the following result, which, relatively to trustworthiness, 
appears to partially support both Conjectures 2 and 4. 
Result 5. Most preferred singled out matches, i.e. singled out 
subjects under a positive frame, behave bimodally, with either high or low 
return rates.  
Result 5 implies that the variance of return rates of most preferred 
matches should be higher than that of return rates of baseline subjects; 
Siegel-Tukey tests support this (p = 0.007).
24
 Conversely, return rates 
variance by least preferred matches (BS and PIBS) is not statistically 
                                                          
23
 BS and PIBS return rates have a standard deviation respectively of 0.049 and 0.082, 
while in B return rates are smoothly distributed between 0.042 and 0.392 with a standard 
deviation of 0.125. In contrast, the return rates lie between 0 and 0.483 in GS and between 
0 and 0.5 in PIGS, with a standard deviation respectively of 0.224 and 0.226. 
24
 A treatment-by-treatment comparison gives similar results (the p-values are 0.001 and 
0.076 for respectively B versus GS and B versus PIGS). 
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different from that in the B treatment (p = 0.271),
25
 and equally the variance 
of return rates by most preferred subjects in the B treatment does not differ 
from that of other baseline subjects (p = 0.164).  
Figure 2: Frequencies of Return Rates From Singled Out Subjects 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 A treatment-by-treatment comparison again gives similar results (the p-values are 0.561 
and 0.611 for respectively B versus BS and B versus PIBS). 
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Behavior of authorities. In the ABS treatment, the mean giving rate 
of authorities did not significantly differ from the mean giving rate of 
singled out subjects (Wilcoxon p = 0.575) or of non-singled subjects 
(Wilcoxon p = 0.327). In contrast, we do have evidence that authorities 
returned significantly less than singled out subjects (Wilcoxon p = 0.068) 
and non-singled out subjects (Wilcoxon p = 0.030). Furthermore, while the 
mean giving rate of authorities did not differ from the baseline (Mann-
Whitney p = 0.401), we do find strongly significant evidence of lower return 
rates from authorities relative to the baseline (Mann-Whitney p = 0.045). 
Result 6. There is preliminary evidence that the subject randomly 
assigned the role of authority returned significantly less because of being 
assigned to the role of authority. 
B. Regression Analysis 
In the regression analysis we treat each individual as the unit of 
observation.
26
 We employ Tobit regressions
27
 with clustered robust standard 
errors in order to control for the possible non-independence of the 
observations within a same session.
28
 Regressions 1-2 in Table 4 and 
regressions 3-4 in Table 5 use the mean giving and return rate respectively 
to non-singled out subjects as dependent variable, while regressions 5-6 in 
Table 6 and regressions 7-8 in Table 7 use respectively the giving and return 
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 The i observation on the giving/return rate corresponds to the average giving/return rate 
of the i-th subject over the two rounds of the trust game where the subject played as 
truster/trustee (note from the design section that each subject played two times in the role of 
truster and two times in the role of trustee in a random order). We use individual averages 
in order to control for the non-independence of the observations at individual level. Note in 
fact that we have two potential levels of non-independence: at individual and session level. 
By taking the individual mean giving and return rates, we control for the first. This 
simplifies our estimation, reducing potential endogeneity issues and providing more 
comparable results with previous studies (e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Tsustui 
and Zizzo, in press). In the appendix, we also report the results of Tobit regressions with 
clustered robust standard errors at subject level or session level, and multilevel mixed-
effects linear regressions, where the unit of observation is the round. The results of these 
regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported in the chapter. However, they do not 
fully control for the non-independence of the observations or the censored nature of the 
data, leaving the regressions reported in the chapter as a better estimation option. 
27
 Giving and return rates lie between 0 and 1.  
28
 We have also conducted random effects regressions, which however, generally failed to 
pass the Hausman diagnostic test. The only regressions that did pass the Hausman 
diagnostic test are on the giving rate to non-singled out and singled out subjects. Their 
results broadly replicate those in the chapter.  
29 
 
rate to singled out subjects.
29
 This distinction between giving/return rate to 
non-singled out subjects and giving/return rate to singled out subjects allows 
us to test whether singled out subjects discriminate against non-singled out 
subjects and/or the reverse relative to the Baseline treatment. In particular, 
they allow us to separate individual decisions made when a subject was 
matched with a singled out individual and with a non-singled out individual. 
The regressions employ dummy variables for the experimental 
treatments, either individually (BS = 1 for BS treatment observations, and 
similarly for GS, RS, PIBS, PIGS and ABS) or in combination (RS+ABS = 
1 for RS or ABS treatments observations,
30
 and similarly for BS + PIBS and 
for GS + PIGS). In regressions 2 and 4 we use a single dummy variable 
(“All Treatments”) for all treatments with a singled out subject; in 
regressions 6 and 8 we employ a single dummy variable (“Asterisk”) for all 
treatments where the singled out was identified by an asterisk. In 
regressions 1-4 we also employ dummy variables, one for each treatment, 
which take value 1 if the subject was a singled out subjects in BS and PIBS 
or alternatively in GS and PIGS;
31
 we also use a further dummy variable for 
the authority (Authority = 1 for authorities). In the return rate regressions 
(Table 5 and 7), an extra explanatory variable is the giving rate received by 
the trustee.
32
 All the regressions include demographic variables, such as age, 
gender (=1 for men), economics background (=1 if applicable), nationality 
(UK=1 for UK subjects, and India =1 for Indian subjects), religion 
(Christian = 1 for Christian subjects, Muslim = 1 for Muslim subjects), 
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 Note that each subject could not interact with a singled out individual (or any other 
subject) more than once. Hence, each observation of regressions 7-8, in a treatment where 
the singled out was identified by an asterisk, is not an average across two rounds but 
corresponds to the giving/return rate of a non-singled out subject interacting with a singled 
out subject. 
30
 The singled out subject was selected by the computer (i.e. through a random draw) in RS, 
and by the authority (i.e. the participant whose individual ranking determined who was 
considered the least preferred match) in ABS: in both treatments subjects matched with the 
singled out individual were not responsible for her/his status. In a bivariate test, we find no 
statistically significant evidence of a different mean giving/return rate to singled out 
subjects between the two treatments (Mann-Whitney p > 0.1). Hence, we employ a unique 
dummy to identify both RS and ABS treatment in regressions 5 and 7 (i.e. giving and return 
rate to singled out subjects). 
31
  Giving/return rates of singled out subjects in BS and PIBS display a similar pattern 
(Mann-Whitney p > 0.1), as do the giving/return rates in GS and PIGS (Mann-Whitney p > 
0.1).  
32
 As we already pointed out, the return rate may depend on the amount sent by the truster, 
i.e. the giving rate of the trustee’s counterpart.  
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whether the subject smokes or not (Smoker = 1 for smoker subjects), 
whether the subject is a MPhil/PhD student or not (PhD = 1 for MPhil/PhD 
students) and relationship status (Single = 1 for subjects who were not in a 
relationship or were unmarried), and psychological measures (i.e. social 
desirability, self-esteem, and risk attitude).
33
 In the regressions of Table 5, 
we added interaction terms between Authority and the psychological 
measures.
34
  
Table 4. If we first consider the findings regarding the giving rate to 
non-singled out subjects, none of the treatment dummies is statistically 
significant. Among the dummy variables identifying the giving rates from 
singled out subjects, none of them is statistically significant. This brings us 
to the following result that does not seem to support Conjecture 1 with 
respect to trusting behavior.  
Result 7. The presence of singled out subjects did not affect mean 
giving rates to non-singled out subjects. 
Table 5. Turning to the return rate to non-singled out subjects, and 
in line with previous findings on trust games, the giving rate from the truster 
are found to positively affect the return rate of the trustee (p = 0.000). We 
also replicate our previous findings that the least preferred match, in line 
with Conjecture 2, and the authority returned significantly less than other 
subjects (p  <  0.01).  
 
 
                                                          
33
 We do not introduce a dummy variable for Facebook use since only 7 subjects out of 324 
in our sample stated that they do not use Facebook. Also, since the risk elicitation task was 
administered at the end of the experiment, it is possible that subjects made more or less 
risky choices depending on their expected earnings obtained in the trust game. If such a 
bias exists, we should observe a correlation between our measure of risk aversion and the 
expected payoffs from the trust game. However, this correlation is low and not significant 
(Spearman ρ = 0.013, p = 0.818). Hence, we conclude that there is no evidence of 
systematic bias in measuring risk aversion. Finally, we have also tried other specifications 
where we have included interactions of the dummies for most and least preferred subjects 
with dummies related to those attributes (i.e. UK, single, PhD) which were more likely to 
characterize least and most preferred subjects (see section E of the appendix, and section 4 
of the chapter). None of these interaction terms resulted significant. 
34
 In all the regressions, all the psychological variables as well as the ‘Trust Rate as 
Trustee’ variable are centered in order to control for the high correlation between the 
independent variables. In other words, we subtract the mean from every observation. For a 
discussion, see Marquardt (1980). 
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Table 4: Regressions on Giving Rate to non-singled out subjects 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
 
b se p b se p 
All Treatments 
   
-0.01 0.1 0.919 
BS+PIBS -0.059 0.11 0.594 
   
GS+PIGS 0.016 0.11 0.887 
   
RS 0 0.12 0.997 
   
ABS 0.022 0.11 0.847 
   
Singled out in RS -0.081 0.08 0.301 -0.066 0.12 0.585 
Singled out in ABS -0.001 0.07 0.984 0.031 0.08 0.684 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.02 0.12 0.868 -0.066 0.12 0.576 
Singled out in GS and PIGS -0.098 0.06 0.128 -0.071 0.08 0.36 
Selector -0.103 0.15 0.494 -0.073 0.13 0.579 
Risk Aversion -0.005 0.01 0.596 -0.007 0.01 0.496 
SDS17 Score -0.015 0.01 0.117 -0.015 0.01 0.12 
RSE Score -0.004 0 0.37 -0.004 0 0.408 
Age 0.009 0.01 0.175 0.009 0.01 0.16 
Gender 0.037 0.04 0.321 0.033 0.04 0.385 
Economics 
-
0.113** 
0.05 0.022 
-
0.111** 
0.05 0.027 
UK -0.051 0.05 0.268 -0.053 0.05 0.251 
India 
-
0.206**
* 
0.07 0.002 
-
0.199**
* 
0.07 0.003 
Christian -0.07* 0.04 0.087 -0.076* 0.04 0.056 
Muslim 
-
0.334**
** 
0.09 0 
-
0.333**
** 
0.09 0 
Single 0.084* 0.04 0.051 0.089** 0.04 0.041 
Smoker 0.019 0.08 0.804 0.029 0.08 0.705 
PhD 0.035 0.08 0.651 0.037 0.08 0.64 
Constant 0.221 0.19 0.253 0.228 0.18 0.212 
Obs 324 
  
324 
  
Pseudo R-sqr 0.091 
  
0.086 
  
Df 302 
  
305 
  
Prob > F 0 
  
0 
  
Notes: Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,* ** 
p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
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Table 5: Regressions on Return Rate to non-singled out subjects 
 Regression 3 Regression 4 
 b se p b se p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.406**** 0.06 0.000 0.409**** 0.06 0.000 
All Treatments    -0.076* 0.04 0.052 
BS+PIBS -0.107** 0.05 0.026    
GS+PIGS -0.078* 0.05 0.091    
RS -0.041 0.06 0.487    
ABS -0.047 0.07 0.496    
Singled out in RS 0.105 0.11 0.359 0.143 0.10 0.141 
Singled out in ABS 0.109 0.13 0.398 0.138 0.10 0.185 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.129*** 0.05 0.007 -0.160*** 0.05 0.001 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.064 0.08 0.420 0.060 0.07 0.418 
Authority -0.170**** 0.05 0.000 -0.143**** 0.04 0.001 
Risk Aversion 0.004 0.01 0.574 0.002 0.01 0.742 
SDS17 Score -0.005 0.01 0.379 -0.006 0.01 0.332 
RSE Score -0.007* 0.00 0.094 -0.006 0.00 0.127 
Authority ×SDS17 0.048*** 0.02 0.003 0.048*** 0.02 0.002 
Authority ×RSE 0.004 0.01 0.471 0.003 0.01 0.514 
Authority ×Risk Aversion -0.008 0.02 0.653 -0.006 0.02 0.711 
Age 0.003 0.01 0.630 0.003 0.00 0.594 
Gender 0.011 0.03 0.718 0.009 0.03 0.761 
Economics -0.083** 0.04 0.049 -0.081** 0.04 0.047 
UK -0.060 0.05 0.185 -0.060 0.05 0.193 
India -0.058 0.06 0.323 -0.056 0.06 0.350 
Christian -0.002 0.04 0.958 -0.007 0.04 0.845 
Muslim -0.118 0.08 0.161 -0.122 0.08 0.146 
Single 0.067** 0.03 0.024 0.067** 0.03 0.021 
Smoker -0.012 0.04 0.758 -0.009 0.04 0.817 
PhD -0.013 0.06 0.821 -0.010 0.06 0.856 
Constant 0.151 0.14 0.273 0.152 0.12 0.217 
Obs 307   307   
Pseudo R-sqr 0.393   0.382   
Df 281   284   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
Notes: Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,* ** 
p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Regressions on Giving Rate to singled out subjects 
 Regression 5 Regression 6 
 
b se p b se p 
Asterisk 
   
-0.127 0.11 0.27 
BS -0.067 0.14 0.638 
   
GS -0.127 0.15 0.404 
   
PIBS -0.07 0.12 0.57 -0.071 0.12 0.566 
PIGS -0.013 0.12 0.917 -0.012 0.12 0.921 
RS+ABS -0.157 0.13 0.222 
   
Risk Aversion -0.008 0.01 0.568 -0.006 0.01 0.63 
SDS17 Score -0.007 0.01 0.512 -0.007 0.01 0.527 
RSE Score -0.006 0.01 0.367 -0.006 0.01 0.376 
Age 0.013 0.01 0.149 0.013 0.01 0.156 
Gender -0.022 0.06 0.7 -0.023 0.06 0.677 
Economics -0.15* 0.08 0.064 -0.156* 0.08 0.056 
UK -0.036 0.07 0.607 -0.035 0.07 0.611 
India 
-
0.220** 
0.09 0.014 -0.215* 0.09 0.013 
Christian -0.049 0.06 0.421 -0.045 0.06 0.459 
Muslim 
-
0.434**
* 
0.14 0.002 
-
0.431**
* 
0.14 0.002 
Single 0.061 0.06 0.298 0.059 0.06 0.323 
Smoker 0.058 0.11 0.593 0.053 0.11 0.628 
PhD -0.119 0.09 0.208 -0.121 0.09 0.203 
Constant 0.18 0.23 0.437 0.189 0.23 0.408 
Obs 196 
  
196 
  
R-sqr 0.086 
  
0.084 
  
Df 178 
  
180 
  
Prob > F 0.015 
  
0.009 
  
Notes: Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,* ** 
p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
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Table 7: Regressions on Return Rate to singled out subjects 
 Regression 7 Regression 8 
 b se p b se p 
Trust Rate as 
Trustee 
0.437**** 0.08 0.000 0.416**** 0.07 0.000 
Asterisk    -0.130*** 0.05 0.005 
BS -0.016 0.09 0.858    
GS -0.063 0.06 0.297    
PIBS -0.070 0.04 0.109 -0.076* 0.04 0.087 
PIGS -0.082 0.06 0.157 -0.091 0.06 0.119 
RS+ABS -
0.201**** 
0.06 0.000    
Risk Aversion -0.004 0.01 0.606 -0.002 0.01 0.766 
SDS17 Score 0.005 0.01 0.433 0.004 0.01 0.496 
RSE Score -0.005 0.00 0.330 -0.005 0.00 0.231 
Age 0.007 0.01 0.245 0.007 0.01 0.239 
Gender -0.027 0.04 0.448 -0.020 0.04 0.575 
Economics -0.048 0.05 0.323 -0.063 0.05 0.195 
UK 0.031 0.05 0.532 0.024 0.05 0.623 
India -0.077 0.05 0.140 -0.098* 0.05 0.054 
Christian -0.048 0.04 0.199 -0.049 0.04 0.195 
Muslim -0.138* 0.08 0.098 -0.094 0.09 0.312 
Single 0.032 0.04 0.371 0.036 0.04 0.326 
Smoker 0.018 0.05 0.717 0.013 0.05 0.799 
PhD 0.037 0.07 0.586 0.031 0.07 0.657 
Constant 0.056 0.14 0.695 0.047 0.15 0.754 
Obs 179   179   
Pseudo R-sqr 0.491   0.438   
Df 160   162   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
Notes: Tobit regression with clustered robust standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,* ** 
p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
Result 8. Least preferred singled out subjects, and authorities, were 
less trustworthy than baseline subjects. 
Authority × SDS17 is statistically significant (p < 0.05). This implies 
that authorities with a high score in the SDS17 questionnaire return 
proportionally more; this suggests that they perceive that social pressure is 
put on them (Zizzo and Fleming, 2011). 
The aggregate treatments dummy of regression 4 is mildly 
significantly negative (p = 0.052). In regression 3, all the coefficients of 
treatment variables are negative. However, only the coefficients of 
BS+PIBS and PG+PIGS are strongly and mildly statistically significant 
respectively. This evidence brings us to the next result that, relatively to 
trustworthiness, is strikingly in opposition to Conjecture 1. 
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Result 9. There is some evidence that the presence of a singled out 
subject reduced return rates to non-singled out subjects. This is particularly 
prominent in the treatments where the singled out subject was the least 
preferred match.  
Table 6. In the regressions on the giving rate to singled out subjects, 
all the coefficients of the treatments dummies are negative, but statistically 
not significant.  
Result 10. Once covariates are controlled for, giving rates towards 
singled out subjects were not different from those towards baseline subjects. 
Hence, although the sign of the coefficients in the regressions points 
to a negative effect, there is no statistical significant evidence that the 
singled out individual was trusted less than other individuals (i.e. Conjecture 
1 does not hold with respect to trust). 
Table 7. In the regressions on the return rate to singled out subjects, 
all the treatment dummies in regression 7 are negative, though only the 
coefficient on RS+ABS is statistically significant (p < 0.001). An F test 
restricting all the dummies corresponding to treatments where the singled 
out can be identified (BS, GS, RS, ABS) to 0 is rejected (p < 0.01). In 
addition, the Asterisk dummy of regression 7 is statistically significant (p < 
0.01). 
Result 11. Subjects who were not responsible of the distinct status 
of the singled out subject returned about 20% less to this person. 
This result provides strong evidence in favor of Conjecture 3 with 
respect to trustworthiness.  
In all the regressions, we control for demographic and psychological 
variables, and some of them turned out to be statistically significant.
35
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 Most notably, participants with a background in economics gave less to both non-singled 
and singled out subjects; a similar behavioral pattern is observed for Muslim subjects and 
Indian subjects; while single participants gave and returned more to non-singled out 
subjects. Our psychological measures had limited power to explain trust game behavior. 
First, the risk attitude of the subjects, as measured in the Holt and Laury (2002) task, did 
not relate to trusting or trust fulfilling behavior, as already found in Tsutsui and Zizzo 
(forthcoming), Lönnqvist et al. (2010), and Houser et al. (2010). Second, although self-
esteem is a key concept of social identity theory, our measure of self-esteem does not 
36 
 
       6.  Discussion and Conclusions 
Our experiment was the first to look at singling out in an economic 
setting and was run under a minimal and artificial manipulation. While 
obviously research with natural group has merits, the artificial set-up is a 
good one to tackle a new area, reduces potential confounding such as natural 
group stereotyping and minimizes any potential experimenter demand 
effects. However, it is possible that stronger or less artificial manipulations 
(e.g., associating a status of being singled out with a specific socio-
economic characteristic) may provide additional insights in the 
understanding of how this social phenomenon works in the real world. 
Furthermore, we studied the implications of singling someone out in the 
specific setting of trust games. It is likely that singling someone out also 
affects the standard results of other experimental environments of interest to 
within-firm cooperation, such as public goods games, weakest link games 
and so on; it might also affect individual preferences for time or work 
productivity. This is why additional research should take place to confirm 
the robustness of our results and further our understanding of the 
implications of singling out. 
One potential explanation of our findings might be that there is not a 
behavior change because of singling out. Rather, the singled out subjects 
may behave differently because individual characteristics information made 
them singled out (i.e., least preferred or most preferred) and implies that 
they behaved differently. The focus here is on individual characteristics 
information which was transmitted (e.g., age or PhD), and which may make 
the sample of singled out subjects different from the sample of non-singled 
out subjects. This individual characteristics hypothesis is within the realm 
of possibility in the least preferred and most preferred singled out subjects 
treatments precisely because the choice of such least preferred and most 
preferred singled out subjects may be non-random, as information is 
                                                                                                                                                   
contribute to explain the behavior in our trust game. Third, other than in relation to 
authorities as just remarked on, the social desirability scale was unrelated to both trusting 
and trust fulfilling behavior. Since this measure is a proxy for experimenter demand effects 
(see Zizzo and Fleming, 2011), the fact that it does not correlate with trust or 
trustworthiness in our experiment, and that our key results above are robust to controlling 
for it, inspires confidence for the robustness of our results to potential experimenter demand 
effects. In the appendix, we also analyze the time trend of the key variables. 
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provided to subjects to choose their ranking of subjects they would wish to 
be matched with. We are able to control for this hypothesis in three 
complementary ways. First, in section 3, we provided evidence on how the 
behavior of the least or most preferred matches in the B subjects, who were 
not singled out, was different from that of the least and most preferred 
matches in BS/PIBS and GS/PIGS treatments respectively, who were 
singled out. Specifically, the behavioral patterns identified by Result 4 and 8 
– such as the lower trustworthiness of singled out subjects – were not 
replicated by looking at least/most preferred matches in the B subjects. This 
implies that the act of singling out as opposed to the individual 
characteristics making a subject least or most preferred determined those 
results. Second, we control directly for various individual characteristics in 
the regression analysis presented in Tables 4 and 5, thus enabling us to 
identify the effects of singling out as separate to that of being a singled out 
subject. Third, and more fundamentally, the appendix (section E) shows that 
the sample of singled out subjects does not differ from the sample of 
corresponding non-singled out subjects in almost all of the individual 
characteristics. As shown in the appendix, PhD students were more likely to 
be least preferred, but the PhD dummy is statistically insignificant in all 
regressions in Tables 4-7, implying that it made no difference.
36
 Equally, 
UK subjects were more likely to be most preferred matches (see appendix), 
but the UK dummy is again statistically insignificant in Tables 4-7, 
implying that they did not behave any differently from everyone else. 
Finally, single subjects were less likely to be most preferred matches, and 
what we find is that they were more trusting and trustworthy towards non-
singled out subjects according to Tables 4 and 5. However, we have not 
found any evidence that high status subjects (i.e., the most preferred 
matches) are less trusting and trustworthy towards non-singled out subjects, 
and so this potential individual characteristic effect does not turn out to be 
relevant. It is, of course, anyway controlled for in the regression analysis. 
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 Further evidence of the irrelevance of this variable for our findings on low status subjects 
(i.e. least preferred matches) is that the results of the regressions do not change if we drop 
the observations corresponding to PhD students selected as the least preferred match (3 
observations). 
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As we can rule out the individual characteristics hypothesis as an 
explanation of our results, we conclude that singling out appears to matter as 
such. Insofar as we could glean from our experiment, we found no evidence 
suggesting that singling out is beneficial, at least with respect to trust or 
trustworthiness. We found it is irrelevant for trust and potentially disruptive 
for trustworthiness.  
Trustworthiness of non-singled out subjects towards singled out 
subjects. In line with Conjecture 1, we found an overall reduction of 
trustworthiness of non-singled out subjects towards singled out subjects, and 
one largely focused on the RS and the ABS treatments. In these treatments, 
subjects returned around 20% less to the singled out subject compared to the 
baseline (Result 6), and over twice as large an effect relative to the other 
treatments. This effect holds even while controlling for covariates such as 
behavioral reciprocity (based on how much trustees were given by trusters) 
and any potential experimenter demand (as proxied by our social 
desirability scale measure).  Our interpretation is that, in RS and ABS, the 
responsibility of choosing the singled out subject shifted to someone else, 
and, therefore, any concern for the singled out subject’s condition was 
mitigated if not removed. Conversely, in the case of the other treatments, 
such concern could be present, as subjects may have felt responsible for the 
singled out subject, thus reducing the negative effect of perceiving the 
singled out individual as an outsider. This interpretation is in line with a 
responsibility-alleviation effect (Charness, 2000) identified in Conjecture 3. 
A second explanation, which is still linked with a responsibility-alleviation 
argument, is that, in treatments such as BS, subjects might have thought to 
have made mistakes in the selection process of the singled out subject, and, 
therefore, did not want to take actions which could have harmed a 
“blameless” person. In other words, here the responsibility is not to have 
consciously singled someone out, but rather to have made mistakes in 
singling someone out.
37
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 Note that people might be in general more careful in evaluating top ranked choices than 
lower ranked choices (Hausman and Ruud, 1987), and, therefore, commit increasing 
mistakes with the latter. 
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Trustworthiness of non-singled out subjects towards non-singled out 
subjects.
38
 In contrast to Conjecture 1, we found no evidence that singling 
out works as a bonding tool for other group members leading to greater in-
group cooperation: relative to the baseline, there is no significant increase in 
trustworthiness from non-singled out subjects towards other non-singled out 
subjects. If anything, there is evidence the presence of a singled out subject 
reduced return rates to non-singled out subjects, notably by around 10-11% 
in the treatments where the singled out subject was the least preferred match 
(Result 9 and Table 5). There are different possible reasons for this; we 
mention two. First, the presence of an a-prototypical member in the group 
may jeopardize the distinctiveness of the in-group as far as the singled out 
subject is not excluded from the group (Hogg et al., 2005). Second, non-
singled out subjects may blame other non-singled out subjects for some 
responsibility for the singling out of a specific subject. 
Trustworthiness of singled out subjects towards non-singled out 
subjects. It mattered for singled out subjects whether they were singled out 
for being the least preferred match or otherwise. In contrast to Conjecture 4 
and in agreement with Conjecture 2, return rates by least preferred matches 
strikingly decreased from the 24% of the baseline to single digits (4-7%) as 
per Table 3. According to the regressions in Table 5, once covariates are 
taken into account, subjects who were seen as least preferred matches were 
less trustworthy by as much as 16%. It was not the act of being marked as 
low status that caused this reaction, since it occurred even in PIBS, when 
only least preferred matches knew they were the least preferred, and they 
knew that this was the case. We can also exclude the fact of being singled 
out as having such an effect per se, since we do not find the same large 
effect outside BS and PIBS. Rather, it was the fact of being considered by 
other subjects as undesirable that appears to have elicited the negative 
reaction. Many psychological studies show that people who have been 
excluded appear to engage in anti-social behaviors (e.g. Twenge et al., 
2001). Our manipulation does not imply exclusion. Nevertheless, some of 
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 We obviously do not have a discussion of the trustworthiness of singled out subjects 
towards other singled out subjects since there was a single singled out subject in each 
session, and so no other singled out subject that each singled out subject could interact 
with.   
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the underlying psychological forces motivating excluded people to engage 
in self-defeating social behaviors might also be the same that trigger the 
anti-social behavior of the singled out subject. Anger, resentment, and 
reciprocity might be the driving forces of such retaliatory behavior. 
Most preferred singled out matches, i.e. singled out subjects under a 
positive frame, behaved bimodally, with either high or low return rates 
(Result 5 and Figure 2). This result supports at the same time both 
Conjecture 2 and 4. One interpretation of this result is that it reflects some 
of the mixed results of the psychological research on leadership theory. 
Highly prototypical subjects should display more distinct group behaviors, 
and, therefore, more in-group favoritism (Hogg, 2001). However, the status-
based gap between the highly prototypical subject and the rest of the group 
may transform an intra-group relationship between the consensually liked 
subject and the others into an inter-group relationship (Hogg, 2001). Due to 
this, the singled out subject may behave in a more anti-social way toward 
the lower status subjects. Our results suggest that both behavioral patterns 
may describe the singled out subject’s decision whether to fulfill trust. 
Which behavior turns out to happen probably depends on whether the most 
preferred singled out individual perceives himself or herself as an insider or 
outsider.  
Another interpretation of our bimodality finding is that also it may 
be explained by the particular beliefs of most preferred matches, quite 
independently of group identity concerns. The most preferred singled out 
subject might have believed to be selected by others because of strategic 
reasons rather than niceness (i.e. he or she was considered the most 
exploitable subject in the groups), and, therefore, he or she might have 
behaved antisocially in response to such attribution (in the spirit of McCabe 
et al., 2003). Alternatively, the fact that he or she is considered most 
preferred might support a belief that trust is being placed on him or her, and 
that he or she should feel let down if trust is not fulfilled; this would lead to 
more pro-social behavior (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Battigalli 
and Dufwennberg, 2007). Our design does not allow us to disentangle these 
alternative explanations, and it would therefore be worthwhile to investigate 
this in further research. 
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Trustworthiness of authorities towards non-singled out subjects.
39
 
ABS treatment authorities had a return rate of just around 7-8%. The 
reduction in trustworthiness is moderated by experimenter and social 
demand: subjects more sensitive to social pressure such as experimenter 
demand return comparatively more, as shown by the significance of SDS17 
× Authority in the Table 5 regressions. Nevertheless, Table 5 also shows 
that the effect persists when controlling for our social desirability scale 
measure that we employ to control for experimenter demand. 
We should point out that the aim of our experiment was not to study 
the behavior of the authority. We simply wanted to investigate the effects of 
singling out when a specific individual rather than the entire group is 
responsible for the lower-status attribution. Different conjectures might 
explain why the authority did not fulfill trust. We mention two. First, 
authorities might have felt that, since their co-participants had been assessed 
as comparatively worthy matches, they should be more generous in their 
giving. Second, they may have felt entitled to keep more money because he 
or she had already a service to everyone else by helping identify the least 
preferred match.  
Our starting point was the fact that singling out is a pervasive 
phenomenon of economic and social life. We found that singling out 
individuals does not carry any benefit in terms of trust and has a negative 
effect for trustworthiness. Obviously, further research is needed and singling 
out may yet have benefits for organizations – if, for example, it is connected 
to social rewards and therefore can be used to elicit greater work 
productivity –. However, if you are a manager and you are considering 
singling out someone for blame and praise, you may wish to bear in mind 
that this, and especially the former, may disrupt the social glue holding the 
team together. 
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 We do not discuss the trustworthiness of authorities towards singled out subjects since, as 
noted earlier, authorities were not matched with singled out subjects. Also, non-singled out 
subjects did not know they were matched with an authority, and so could not condition their 
behavior on a subject being marked as an authority.   
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Appendix to Chapter 1: What Happens If You Single Out? An 
Experiment 
 
A. Experimental instructions 
B. Background information on participants 
C. Background information on singled out subjects and authorities 
D. Ranking phase results 
E. Test for random sampling of the least and most preferred 
subjects 
F. Time trend of key variables 
G. Additional Regression Analysis 
 
A. Experimental Instructions 
 
ALL TREATMENTS (beginning of the experiment) 
 
Introduction 
 
This is an experiment on decision making. During the experiment, you are 
not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please raise your hand 
if you have any questions at any point in the experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of four rounds. In addition to these four rounds, 
there is an individual task at the end of the experiment. 
 
There are six participants in the experiment, all of which have received the 
same set of instructions as you have. 
 
Round Decisions 
 
In each round, you will be matched at random with a different participant 
(the coparticipant). Therefore, you will never be matched with the same 
coparticipant twice. 
 
Give/Return Decisions: In each round, you or your coparticipant will be 
designated to move first. The First Mover will begin by receiving 48 
credits. He or she will decide how many credits (if any) to give to the other 
person and how many (if any) to keep. 
 
All the credits given get multiplied by 3 before they are received by the 
Second Mover. The Second Mover then decides how much (if any) to keep 
and how much (if any) to return to the First Mover. 
48 
 
 
Role: you will have the role of First Mover for two random rounds, and that 
of Second Mover for the other two random rounds.  
 
Round earnings: The decisions that you and your coparticipants make in 
each round will determine the amounts you gain as round earnings. 
 
Information: In each round you will learn about your coparticipant’s 
decision and about your round earnings. 
 
Payments 
 
At the end of the experiment a winning round is chosen at random from the 
four rounds, and you will be paid according to your earnings of this round. 
Your earnings in the winning round will be converted into pounds at the rate 
of 20 pence per experimental credit. Your final earnings will also include 
additional earnings that you can gain from the individual task at the end of 
the experiment. Please remain seated until we come to your desk to give you 
the money. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
BS TREATMENT (ranking phase) 
 
Before proceeding with the experiment, please rank the coparticipants 
according to how much you would like to be matched with them in the 
experiment (from the most preferred match to the least preferred match).  
For each member, indicate his/her rank from 1 (the most preferred match) to 
5 (the least preferred match). In other words, please assign a rank of 1 to the 
coparticipant that you would most like to be matched with in the 
experiment, assign a rank of 2 to the second most preferred match, 3 to the 
third most preferred match, and so on. Ties in the ranking are not allowed. 
 
Explanation of the least preferred match 
 
The computer has received the individual ranking of each of you. It will 
now aggregate all the rankings and will determine which participant is 
considered the least preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant 
that everyone else least wants to interact with in the experiment according to 
the following rule.  
  
The computer will give each participant a certain number of points 
corresponding to the position in which he or she has been ranked by the 
coparticipants. Specifically, each participant will receive five points each 
time he or she has been ranked first by another participant, four for being 
ranked second, three for being ranked third, two for being ranked fourth and 
one for being ranked last. 
  
The participant with the least points will be selected by the computer as the 
least preferred match in the experiment. 
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In each round, if a participant is matched with the least preferred match, the 
least preferred match will be marked with an asterisk (*). 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
GS TREATMENT (ranking phase) 
 
Before proceeding with the experiment, please rank the coparticipants 
according to how much you would like to be matched with them in the 
experiment (from the most preferred match to the least preferred match).  
For each member, indicate his/her rank from 1 (the most preferred match) to 
5 (the least preferred match). In other words, please assign a rank of 1 to the 
coparticipant that you would most like to be matched with in the 
experiment, assign a rank of 2 to the second most preferred match, 3 to the 
third most preferred match, and so on. Ties in the ranking are not allowed. 
 
Explanation of the most preferred match 
 
The computer has received the individual ranking of each of you. It will 
now aggregate all the rankings and will determine which participant is 
considered the most preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant 
that everyone else most wants to interact with in the experiment according 
to the following rule.  
  
The computer will give each participant a certain number of points 
corresponding to the position in which he or she has been ranked by the 
coparticipants. Specifically, each participant will receive five points each 
time he or she has been ranked first by another participant, four for being 
ranked second, three for being ranked third, two for being ranked fourth and 
one for being ranked last. 
  
The participant with the most points will be selected by the computer as the 
most preferred match in the experiment. 
 
In each round, if a participant is matched with the most preferred match, the 
most preferred match will be marked with an asterisk (*). 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
PIBS TREATMENT (ranking phase) 
 
Before proceeding with the experiment, please rank the coparticipants 
according to how much you would like to be matched with them in the 
experiment (from the most preferred match to the least preferred match).  
For each member, indicate his/her rank from 1 (the most preferred match) to 
5 (the least preferred match). In other words, please assign a rank of 1 to the 
coparticipant that you would most like to be matched with in the 
experiment, assign a rank of 2 to the second most preferred match, 3 to the 
third most preferred match, and so on. Ties in the ranking are not allowed. 
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Explanation of the least preferred match 
 
The computer has received the individual ranking of each of you. It will 
now aggregate all the rankings and will determine which participant is 
considered the least preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant 
that everyone else least wants to interact with in the experiment according to 
the following rule.  
  
The computer will give each participant a certain number of points 
corresponding to the position in which he or she has been ranked by the 
coparticipants. Specifically, each participant will receive five points each 
time he or she has been ranked first by another participant, four for being 
ranked second, three for being ranked third, two for being ranked fourth and 
one for being ranked last. 
  
The participant with the least points will be selected by the computer as the 
least preferred match in the experiment. 
 
A participant does not know whether and when he or she is matched with 
the least preferred match during the experiment.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
PIGS TREATMENT (ranking phase) 
 
Before proceeding with the experiment, please rank the coparticipants 
according to how much you would like to be matched with them in the 
experiment (from the most preferred match to the least preferred match).  
For each member, indicate his/her rank from 1 (the most preferred match) to 
5 (the least preferred match). In other words, please assign a rank of 1 to the 
coparticipant that you would most like to be matched with in the 
experiment, assign a rank of 2 to the second most preferred match, 3 to the 
third most preferred match, and so on. Ties in the ranking are not allowed. 
 
Explanation of the most preferred match 
 
The computer has received the individual ranking of each of you. It will 
now aggregate all the rankings and will determine which participant is 
considered the most preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant 
that everyone else most wants to interact with in the experiment according 
to the following rule.  
  
The computer will give each participant a certain number of points 
corresponding to the position in which he or she has been ranked by the 
coparticipants. Specifically, each participant will receive five points each 
time he or she has been ranked first by another participant, four for being 
ranked second, three for being ranked third, two for being ranked fourth and 
one for being ranked last. 
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The participant with the most points will be selected by the computer as the 
most preferred match in the experiment. 
 
A participant does not know whether and when he or she is matched with 
the most preferred match during the experiment.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
RS TREATMENT (ranking phase) 
 
Ranking 
 
Before proceeding with the experiment, please rank the coparticipants 
according to how much you would like to be matched with them in the 
experiment (from the most preferred match to the least preferred match).  
For each member, indicate his/her rank from 1 (the most preferred match) to 
5 (the least preferred match). In other words, please assign a rank of 1 to the 
coparticipant that you would most like to be matched with in the 
experiment, assign a rank of 2 to the second most preferred match, 3 to the 
third most preferred match, and so on. Ties in the ranking are not allowed. 
 
Asterisk 
 
The computer will now randomly select a participant from the experiment. 
This participant will be referred to as the denoted match. 
  
In each round, if a participant is matched with the denoted match, the 
denoted match will be marked with an asterisk (*). 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
ABS TREATMENT (ranking phase) 
 
Explanation of the least preferred match 
 
The computer has received the individual ranking of each of you. It will 
now randomly select a participant from the experiment. This participant will 
be referred to as the authority.   
 
The individual ranking of the authority will determine who is considered the 
least preferred match in the experiment, i.e. the participant that the authority 
least wants to interact with in the experiment according to his/her individual 
ranking. 
In each round, if a participant is matched with the least preferred match, the 
least preferred match will be marked with an asterisk (*). 
The authority will not be matched with the least preferred match for the rest 
of the experiment. 
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Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
Screens: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
You have not been randomly selected by the computer and, therefore, you 
are not the authority. 
Please wait to be informed whether you are the least preferred match or not. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
You have been randomly selected by the computer as the authority.   
The participant that you have indicate as the least preferred match is going 
to be the least preferred match in the experiment and will be marked with an 
asterisk (*). 
You will not be matched with the least preferred match for the rest of the 
experiment. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
ALL TREATMENTS (beginning of individual task) 
 
Instructions for the individual task 
 
You now need to make 10 decisions. Each decision is a paired choice 
between two options (“Option A” and “Option B”). 
Only one of these 10 decisions will be used in the end to determine your 
earnings. You will only know which one at the end of the experiment. 
  
How will these decisions affect your earnings for this part of the 
experiment? After you have made all of your decisions, the computer will 
randomly select which of the 10 decisions will be used to determine your 
earnings. In relation to this decision, the computer will then randomly select 
the outcome based on the probabilities assigned to the option you chose. 
 
As an example, assume that, for the randomly selected decision, the option 
to the left pays 10 credits with a 10% chance and 5 credits with a 90% 
chance, while the option to the right pays 8 credits with a 20% chance and 4 
credits with an 80% chance. Assume that you chose the option to the left for 
this decision; then there is a 10% chance that you will earn 10 credits and a 
90% chance that you will earn 5 credits. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
  
53 
 
B. Background of Experimental Participants 
 
 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Female 167 51.54 
Male 157 48.46 
Total 324 100.00 
 
 
Degree Frequency Percent 
INTO 3 0.93 
Bachelor  166 51.23 
PG diploma 1 0.31 
Master 101 31.17 
MPhil/PhD 40 12.35 
Staff 5 1.54 
Other 8 2.47 
Total 324 100.00 
 
 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Age 324 23.52 4.82 18 59 
 
 
Economics Frequency Percent 
No 264 81.48 
Yes 60 18.52 
Total 324 100.00 
 
 
Religion Frequency Percent 
No religion 163 50.31 
Buddhist 14 4.32 
Christian 106 32.72 
Hindu 18 5.56 
Jewish 3 0.93 
Muslim 14 4.32 
Other 6 1.85 
Total 324 100.00 
 
 
Facebook Frequency Percent 
No 7 2.16 
Yes 317 97.84 
Total 324 100.00 
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Relationship Status Frequency Percent 
Single 168 51.85 
Engaged 6 1.85 
In a relationship 128 39.51 
Married 22 6.79 
Total 324 100.00 
 
 
Smoker Frequency Percent 
No 291 89.81 
Yes 33 10.19 
Total 324 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Country Frequency Percent 
Azerbaijan 1 0.31 
Belgium 1 0.31 
Brazil 1 0.31 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
1 0.31 
Bulgaria 2 0.62 
China 22 6.79 
Egypt 1 0.31 
Estonia 1 0.31 
Finland 1 0.31 
France 5 1.54 
Germany 3 0.93 
Greece 2 0.62 
Guyana 1 0.31 
Hong Kong 7 2.16 
India 24 7.41 
Indonesia 2 0.62 
Iraq 1 0.31 
Italy 3 0.93 
Japan 2 0.62 
Jersey 1 0.31 
Jordan 1 0.31 
Kenya 2 0.62 
Laos 1 0.31 
Latvia 2 0.62 
Lithuania 3 0.93 
Malaysia 3 0.93 
Mexico 5 1.54 
Nepal 1 0.31 
Netherlands 2 0.62 
Nigeria 8 2.47 
Pakistan 2 0.62 
Palestine 1 0.31 
Philippines 1 0.31 
Poland 3 0.93 
Romania 2 0.62 
Russian 
Federation 
1 0.31 
Slovenia 1 0.31 
Spain 2 0.62 
Sri Lanka 2 0.62 
Switzerland 1 0.31 
Taiwan 1 0.31 
Thailand 4 1.23 
Turkey 2 0.62 
Ukraine 1 0.31 
United 
Kingdom 
157 48.46 
United States 9 2.78 
Vietnam 22 6.79 
Zambia 1 0.31 
Zimbabwe 1 0.31 
Total 324 100.00 
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C. Background of Singled Out Subjects and Authority Subjects 
Type Treatment Gender Age Degree Country Economics Religion Facebook Relationship Status Smoker 
Least Preferred BS Male 20 Bachelor Thailand YES No Religion YES Single NO 
Least Preferred BS Male 18 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Single NO 
Least Preferred BS Male 33 MPhil/PhD Mexico NO Other YES Married NO 
Least Preferred BS Female 28 MPhil/PhD France NO Christian YES Relationship NO 
Least Preferred BS Male 20 Bachelor Laos YES Buddhist YES Relationship NO 
Least Preferred BS Male 25 MPhil/PhD Palestine YES Muslim YES Single NO 
Least Preferred BS Female 23 Master Vietnam YES No Religion YES Single NO 
Least Preferred BS Male 21 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Single YES 
Least Preferred PIBS Female 19 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Least Preferred PIBS Female 26 Master Hong Kong NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Least Preferred PIBS Female 21 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Least Preferred PIBS Male 18 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Relationship YES 
Least Preferred PIBS Male 18 Bachelor Greece NO No Religion YES Single NO 
Least Preferred PIBS Male 22 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Single YES 
Least Preferred PIBS Female 21 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Relationship NO 
           
Most Preferred GS Male 20 Bachelor UK YES No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred GS Female 20 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred GS Male 18 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Single YES 
Most Preferred GS Female 32 MPhil/PhD UK NO No Religion YES Married NO 
Most Preferred GS Female 22 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship YES 
Most Preferred GS Female 27 Master Sri Lanka NO Buddhist YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred GS Female 21 Bachelor UK YES No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred GS Female 18 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred PIGS Male 30 MPhil/PhD Pakistan NO Muslim YES Married NO 
Most Preferred PIGS Male 23 Master UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred PIGS Female 19 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship YES 
Most Preferred PIGS Female 21 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred PIGS Female 23 Master Vietnam NO No Religion YES Single NO 
Most Preferred PIGS Male 25 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Most Preferred PIGS Female 33 Master UK NO Christian NO Single NO 
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Type Treatment Gender Age Degree Country Economics Religion Facebook Relationship Status Smoker 
Random RS Male 37 MPhil/PhD Mexico NO Christian YES Married NO 
Random RS Female 20 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Random RS Female 19 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Relationship NO 
Random RS Female 19 Bachelor Brazil YES Christian YES Single NO 
Random RS Male 22 Master UK NO No Religion YES Single NO 
Random RS Male 20 Bachelor Netherlands NO Muslim YES Single NO 
Random RS Male 21 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Single NO 
Random RS Female 21 Bachelor UK NO Christian YES Relationship NO 
           
Authority ABS Female 22 Master India NO Hindu YES Relationship NO 
Authority ABS Male 22 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Authority ABS Male 29 Master Thailand YES Buddhist YES Single NO 
Authority ABS Female 26 MPhil/PhD France NO No Religion YES Relationship YES 
Authority ABS Female 28 Master India NO Hindu YES Married NO 
Authority ABS Female 24 Master Nigeria NO Christian YES Relationship NO 
Authority ABS Female 24 Master China NO No Religion YES Single NO 
Authority ABS Female 21 Bachelor UK NO No Religion YES Single NO 
           
Least Preferred ABS Male 28 MPhil/PhD Italy NO No Religion YES Relationship NO 
Least Preferred ABS Female 24 Master Greece YES No Religion YES Single NO 
Least Preferred ABS Female 22 Master India NO Hindu YES Engaged NO 
Least Preferred ABS Male 25 Master Japan YES No Religion YES Married NO 
Least Preferred ABS Female 23 Master China YES No Religion NO Relationship NO 
Least Preferred ABS Male 19 Bachelor Estonia NO Other YES Single NO 
Least Preferred ABS Female 43 Master Kenya YES Christian YES Married NO 
Least Preferred ABS Female 22 Master UK NO Christian YES Single NO 
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D. Data from the Ranking Phase 
We first consider the data on the individual rankings. The 
econometric model that we use is the rank-ordered logit model (see Beggs et 
al., 1981; Hausman and Ruud, 1987), which is a generalization of the 
conditional logit regression model introduced by McFadden (1974). This 
model allows us to analyze the data that we obtained by asking subjects to 
rank the other people in the lab given some personal details of these 
people.
40
 
For each subject we collected five observations. Each observation is 
a rank (from 1 to 5) on one of the other five participants of an experimental 
session.
41
  Therefore, we have overall 1620 observations. We ran two 
regressions, using as dependent variable the ranks given by each subject.
42
 
Table 1D shows the results of the estimation. The first regression 
(Regression A) uses as explanatory variables only alternative-specific 
variables, i.e. variables that describe the individuals who had been ranked 
by the subjects. These independent variables are age, gender (=1 for men), 
economics background (=1 if applicable), nationality (Uk=1 for UK 
subjects), religion (Christian = 1 for Christian subjects, and Muslim = 1 for 
Muslim subjects), university status (PhD = 1, for PhD students), whether the 
individual smokes or not (Smoker = 1 for smokers), and relationship status 
(Single = 1 for subjects who were not in a relationship or were unmarried). 
The second regression (Regression B) also includes interactions of 
observation-specific variables with case-specific variables. In particular, we 
                                                          
40
 One limitation of this approach is that the rank-ordered logit model assumes 
independency between the relative preference for a subject j over a subject k and the current 
choice set (Allison and Christakis, 1994).  Although this assumption might be somewhat 
implausible, we cannot relax it without incurring difficult problems of either computation 
or identification; given this limitation, our results should be more correctly interpreted as an 
approximation of a more complex phenomenon (Allison and Christakis, 1994). Note also 
that this problem of interpretation arises generally for all multinomial logistic models. 
41
 Alternatives are ranked from “most preferred” to “least preferred”. Therefore, ranki = 1 
corresponds to the most preferred match for subject i, ranki = 2 to the second most preferred 
match for subject i, and so on. In other words, the variable rank used here corresponds to 
the actual rank by “attractiveness”, and not the points assigned by the computer (5 points 
for most preferred, 4 for second most preferred, etc.). Note that the rank-ordered logit 
model may give different estimated coefficients between a specification by attractiveness 
and one by unattractiveness. Therefore, we also tried a rank-ordered logit model by 
reversing the rank order. However, the results did not differ.  
42
 The model takes into account the fact that all observations related to one individual, i.e. 
each of the five ranked alternatives, are linked together.  
58 
 
create the variable Single×SINGLE, which takes value 1 when both the 
individual who ranked and the individual who was ranked were single, 0 
otherwise; the variable Gender×GENDER which takes value 1 when both 
individuals were male, 0 otherwise; the variable Uk×UK which takes value 
1 when both individuals were from UK; the variable 
Economics×ECONOMICS which takes value 1 when both individuals were 
students in Economics; PhD×PHD which takes value 1 when both 
individuals were PhD students; Smoker×SMOKER which takes value 1 when 
both individuals were smokers; Christian×CHRISTIAN which takes value 1 
when both individuals were Christian; and the variable Age×AGE which is 
an interaction of two continuous variables, the age of the subjects who 
ranked and the age of the ranked subject
43
. The interaction variables allow 
us to control whether different socioeconomic characteristics of those who 
ranked, relatively to the socioeconomic characteristics of those who had 
been ranked, affected the rank decision. A comparison of the log likelihoods 
of the two models suggests that including interaction variables among the 
explanatory variables improves significantly the fit of the model (likelihood 
ratio test, p = 0.001). Hence, different subjects appear to have different 
preferences regarding the rank to allocate to other subjects.   
Result A1. Focusing on variables which have significant coefficients 
(at the 5% level) in regression A, subjects preferred to be matched with 
English female participants, whose educational background is not in 
Economics, and who do not smoke.  
This result provides a basis of comparison for the next results.  In 
particular, if we move to regression B, we obtain the following results. 
Result A2. Female subjects were more likely to assign lower ranks 
to male subjects than female (the β of Gender is significantly negative), 
while male subjects did not seem to discriminate between male and female 
subjects (the β of Gender×GENDER is not significant). This explains why 
female subjects were generally more preferred than male.  
                                                          
43
 In the regression, we did not include interaction variables for which we had few 
observations or we did not have any a priori belief about their importance in explaining the 
dependent variable.  
59 
 
Table 1D: Rank-ordered logit model on individual rankings  
 Regression A Regression B 
 b se p b se   p 
Gender -0.168** 0.07 0.014 -0.201** 0.09 0.029 
Age -0.005 0.01 0.511 -0.110*** 0.05 0.014 
Economics -0.289*** 0.09 0.002 -0.300*** 0.10 0.003 
Uk 0.156** 0.08 0.047 0.234** 0.11 0.035 
PhD 0.100 0.12 0.397 -0.005 0.13 0.970 
Christian 0.069 0.07 0.352 -0.046 0.09 0.605 
Muslim -0.298 0.18 0.098 -0.289 0.18 0.112 
Single -0.101 0.07 0.166 -0.274*** 0.11 0.010 
Smoker -0.286** 0.12 0.013 -0.381*** 0.12 0.002 
Single×SINGLE    0.302** 0.14 0.030 
Gender×GENDER    0.094 0.13 0.482 
Age×AGE    0.004** 0.00 0.017 
Uk×UK    -0.137 0.15 0.346 
Economics×ECONOMICS    -0.057 0.25 0.819 
PhD×PHD    0.922** 0.36 0.011 
Smoker×SMOKER    0.794** 0.38 0.036 
Christian×CHRISTIAN    0.364** 0.16 0.026 
Obs 1620   1620   
Log Likelihood -1530.359   -1517.503   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. Notes: case-specific variables are in small 
caps; alternative-specific variables are written in lowercase letters. 
Result A3. The older a subject was the less she or he preferred 
young people compared to old.  
This effect is captured by the predictor variables Age (−) and 
Age×AGE (+). In particular, the marginal effect of a subject k ’s Age on the 
utility function of a subject j is conditional to the value of     . The utility 
function can be written as     (                 )       . For 
older subjects (     > 27), the marginal utility becomes positive, whereas 
for more young subjects (     < 27), it is negative. This implies that older 
subjects were more likely to assign higher ranks to older subjects, while 
more young subjects were more likely to assign higher ranks to more young 
subjects.  
Result A4. Subjects who did not study Economics preferred to be 
matched with subjects with no background in Economics (βEconomics is 
significantly negative). Instead, subjects who studied Economics did not 
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seem to take into account in their rank decision whether a co-participant had 
an Economic background or not.  
Result A5. Subjects who were not from UK were more likely to 
assign higher ranks to UK subjects than non UK (the β of UK is 
significantly positive).  
Result A6. There is evidence that PhD students preferred to be 
matched with other PhD students (the β of PhD×PHD is significant and 
positive).  
Result A7. With respect to religious affiliation, Christians showed a 
significant preference for subjects of their same religious affiliation (the β of 
Christian×CHRISTIAN is significant and positive).  
Result A8. Subjects who were in a relationship or were married 
assigned low ranks to single subjects (βSingle is significantly negative), 
whereas single subjects more likely preferred to be matched with other 
single individuals (the β of Single×SINGLE is significant and positive).  
Result A9. Subjects who did not smoke did not prefer to be matched 
with smokers (βSmoker < 0), while the latter were more likely to assign high 
ranks to smokers (βSmoker×SMOKER > 0) than non smokers. 
Most of the results are not surprising since they seem to reflect 
phenomena of the real world or behavioral attitudes of experimental 
subjects which have been widely documented.
44
 For instance, most of our 
results seem to be consistent with the socio-psychological literature on 
group identity. In particular, people generally prefer to interact with 
individuals who share similar socioeconomic characteristics, whereas they 
might dislike people who are different. This might explain why Christians, 
PhD students, female subjects, and singles gave high ranks to fellow 
members of the same social group or why old subjects tended to prefer old 
individuals over young and vice versa. Some of the evidence might also 
reflect sociological patterns which are explained in the literature on social 
                                                          
44
 For example, Holm and Engseld (2005) showed that female subjects are more popular 
than male. 
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exclusion and stigmatization. For example, evidence in social psychology 
showed that singles (e.g. DePaulo and Morris, 2006) and smokers (e.g. 
Goldstein, 1991) are usually stereotyped and discriminated in societies. 
Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility that some subjects ranked 
their co-participants according to some strategic criteria, in particular, if 
they had some expectations that the ranking would have an effect on the 
experimental tasks. For instance, women are usually considered more 
cooperative and socially sensitive (e.g. Eagly, 1995). This belief might have 
motivated some female participants to allocate higher ranks to female than 
male subjects. Similarly, some participants might have believed that 
students in Economics are greedier and less cooperative, and, therefore, had 
been reluctant to assign high ranks to them. Finally, we cannot completely 
exclude the possibility that some subjects who shared similar characteristics 
knew each other from outside the lab and, therefore, assigned higher rank to 
themselves. However, we believe that this possibility is very unlikely. First, 
we ran sessions with only 6 players in order to minimize the probability that 
among the 6 subjects there were acquaintances. Second and most 
importantly, we recruited subjects using the software ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004), which ensured a systematic randomization of the participants. In 
particular, we randomly recruit students from the whole university, and, 
therefore, it was very unlikely that, for instance, two PhD students from the 
same department participated in the same session. Third, interactions 
between participants were minimized before, during and after the 
experiment. Hence, if two subjects knew each other, they could identify 
themselves only from the characteristics displayed in the computer screen 
during the ranking phase, and, unless for certain outstanding cases, it may 
be not have been an easy task to do if there were other participants with 
similar characteristics. 
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E. Test for random sampling of the least and most preferred subjects 
The act of choosing singled out subjects is in itself non-random. 
Therefore, the least preferred subjects might have behaved differently 
because of the specific characteristics that made them the least preferred 
subjects. One way of controlling for this problem is to conduct a logistic 
regression analysis in which the dichotomous dependent variable – whether 
or not a subject was considered by the whole group the least preferred match 
– is modelled as a function of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
subjects.
45
 The model also accounts for the session-level clustered nature of 
the sample. This analysis allows us to test whether the characteristics of the 
consensually least preferred subjects significantly differ from those of the 
other subjects who were not consensually least preferred. Table 1E presents 
the results of the regression.
46
 
 
Table 1E: Logistic regression analysis (least preferred subjects) 
 Regression 1 
 b se p 
UK -0.198 0.59 0.737 
PhD 2.425** 0.94 0.010 
Christian -0.499 0.66 0.450 
Muslim -0.215 1.30 0.869 
Single -0.126 0.54 0.814 
Age -0.270 0.18 0.128 
Economics 0.964 0.78 0.215 
Gender -0.173 0.61 0.777 
Smoker 1.665 1.14 0.144 
Constant 4.196 3.90 0.282 
Obs 90   
R-sqr 0.135   
Prob > F 0.177   
Logistic regression with clustered robust 
standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,* ** 
p<0.01, **** p<0.001  
 
                                                          
45
 We were unable to obtain logistic model estimates of the impact of ‘India’, and other 
marginal variables (e.g. other types of religious affiliation) because there were not enough 
occurrences of these attributes among the participants and they characterized either only 
singled out or non-singled out subjects (e.g. there were not Indian subjects among the least 
preferred subjects). Therefore, we did not include these variables in the regression. 
46
 Data correspond to the socio-economic characteristics of the participants of the BS and 
PIBS treatments (i.e. treatments where participants selected the consensually least preferred 
subject). In the regression, we treat each individual as the unit of observation.  
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In the regression, the coefficient of PhD is statistically significantly 
positive. None of the other variables appear to be significant. Therefore, we 
can conclude that PhD students were more likely to be consensually selected 
as the least preferred match. This evidence indicates that the least preferred 
subjects might have behaved differently because they were more likely PhD 
students. In the regression analysis of the chapter, we control for that by 
including a dummy for PhD students, which, however, results statistically 
insignificant. We also tried regressions where we included an interaction 
term between the dummy for PhD students and the dummy for least 
preferred subjects. The coefficient of this interaction variable was not 
statistically significant. Finally, the results of the regressions in the chapter 
do not change if we drop the observations corresponding to PhD students 
selected as the least preferred match (3 observations).  
A similar analysis can be conducted for the consensually most 
preferred subjects. In this case, the dichotomous dependent variable is 
whether or not a subject was considered the most preferred match by the 
whole group. Table 2E presents the results of the logistic regression.
47
  
 
Table 2E: Logistic regression analysis (most preferred subjects) 
 Regression 2 
 b se p 
UK 2.264** 0.88 0.010 
PhD 0.448 1.01 0.658 
Christian -0.319 1.05 0.761 
Muslim 0.656 1.54 0.671 
Single -1.547** 0.71 0.029 
Age 0.073 0.09 0.406 
Economics 0.159 1.05 0.880 
Gender -1.066 0.75 0.158 
Smoker 0.069 0.93 0.940 
Constant -3.745 2.03 0.065 
Obs 90   
R-sqr 0.231   
Prob > F 0.052   
Logistic regression with clustered robust 
standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p<0.05,* ** 
p<0.01, **** p<0.001  
                                                          
47
 Data correspond to the socio-economic characteristics of the participants of the GS and 
PIGS treatments (i.e. treatments where participants selected the consensually most 
preferred subject). In the regression, we treat each individual as the unit of observation. 
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The regression analysis suggests that UK subjects were more likely 
to be consensually selected as the most preferred match, whereas single 
subjects were less likely to be selected as the most preferred match, other 
things being equal. This evidence indicates that the most preferred subjects 
might have behaved differently because they were more likely UK and less 
likely single. In the regression analysis of the chapter, we control for that by 
including a dummy for UK subjects, and one for single subjects. The UK 
dummy is statistically insignificant in all regressions, implying that it made 
no difference. On the other hand, single subjects were more trusting and 
trustworthy towards non-singled out subjects according to Tables 3 and 4 of 
the chapter. However, we have not found any evidence, and made no claim, 
that high status subjects are less trusting and trustworthy towards non-
singled out subjects, and so this potential individual characteristic effect 
does not turn out to be relevant. It is, of course, anyway controlled for in the 
regression analysis. We also tried regressions where we included an 
interaction term between the dummy for UK subjects and the dummy for 
most preferred subjects, and an interaction variable between the dummy for 
single subjects and the dummy for most preferred subjects. The coefficients 
of these interaction variables were not statistically significant. Hence, we 
can conclude that the behavior of the least preferred subjects is not 
explained by their specific individual characteristics. 
Overall, while the sampling of the individual rankings is not random 
(as per section D of this appendix), given the aggregation procedure and the 
heterogeneity of the rankings across individuals, we found that the socio-
economic characteristics of both the least and most preferred subjects were 
mostly random or did not explain the results on the effects of singling out in 
the trust game.  
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F. Time trend of key variables 
We also looked at how giving and return rates evolved over time. 
Tables 1F and 2F show average giving and return rates per round. Giving 
rates only slightly decreased over time, but the trend is not statistically 
significant (Spearman ρ = -0.044, p = 0.658); return rates statistically 
significantly decreased over time (ρ = -0.167, p < 0.001). Specifically, 
giving and return rates from singled out subjects did not show any 
significant time trend (ρ = -0.084 and ρ = -0.097 respectively, p > 0.1). The 
same applies to giving rates (ρ = -0.067, p = 0.392) and return rates (ρ = -
0.194, p < 0.001) specifically of non singled out subjects when interacting 
with other non-singled out subjects. Finally, giving rates from non singled 
out subjects to singled out subjects significantly increased over time (ρ = 
0.150, p = 0.008), whereas return rates from non singled out subjects to 
singled out subjects did not exhibit any time trend (ρ = 0.076, p = 0.701).48 
Table 1F: Giving and return rates to singled out and non-singled out over time 
 1 2 3 4 Tot. 
Giving rate 0.393 0.406 0.395 0.385 0.394 
To  Singled Out 0.240 0.325 0.454 0.328 0.336 
To  non-Singled Out* 0.421 0.437 0.405 0.394 0.414 
Return Rate 0.231 0.213 0.150 0.167 0.191 
To  Singled Out 0.240 0.131 0.077 0.216 0.165 
To non-Singled Out* 0.253 0.214 0.176 0.171 0.206 
Notes: *Giving/return rate of non-singled out subjects to non-singled 
out subjects. 
Table 2F: Giving and return rates from singled out, non-singled out, and authority 
over time 
 1 2 3 4 Tot. 
Giving rate 0.393 0.406 0.395 0.385 0.394 
From  Singled Out 0.428 0.310 0.326 0.340 0.349 
From non-Singled Out* 0.421 0.437 0.405 0.395 0.414 
From Authority 0.422 0.358 0.389 0.097 0.331 
Return Rate 0.231 0.213 0.150 0.167 0.191 
From  Singled Out 0.154 0.281 0.104 0.141 0.164 
From non-Singled Out* 0.253 0.214 0.176 0.171 0.206 
From Authority 0.083 0.157 0.049 0.067 0.078 
Notes: *Giving/return rate of non-singled out subjects to non-singled out subjects. 
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 In all these tests, we controlled for the non-independence (at session and individual level) 
of the observations. 
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G. Additional regression analysis 
In this section, we report some of the regressions of the chapter 
employing giving and return rate per period as the unit of observation. In 
these regressions we employ different estimation techniques. While these 
regressions are provided for the convenience of the reader and the results 
broadly replicate those in the chapter, they do not fully control for the non-
independence of the observations or the censoring nature of the data, 
leaving the regressions reported in the chapter as a better estimation option. 
In tables G1-G12 we report the results of the regressions on return rates to 
non-singled out and singled out subjects.
49
 In table G13, we report the 
results of the regressions on giving rates to non-singled out subjects, 
controlling for the trustworthiness of the co-participant in the previous 
round and its interaction with a singled out co-participant.
50
 Note that in the 
regressions of table G13 we lose half of the observations since we include a 
lag. In addition, we cannot avoid an endogenity problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 We also conducted similar regressions for the giving rate. We do not report them here as 
we did not find any treatment effects for trust and they do not add anything to the 
regressions of the chapter.  
50
 Note in fact that the trustworthiness of the co-participant in the previous round (and its 
interaction with a singled out co-participant) may influence the trusting decision in the 
current round. 
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Table G1: Tobit Random Effects at subject level on Return Rates to non-
singled out subjects 
 
Regression G1 Regression G2 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.395**** 0 0.394**** 0 
All Treatments 
  
-0.08* 0.063 
BS+PIBS -0.118** 0.019 
  
GS+PIGS -0.06 0.225 
  
RS -0.075 0.204 
  
ABS -0.048 0.456 
  
Singled out in RS 0.107 0.334 0.114 0.27 
Singled out in ABS 0.066 0.522 0.098 0.29 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.167** 0.039 -0.204** 0.008 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.027 0.721 0.047 0.514 
Authority -0.194* 0.071 -0.164* 0.092 
Risk Aversion 0 0.964 -0.002 0.794 
SDS17 Score -0.004 0.458 -0.004 0.456 
RSE Score -0.007* 0.067 -0.007* 0.075 
Authority×SDS17 0.038 0.333 0.037 0.355 
Authority×RSE 0.007 0.645 0.007 0.641 
Authority×Risk Aversion -0.006 0.887 -0.004 0.924 
Age 0.002 0.69 0.002 0.65 
Gender 0.016 0.622 0.012 0.7 
UK -0.068* 0.068 -0.069* 0.064 
India -0.04 0.498 -0.035 0.55 
Christian -0.029 0.399 -0.035 0.302 
Muslim -0.109 0.225 -0.101 0.258 
Single 0.063* 0.056 0.066** 0.042 
Economics -0.101** 0.019 -0.098** 0.023 
Smoker -0.007 0.884 -0.001 0.985 
PhD -0.004 0.942 -0.006 0.909 
Constant 0.141 0.193 0.136 0.198 
Obs 484 
 
484 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -161.86 
 
-162.95 
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Table G2: Tobit Random Effects at session level on Return Rates to non-
singled out subjects 
 
Regression G3 Regression G4 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.391**** 0 0.389*** 0 
All Treatments 
  
-0.072 0.137 
BS+PIBS -0.116** 0.036 
  
GS+PIGS -0.049 0.365 
  
RS -0.075 0.248 
  
ABS -0.028 0.684 
  
Singled out in RS 0.109 0.269 0.11 0.244 
Singled out in ABS 0.021 0.817 0.052 0.53 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.171** 0.018 -0.198*** 0.005 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.023 0.721 0.038 0.551 
Authority -0.218** 0.021 -0.188** 0.032 
Risk Aversion 0 0.941 -0.002 0.786 
SDS17 Score -0.002 0.709 -0.002 0.712 
RSE Score -0.006* 0.068 -0.006* 0.074 
Authority×SDS17 0.031 0.379 0.029 0.405 
Authority×RSE 0.009 0.493 0.009 0.483 
Authority×Risk Aversion 0.003 0.935 0.006 0.876 
Age 0.001 0.848 0.001 0.769 
Gender 0.017 0.535 0.015 0.601 
UK -0.06* 0.076 -0.062* 0.068 
India -0.037 0.473 -0.035 0.508 
Christian -0.031 0.321 -0.035 0.252 
Muslim -0.115 0.157 -0.109 0.176 
Single 0.048 0.107 0.05* 0.09 
Economics -0.102*** 0.009 -0.100** 0.011 
Smoker -0.027 0.558 -0.022 0.624 
PhD -0.01 0.833 -0.014 0.768 
Constant 0.163 0.107 0.155 0.121 
Obs 484 
 
484 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -170.63 
 
-171.95 
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Table G3: Tobit Random Effects at subject level on Return Rates to non-
singled out subjects controlling for decision period 
 
Regression G5 Regression G6 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.411**** 0 0.411**** 0 
All Treatments 
  
-0.085** 0.045 
BS+PIBS -0.122** 0.015 
  
GS+PIGS -0.066 0.18 
  
RS -0.082 0.16 
  
ABS -0.055 0.388 
  
Singled out in RS 0.126 0.252 0.131 0.201 
Singled out in ABS 0.072 0.484 0.102 0.267 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.159** 0.047 -0.194** 0.011 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.026 0.728 0.046 0.522 
Authority -0.201* 0.062 -0.172* 0.077 
Risk Aversion 0 0.981 -0.001 0.858 
SDS17 Score -0.004 0.473 -0.004 0.473 
RSE Score -0.007* 0.069 -0.006* 0.077 
Authority×SDS17 0.04 0.309 0.039 0.329 
Authority×RSE 0.007 0.622 0.007 0.618 
Authority×Risk Aversion -0.01 0.811 -0.008 0.845 
Age 0.002 0.637 0.002 0.596 
Gender 0.013 0.667 0.01 0.744 
UK -0.069* 0.061 -0.071* 0.058 
India -0.047 0.425 -0.042 0.47 
Christian -0.029 0.382 -0.035 0.29 
Muslim -0.114 0.201 -0.106 0.232 
Single 0.058* 0.075 0.062* 0.057 
Economics -0.104** 0.014 -0.102** 0.018 
Smoker -0.003 0.95 0.003 0.951 
PhD -0.006 0.904 -0.009 0.866 
Period -0.083**** 0 -0.084**** 0 
Constant 0.275** 0.015 0.271** 0.015 
Obs 484 
 
484 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -155.01 
 
-156 
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Table G4: Tobit Random Effects at session level on Return Rates to non-
singled out subjects controlling for decision period 
 
Regression G7 Regression G8 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.406**** 0 0.404**** 0 
All Treatments 
  
-0.078* 0.099 
BS+PIBS -0.119** 0.026 
  
GS+PIGS -0.055 0.299 
  
RS -0.082 0.193 
  
ABS -0.036 0.599 
  
Singled out in RS 0.127 0.196 0.127 0.176 
Singled out in ABS 0.026 0.774 0.056 0.49 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.163** 0.021 -0.190*** 0.006 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.022 0.735 0.037 0.555 
Authority -0.224** 0.018 -0.194** 0.026 
Risk Aversion 0 0.987 -0.001 0.834 
SDS17 Score -0.002 0.7 -0.002 0.704 
RSE Score -0.006* 0.07 -0.006* 0.075 
Authority×SDS17 0.032 0.351 0.03 0.378 
Authority×RSE 0.01 0.463 0.01 0.451 
Authority×Risk Aversion -0.002 0.953 0 0.99 
Age 0.001 0.77 0.001 0.69 
Gender 0.015 0.603 0.012 0.675 
UK -0.061* 0.07 -0.062* 0.063 
India -0.043 0.406 -0.04 0.438 
Christian -0.033 0.286 -0.037 0.222 
Muslim -0.123 0.127 -0.117 0.145 
Single 0.046 0.116 0.049* 0.096 
Economics -0.105*** 0.007 -0.102*** 0.008 
Smoker -0.021 0.644 -0.017 0.715 
PhD -0.011 0.822 -0.015 0.754 
Period -0.084*** 0.001 -0.085*** 0.001 
Constant 0.295*** 0.006 0.288*** 0.007 
Obs 484 
 
484 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -165.52 
 
-166.82 
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Table G5: Multilevel Random Effects on Return Rates to non-singled out subjects 
 
Regression G9 Regression G10 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.243**** 0 0.242**** 0 
All Treatments 
  
-0.057** 0.045 
BS+PIBS -0.086** 0.01 
  
GS+PIGS -0.049 0.137 
  
RS -0.058 0.144 
  
ABS -0.013 0.765 
  
Singled out in RS 0.071 0.346 0.074 0.293 
Singled out in ABS 0.026 0.71 0.069 0.266 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.094* 0.058 -0.121*** 0.009 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.041 0.404 0.05 0.289 
Authority -0.163** 0.019 -0.119* 0.057 
Risk Aversion -0.002 0.727 -0.003 0.5 
SDS17 Score -0.003 0.438 -0.003 0.416 
RSE Score -0.005* 0.065 -0.004* 0.074 
Authority×SDS17 0.029 0.282 0.028 0.307 
Authority×RSE 0.003 0.761 0.003 0.758 
Authority×Risk Aversion -0.003 0.907 -0.001 0.96 
Age 0.001 0.616 0.002 0.463 
Gender 0.021 0.322 0.017 0.408 
UK -0.031 0.211 -0.032 0.199 
India -0.043 0.281 -0.039 0.325 
Christian -0.014 0.53 -0.018 0.414 
Muslim -0.067 0.259 -0.067 0.254 
Single 0.038* 0.08 0.04* 0.062 
Economics -0.054** 0.048 -0.051* 0.065 
Smoker 0.001 0.967 0.008 0.816 
PhD -0.006 0.859 -0.009 0.802 
Constant 0.197*** 0.006 0.184*** 0.009 
Obs 484 
 
484 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll 56.349 
 
61.945 
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Table G6: Multilevel Random Effects on Return Rates to non-singled out 
subjects controlling for decision period 
 
Regression G11 Regression G12 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.252**** 0 0.251**** 0 
All Treatments 
  
-0.060** 0.036 
BS+PIBS -0.088*** 0.009 
  
GS+PIGS -0.052 0.115 
  
RS -0.061 0.121 
  
ABS -0.015 0.717 
  
Singled out in RS 0.081 0.282 0.083 0.238 
Singled out in ABS 0.025 0.711 0.068 0.267 
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.093* 0.059 -0.119** 0.01 
Singled out in GS and PIGS 0.042 0.4 0.049 0.287 
Authority -0.166** 0.017 -0.123** 0.049 
Risk Aversion -0.001 0.752 -0.003 0.526 
SDS17 Score -0.003 0.462 -0.003 0.441 
RSE Score -0.004* 0.068 -0.004* 0.077 
Authority×SDS17 0.029 0.279 0.028 0.302 
Authority×RSE 0.003 0.75 0.003 0.746 
Authority×Risk Aversion -0.004 0.882 -0.002 0.934 
Age 0.002 0.561 0.002 0.412 
Gender 0.019 0.361 0.016 0.453 
UK -0.031 0.208 -0.032 0.195 
India -0.045 0.248 -0.042 0.287 
Christian -0.015 0.499 -0.019 0.39 
Muslim -0.069 0.235 -0.07 0.229 
Single 0.035* 0.097 0.038* 0.077 
Economics -0.055** 0.043 -0.052* 0.058 
Smoker 0.003 0.932 0.009 0.784 
PhD -0.008 0.815 -0.011 0.758 
Period -0.049**** 0.001 -0.049**** 0.001 
Constant 0.274**** 0 0.262**** 0 
Obs 484 
 
484 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll 58.413 
 
64.083 
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Table G7: Tobit Random Effects at subject level on Return Rates to singled 
out subjects 
 Regression G13 Regression G14 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.416**** 0 0.416**** 0 
Asterisk 
  
-0.087* 0.095 
BS -0.017 0.85 
  
GS -0.001 0.995 
  
PIBS -0.111** 0.026 -0.115** 0.022 
PIGS -0.069 0.158 -0.075 0.129 
RS+ABS -0.153** 0.017 
  
Risk Aversion -0.01 0.202 -0.008 0.281 
SDS17 Score 0.005 0.401 0.005 0.433 
RSE Score -0.006 0.168 -0.006 0.155 
Age 0.009 0.115 0.009 0.109 
Gender 0.001 0.97 0.002 0.955 
Economics -0.055 0.256 -0.062 0.202 
UK 0.052 0.233 0.046 0.291 
India -0.05 0.469 -0.062 0.372 
Christian -0.07* 0.07 -0.072* 0.065 
Muslim -0.190** 0.033 -0.163* 0.064 
Single 0.044 0.263 0.043 0.271 
Smoker 0.015 0.772 0.014 0.794 
PhD 0.023 0.724 0.02 0.762 
Constant -0.064 0.654 -0.061 0.671 
Obs 266 
 
266 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -64.168 
 
-81.725 
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Table G8: Tobit Random Effects at session level on Return Rates to singled 
out subjects 
 Regression G15 Regression G16 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.416**** 0 0.392**** 0 
Asterisk 
  
-0.079 0.186 
BS -0.017 0.85 
  
GS -0.001 0.995 
  
PIBS -0.111** 0.026 -0.109* 0.085 
PIGS -0.069 0.158 -0.074 0.241 
RS+ABS -0.153** 0.017 
  
Risk Aversion -0.01 0.202 -0.006 0.495 
SDS17 Score 0.005 0.401 0.006 0.338 
RSE Score -0.006 0.168 -0.005 0.203 
Age 0.009 0.115 0.008 0.165 
Gender 0.001 0.97 -0.006 0.877 
Economics -0.055 0.256 -0.064 0.193 
UK 0.052 0.233 0.043 0.328 
India -0.05 0.469 -0.066 0.349 
Christian -0.07* 0.07 -0.061 0.128 
Muslim -0.190** 0.033 -0.147* 0.094 
Single 0.044 0.263 0.032 0.42 
Smoker 0.015 0.772 -0.005 0.92 
PhD 0.023 0.724 0.015 0.819 
Constant -0.064 0.654 -0.031 0.831 
Obs 266 
 
266 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -74.659 
 
-86.47 
 
Table G9: Tobit Random Effects at subject level on Return Rates to singled 
out subjects controlling for decision period 
 Regression G15 Regression G16 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.420**** 0 0.419**** 0 
Asterisk 
  
-0.089* 0.089 
BS -0.017 0.854 
  
GS -0.01 0.911 
  
PIBS -0.109** 0.028 -0.112** 0.024 
PIGS -0.071 0.148 -0.076 0.12 
RS+ABS -0.151** 0.018 
  
Risk Aversion -0.01 0.201 -0.009 0.27 
SDS17 Score 0.006 0.377 0.005 0.406 
RSE Score -0.006 0.175 -0.006 0.158 
Age 0.009 0.122 0.009 0.114 
Gender -0.001 0.97 0 0.992 
Economics -0.054 0.264 -0.061 0.208 
UK 0.052 0.233 0.047 0.285 
India -0.049 0.473 -0.061 0.379 
Christian -0.069* 0.071 -0.071* 0.068 
Muslim -0.188** 0.034 -0.163* 0.064 
Single 0.043 0.272 0.043 0.276 
Smoker 0.013 0.811 0.011 0.841 
PhD 0.023 0.731 0.019 0.77 
Period -0.05 0.145 -0.054 0.121 
Constant 0.022 0.886 0.03 0.847 
Obs 266 
 
266 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll 290.834 
 
-79.288 
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Table G10: Tobit Random Effects at session level on Return Rates to 
singled out subjects controlling for decision period 
 Regression G17 Regression G18 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.420**** 0 0.419**** 0 
Asterisk 
  
-0.089* 0.089 
BS -0.017 0.854 
  
GS -0.01 0.911 
  
PIBS -0.109** 0.028 -0.112** 0.024 
PIGS -0.071 0.148 -0.076 0.12 
RS+ABS -0.151** 0.018 
  
Risk Aversion -0.01 0.201 -0.009 0.27 
SDS17 Score 0.006 0.377 0.005 0.406 
RSE Score -0.006 0.175 -0.006 0.158 
Age 0.009 0.122 0.009 0.114 
Gender -0.001 0.97 0 0.992 
Economics -0.054 0.264 -0.061 0.208 
UK 0.052 0.233 0.047 0.285 
India -0.049 0.473 -0.061 0.379 
Christian -0.069* 0.071 -0.071* 0.068 
Muslim -0.188** 0.034 -0.163* 0.064 
Single 0.043 0.272 0.043 0.276 
Smoker 0.013 0.811 0.011 0.841 
PhD 0.023 0.731 0.019 0.77 
Period -0.05 0.145 -0.054 0.121 
Constant 0.022 0.886 0.03 0.847 
Obs 266 
 
266 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -74.675 
 
-78.114 
 
Table G11: Multilevel Random Effects on Return Rates to singled out subjects 
 Regression G19 Regression G20 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.248**** 0 0.246**** 0 
Asterisk 
  
-0.064* 0.077 
BS -0.024 0.7 
  
GS -0.008 0.891 
  
PIBS -0.080** 0.027 -0.082** 0.023 
PIGS -0.056 0.121 -0.059 0.101 
RS+ABS -0.101** 0.018 
  
Risk Aversion -0.007 0.228 -0.006 0.322 
SDS17 Score 0.002 0.685 0.002 0.703 
RSE Score -0.004 0.236 -0.004 0.223 
Age 0.005 0.247 0.005 0.243 
Gender 0.012 0.649 0.012 0.663 
Economics -0.038 0.267 -0.042 0.217 
UK 0.043 0.172 0.04 0.201 
India -0.051 0.303 -0.059 0.234 
Christian -0.037 0.179 -0.037 0.177 
Muslim -0.105* 0.094 -0.085 0.167 
Single 0.018 0.526 0.017 0.533 
Smoker -0.003 0.944 -0.003 0.946 
PhD 0.018 0.711 0.016 0.735 
Constant 0.102 0.326 0.106 0.306 
Obs 266 
 
266 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll 24.398 
 
26.726 
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Table G12: Multilevel Random Effects on Return Rates to singled out 
subjects controlling for decision period 
 Regression G21 Regression G22 
 
b p b p 
Trust Rate as Trustee 0.250**** 0 0.249**** 0 
Asterisk 
  
-0.065* 0.072 
BS -0.023 0.709 
  
GS -0.014 0.815 
  
PIBS -0.079** 0.029 -0.081** 0.025 
PIGS -0.056 0.118 -0.059* 0.098 
RS+ABS -0.101** 0.019 
  
Risk Aversion -0.007 0.225 -0.006 0.308 
SDS17 Score 0.002 0.682 0.002 0.699 
RSE Score -0.003 0.26 -0.004 0.242 
Age 0.005 0.266 0.005 0.26 
Gender 0.01 0.715 0.01 0.719 
Economics -0.036 0.288 -0.04 0.232 
UK 0.042 0.177 0.04 0.203 
India -0.05 0.312 -0.058 0.243 
Christian -0.036 0.185 -0.036 0.183 
Muslim -0.103 0.1 -0.084 0.171 
Single 0.017 0.546 0.017 0.547 
Smoker -0.005 0.897 -0.005 0.892 
PhD 0.017 0.714 0.016 0.738 
Period -0.035* 0.095 -0.037* 0.084 
Constant 0.165 0.136 0.169 0.123 
Obs 266 
 
266 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll 22.847 
 
25.27 
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Table G13: Tobit on Giving Rates to non-singled out controlling for the 
trustworthiness of the co-participant in t-1 
 
 
Regression G23 Regression G24 
 
b p b p 
BS+PIBS 0.016 0.876 
  
GS+PIGS -0.004 0.968 
  
RS -0.024 0.848 
  
ABS 0.077 0.542 
  
Singled out in BS and PIBS -0.062 0.549 -0.054 0.593 
Singled out in GS and PIGS -0.193 0.115 -0.204* 0.066 
Singled out in RS 0.182 0.351 0.147 0.475 
Singled out in ABS 0.049 0.702 0.117 0.317 
Authority -0.347* 0.078 -0.277 0.115 
Risk Aversion 0.01 0.297 0.009 0.328 
SDS17 Score -0.021** 0.022 -0.021** 0.022 
RSE Score 0.004 0.466 0.004 0.507 
Age 0.005 0.556 0.006 0.485 
Gender 0.052 0.293 0.052 0.293 
Economics -0.149** 0.028 -0.148** 0.027 
India -0.125 0.144 -0.121 0.141 
UK 0.028 0.649 0.028 0.64 
Christian -0.156*** 0.006 -0.154*** 0.006 
Muslim -0.294*** 0.001 -0.305**** 0 
Single 0.085* 0.08 0.088* 0.068 
Smoker 0.04 0.588 0.043 0.547 
PhD 0.079 0.354 0.08 0.354 
Return rate (t-1) 0.863**** 0 0.847**** 0 
Matched With Stigma × Return rate (t-1) 0.501 0.394 0.461 0.463 
Matched With Stigma -0.095 0.386 -0.082 0.462 
Stigma 
  
0.009 0.924 
Constant 0.141 0.535 0.123 0.582 
Obs 251 
 
251 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
ll -138.12 
 
-138.61 
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Chapter 2: On the Robustness of Emotions and 
Behavior in a Power-to-Take Game Experiment 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the role played by the punishment technology 
in driving the results of power-to-take game (PTTG) experiments, and tests 
to what extent these results can be attributed to negative emotions such as 
anger, irritation, and contempt. In addition, it explores whether the 
experience gained from previous economic experiments and background of 
the participants affect subjects’ emotions and how the latter impact on 
subjects’ behavior in the context of the PTTG.  
Over the last few decades, economists have started to pay greater 
attention to the complexity of emotions on economic scenarios and have 
been trying to capture the range of possible roles that emotions play in the 
decision-making process. For instance, emotions have been proposed as an 
explanation for important economic phenomena such as cooperation (e.g. 
Frank, 1988; Fehr and Gächter, 2002) and decision-making under risk (e.g. 
Loewenstein et al., 2001), and are seen to have important consequences for 
many other economic phenomena, such as inter-temporal choices (e.g. Rick 
and Lowenstein, 2008), competition (e.g. Kräkel, 2008), bidding behavior 
(e.g. Bosman and Riedl, 2004) and bargaining behavior (e.g. Pillutla and 
Murninghan, 1996). More recently, the advent of neuroeconomics has 
further pushed forward the interest of economists on the role played by 
emotions in the economic decision-making process (for a review on 
emotions and neuroeconomics, see Phelps, 2009). 
An important branch of economic research on emotions has used 
experiments to study the impact of negative emotions, particularly anger, 
irritation and contempt, on the decision to punish (Bosman and van Winden, 
2002; Bosman et al., 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; Hopfensitz and 
Reuben, 2009; Joffily et al., 2013). This stream of research started with the 
seminal work of Bosman and van Winden (2002) on the PTTG. In the 
PTTG, there are two players, the ‘take authority’ (with income Ytake), and 
the ‘responder’ (with income Yresp). The game is divided into two stages. In 
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the first stage, the take authority selects a take rate t   [0,1], which is the 
proportion of the responder’s income that will be transferred to the take 
authority at the end of the game. In the second stage, the responder chooses 
a destroy rate d   [0,1], which is the proportion of Yresp that will be 
destroyed. Therefore, the payoffs of the game are (1-t)(1-d)Yresp for the 
responder, and Ytake + t(1-d) Yresp for the take authority. 
If the subjects are rational profit-maximizing agents, the responder 
should not destroy if the take rate is less than 1, and should be indifferent 
between all possible destroy rates if the take rate is 1. Hence, from 
backward induction, the take authority should select t = 1 – ε, where ε is an 
infinitesimal positive number. The PTTG can be interpreted as an ultimatum 
game with continuous opportunities to punish
51
 and can describe many 
economic situations where an agent can take away any part of the 
endowment of another agent (e.g. taxation, monopolistic pricing and 
principal-agent relationships) (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). 
Most of the literature on the PTTG investigates the role played by 
negative emotions on responders’ behavior through physiological (Ben-
Shakhar et al., 2007) and self-report measures (Bosman and van Winden, 
2002; Bosman et al., 2005). Both measures were found to be related to 
destruction decisions. In particular, participants who experienced intense 
anger, irritation, and contempt punished their counterparts more often and 
more severely. This result seems to identify these negative emotions as the 
main driving force of the punishing behavior in this type of context.
52
 
                                                          
51
 It is also worth noting that the endowments are allocated differently in the PTTG 
compared to the Ultimatum Game. From a traditional game theoretic point of view, this 
does not matter, but it may have important implications in terms of behavior. 
52
 Other well-established findings from the experimental literature on the PTTG show that 
people appropriate almost 60% of responders’ income, while only 20% of the responders 
destroy income and usually all of it (e.g. Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Reuben and van 
Winden, 2010). Small differences were observed between an effort treatment – where 
endowments were earned by doing a preliminary individual real effort task – and a no-
effort treatment – where endowments were exogenously given by the experimenter 
(Bosman et al., 2005). A group version of the PTTG – where decisions were made by 
groups – presented the same results qualitatively as the no-group experiment (Bosman et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, in a three-player version of the PTTG with one take authority and 
two responders, Reuben and van Winden (2008) showed that responders who knew each 
other from outside the laboratory punish and coordinate more than strangers. The PTTG has 
also been used to study the influence of participation (Albert and Mertins, 2008), gender 
pairing (Sutter et al., 2009) and waiting time (Galeotti, 2013) on economic decision-
making. 
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However, this finding may be confounded by the technology of the 
punishment adopted. In particular, the non-constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, 
adopted in the PTTG and defined as “the income reduction for the targeted 
subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment” 
(Casari, 2005:107), may explain all or part of the relationship between 
punishing behavior and negative emotions observed in previous PTTG 
studies. In the PTTG, the income reduction for the authority is tdYresp, 
whereas the cost for the responder to punish is  (   )     . Therefore, the 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is         (   )     ⁄      ⁄ , where t – the 
proportion of the responder’s income that will be transferred to the take 
authority – is an endogenous and non-constant parameter. This implies that 
the ‘demand’ for punishment is higher when t is higher (i.e. the ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio is higher). In other words, for high take rates the responder has a 
higher incentive
53
 to punish her counterpart, whereas for low take rates the 
incentive is lower. Hence, the role of negative emotions might be 
overstated; when the offence is severe subjects experience strong negative 
emotions, but they punish because punishing is cheaper for increasing 
offences and not, or not only, because they experience anger, irritation or 
contempt. It thus becomes important to test the robustness of the results of 
PTTG experiments against this possible source of confound. If a confound 
exists, we may need to reconsider the role played by these negative 
emotions in this type of context.  
In order to investigate to what extent the punishment behavior 
observed in previous studies on the PTTG is explained by the punishment 
technology rather than negative emotions, we conducted a laboratory 
experiment using students from our university. We varied the extent to 
which the punishment technology embedded a variable or a constant ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio. Emotions were assessed through self-report measures, as in 
previous studies.
54
 Given the variety of cultural backgrounds of the students 
enrolled at our university, we also ran separate sessions for UK students and 
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 Here the incentive is the cost reduction from punishing per unit of punishment. 
54
 For a discussion on the reliability of self-reports in measuring emotions, see Bosman and 
van Winden (2002) or Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009). 
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non-UK students.
55
 We believe this is particularly important in our 
experiment for two main reasons. First, we re-created, at least for half of the 
sessions (i.e. those with UK subjects), a lab environment analogous to the 
one used in previous PTTG studies where most of the participants had a 
similar cultural background. Second, we are able to control for and test, in a 
systematic way and under certain standardized conditions (e.g. location of 
the laboratory, university training, etc.), whether there are cultural 
differences in the elicitation and manifestation of emotions – as it has been 
observed in previous psychological and anthropological literature (for a 
review, see Mesquita and Frijda, 1992) – when students with a different 
cultural background are employed.
56
 Finally, we collected, in a final 
questionnaire, the information about experience of our subjects in prior 
economic experiments, and use it as a control in the data analysis.
57
 This is 
also extremely important as subjects with more experience of the 
environment and the dynamics of laboratory experiments may be more 
aware of what they should expect in an economic experiment and, therefore, 
they might experience less strong emotions and/or be better able to cope 
with their emotional urges than inexperienced subjects. 
To give a brief overview of our results, we find that the bias caused 
by the punishment technology adopted in the standard PTTG is large and 
significant. In particular, the punishment and the role played by anger, 
irritation, and contempt on the decision to punish are inflated, especially for 
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 We recruited subjects using the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In the non-UK 
sessions, we avoided recruiting students from Western societies. This was because we 
wanted to ensure the highest degree of cultural separation between UK and non-UK 
subjects. As a result, apart from one Australian participant, non-UK subjects consisted of 
Asian, South American, African and East European students. 
56
 We cannot rule out the possibility that UK and non-UK students are different self-
selected sub-samples of their native populations. However, the main purpose of this 
exercise is not to test whether UK individuals are in general different from non-UK 
individuals, but rather to establish whether it is methodologically legitimate to conduct 
experiments with non-native students when the aim is to study the emotional basis of 
punishing behavior, especially in the light of the findings of the literature in psychology.  
57
 Note that there are generally two kinds of learning relevant to subjects who participate in 
economic experiments: ‘experimental’ learning and ‘within game’ learning (Friedman, 
1969). ‘Experimental’ learning refers to the general experience that subjects acquire by 
participating in many different experiments not necessarily linked to each other. ‘Within 
game’ learning refers to a type of experience acquired in the particular experimental set-up 
or specific game-theoretical framework under examination. In our experiment, we 
controlled for and referred to the first type of learning, since none of our subjects had ever 
participated in a PTTG experiment before. 
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high take rates. When we look at the cultural background of the subjects, we 
do not find any difference between UK and non-UK subjects in the way in 
which emotions are experienced and impact on the decision to punish. 
Finally, we find that more experienced subjects punish less often and less 
severely when they experience increasing contempt compared to less 
experienced subjects. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
experimental design, Section 3 describes the theoretical background and the 
behavioral hypotheses, Section 4 reports the results, then Section 5 
discusses the results and concludes.  
2. Experimental Design 
We conducted the experiment between March and September 2012 
at the University of East Anglia, with 282 students participating in the 
experiment over many sessions.
58
 Each session lasted on average 50 
minutes. No subject was allowed to participate in more than one session. 
Subjects received a show-up fee of £5 and earned on average £9.41 (around 
15 US dollars). In order to ensure the greatest comparability of our 
experiment with previous literature, we tried to replicate, as close as 
possible, the experimental procedures adopted in previous PTTG 
experiments. In particular, we (a) conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment, 
(b) employed the same instructions, exercises, examples and procedures as 
previous PTTG studies,
59
 (c) avoided any particular or suggestive 
terminology during the sessions, such as ‘take authority’ or ‘take rate’, (d) 
adopted the same double blind procedure of Bosman and van Winden 
(2002) for the payments, and (e) assessed emotions on a 7-point Likert scale 
via self-reports after each subject learned about the decision of their 
counterpart. More details about the experimental procedure are provided 
below. 
Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned the role of 
participant A (take authority) or participant B (responder) by drawing a 
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 Details of the socioeconomic characteristics of the subjects and experimental instructions 
are in the appendix. 
59
 Minor adjustments to the original instructions were made to fit them to our laboratory 
routines, monetary payments and comparability of our treatments. 
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letter from an urn, then randomly allocated to a computer workstation which 
was isolated from other workstations via partitions. Then the instructions 
were distributed and read aloud to provide common information to the 
subjects. Two individual computerized exercises followed in order to check 
the subjects’ understanding of these instructions. Clarifications were 
individually provided to subjects with incorrect answers. After completion 
of these exercises, each participant A was randomly matched with a 
participant B by asking participant A to randomly choose a coded envelope 
which was linked to a certain participant B. Each participant A was then 
asked to fill in the take rate, that is the proportion of participant B’s 
endowment that would be transferred to participant A at the end of the 
experiment, on the form that was placed inside the envelope. Afterwards, 
the envelopes containing the forms were collected and given to all 
participants B who were asked to complete the form with the destroy rate, 
that is the proportion of their endowment that will be destroyed. The 
envelopes with the forms inside were then given back to all participants A, 
who could take note of the decision of their corresponding matches. 
Subsequently, each subject was asked to fill in a questionnaire concerning 
emotions, expectations about the decision of their counterpart,
60
 and 
personal information. Meanwhile, the envelopes were collected and handed 
to the cashier who was outside the laboratory and, hence, not present during 
the experiment. Subjects were then privately paid one-by-one outside the 
laboratory by the cashier. 
As in Bosman and van Winden (2002), we assessed a list of eleven 
emotions. To not direct the attention of the subjects to specific emotions, the 
list include both negative emotions that previous studies have found relevant 
for explaining the punishing behavior observed in the PTTG (i.e. anger, 
irritation, and contempt), other less influential negative emotions (i.e. envy, 
jealousy, sadness, shame, fear), positive emotions (i.e. joy, and happiness), 
and neutral emotions (i.e. surprise). For each emotion, subjects were asked 
to state how much they felt the emotion on a 7-point Likert scale when they 
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 Participant B was asked to indicate which percentage of his/her endowment he/she 
expected participant A would decide to transfer to himself/herself; participant A was asked 
to indicate which percentage of the transfer he/she expected participant B to destroy. 
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learned about the decision of their counterparts. The scale ranged from “no 
emotion at all” to “high intensity of the emotion” (Bosman and van Winden, 
2002). 
We employed a 2×2 factorial design crossing the nature of the ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio embedded in the punishment technology (constant or variable) 
with the cultural background of the subjects who participated in the sessions 
(UK or non-UK students). Note that subjects were not told about the 
nationality of their co-participants in the experiment. Hence, they did not 
know that they took part in a session with all UK or non-UK participants.
61
 
The main features of the design and the number of independent 
observations
62
 per treatment are summarized in Table 1. The two treatments 
under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio are exact replications of previous PTTG 
experiments (i.e. Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005), in 
one case with only UK subjects and in the other case with only non-UK 
subjects (consisting of Asian, South American, African and East European 
subjects).
63
 In these treatments, the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was increasing in the 
take rate and ranged from 0 to infinite. The same separation of the subjects 
based on cultural background occurred in the treatments under a constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. However, here the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was constantly equal 
to 2 and, therefore, independent of the take rate.
64
 Most of the literature on 
punishment behavior in economics usually employs ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios 
ranging from 1 to 4 (e.g. Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). We opted for a 
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 Subjects also usually arrived a little at time to the experiment, and were immediately 
seated to their cubicles after registration to avoid them queuing at the entrance of the lab. 
Hence, the likelihood of subjects seeing and interacting with each other as they arrived was 
minimized. In addition, partitions ensured that subjects did not see each other during the 
experiment. 
62
 An independent observation is a pair consisting of a responder and a take authority. 
Variations in the number of independent observations across treatments are due to different 
rates of attendance across sessions. 
63
 The exception is one subject from Australia who played in the role of a take authority. It 
is also worth noting that there was a predominance of Chinese among the non-UK subjects 
(see the appendix). 
64
 In order to employ a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, we simply stated in the instructions that 
“for each 1% of his or her endowment that participant B decides to destroy, 10 pence of the 
transfer to participant A will be destroyed as well”. In addition, we allowed subjects to 
deduct the cost of punishing from their show-up fee, if needed. For this reason, the show-up 
fee was set at the level of £5 to ensure that, at worst, subjects (in particular, participants B) 
could leave the experiment with £2.50 in their pockets. This ensured that participants B 
could punish participants A for any possible value of the take rate without incurring losses. 
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value in the middle of the range, equal to 2.
65
 Such a ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio has 
been extensively used in previous economic experiments to study 
punishment behavior (e.g. de Quervain et al., 2004; Cubitt et al., 2011). It 
also maximizes the comparability with the other treatment where the ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio is variable, and with previous PTTG experiments. Note in fact 
that a ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2 corresponds, under a variable ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio, to a take rate of   ⁄ , which is roughly equivalent to the mean and 
median take rate observed in previous PTTG experiments, and obtained in 
our treatment with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. Hence, when we compare 
the two treatments, we have approximately half the observations where the 
incentive to punish is lower in the “constant fine-to-fee ratio” treatment, and 
the other half where the incentive is higher. This allows us to measure the 
bias, if there is any, which may occur in the standard PTTG for both sides of 
the distribution of the take rates: when       (i.e. when the variable ‘fine-
to-fee’ is lower than the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio), and when       (i.e. 
when the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ is higher than the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio). 
Table 1: Features and independent observations of the experimental 
treatments 
 Variable ratio Constant ratio Total 
UK subjects 37 34 71 
non-UK subjects 33 37 70 
Total 70 71 141 
Notes: One independent observation is a pair of a take authority and responder. 
Figure 1 displays how the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio evolved over different 
values of the take rate in the treatments under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
and under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio respectively. The graph clearly 
shows that under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio the effectiveness of the 
punishment increases exponentially as the take rate increases. As a 
consequence, subjects might punish simply because it is more ‘convenient’ 
to do so and not or not only because they experience negative emotions 
(which is to be expected for increasing take rates). In other words, in this 
set-up, the idiosyncratic features of the punishment technology might induce 
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 A value of 2 means that the cost of punishing is half of how much the punishment 
reduces participant A’s endowment. 
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an effect on behavior which can be confounded with that of negative 
emotions (for a discussion of confounds in experiments see Zizzo, 2013). 
This possibility is instead ruled out in the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
treatments, where no confound can be attributed to the punishment 
technology. 
Figure 1: Patterns of variable and constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios 
 
3. Theoretical background 
In this section, we briefly discuss the theoretical implications of 
having a constant versus variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, embedded in the 
punishment technology, for the behavior and emotions of the responder in 
the PTTG, and present the hypotheses and conjectures that can be tested. 
We build on the model that Loewenstein (2000) proposed to describe the 
impact of visceral factors in the utility function of an agent. Let   (     ) be 
the utility function of a generic responder i, in which    is the consumption 
activity, in our case the size of the punishment, and    the visceral state, in 
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our case the experience of anger, irritation or contempt. These emotions 
may affect behavior through two mechanisms: the “carrot” and the “stick” 
(Loewenstein, 2000). The “carrot” is captured by    (     )       ⁄   , 
and identifies the  increase in utility that the responder experiences as a 
result of the mitigating effect of the punishment on the emotion. The “stick” 
is represented by    (  
    )    ⁄   , where   
  is the absence of 
punishment, and identifies the marginal disutility that the responder 
experiences, if he or she does not satisfy the emotional impulse to punish. 
These two effects altogether induce the responder to punish when he or she 
experiences anger, irritation or contempt, and to punish more the higher is 
the intensity of the emotion. In other words, if we call   
  the optimal 
punishment, this may rise if the intensity of the negative emotion rises as 
well (   
    ⁄    ). In the context of the PTTG, the responder may 
experience emotional distress when, for instance, the decision of the 
counterpart is perceived as unkind or when the distribution of the income 
becomes unequal, which may occur every time that    increases. To mitigate 
this distress, the responder may decide to punish. Hence, negative emotions 
may be one of the underlying mechanisms that explain social preferences.  
Anger, irritation or contempt may not be the only explanation of the 
decision to punish. The responder may, for instance, punish because he or 
she feels the need to comply with what he or she believes it is the 
appropriate behavior in the lab (Zizzo, 2010) or because he or she 
misunderstands the instructions or the incentives in the experiment.
66
 On top 
of these alternative explanations of punishing behavior, the decision to 
punish may also be sensitive to more traditional economic incentives such 
as the cost per unit of punishment that the responder needs to pay in order to 
damage the counterpart, which is a measure of the effectiveness of the 
punishment (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). To formalize all this, let 
assume that optimal punishment (  
 ) depends on the intensity of the 
negative emotion (anger, irritation or contempt), which, in turn, depend on 
                                                          
66
 A significant part of the behavior observed in experiments may be attributed to confusion 
or mistakes, as, for instance, Andreoni (1995) found in the context of public good games. 
Confusion and mistakes may explain why a responder punishes in the PTTG since the only 
possible direction in which a responder can make a mistake is towards punishment. 
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the take rate experienced by the individual (  ), the effectiveness of the 
punishment, which is equivalent to the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (  ), and a generic 
parameter    which captures everything else, including confusion, mistakes, 
and experimenter demand effects.
67
 We can write the optimal punishment 
as: 
  
    
 (  (  )      ) 
For the chain rule, the optimal level of punishment weakly increases 
in the take rate (      ⁄    ).
68
 In addition, it is weakly increasing in the 
fine-to-fee ratio (      ⁄    ).
69
 Under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio,    is 
an increasing function of   . Remember that      (    )⁄ . This means 
that the punishment may be even higher if    increases (i.e.    may have a 
multiplier effect on the decision to punish by means of the non-constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio). This multiplier effect is given by     (    ) ⁄    ⁄  
 (    )
 ⁄ , and is exponentially increasing in   . In contrast, if the ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio is a constant (    ̅), its impact on the decision to punish should 
be the same across different level of    (i.e. there is no multiplier effect).
70
 
Hence, under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the role of negative emotions 
may be overstated. By comparing a situation where the punishment 
technology embeds a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio with a situation where the 
punishment technology is characterized by a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, we 
can measure how much of the punishment is actually attributable to the 
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 For simplicity, we also assume perfect separability between    and   , that is    does not 
affect    and vice versa. 
68
       ⁄  (      )⁄ (      )⁄    since         ⁄  and         ⁄ . 
69
 If the responder displays a rational and self-interested behavior, he or she should never 
destroy if     , and be indifferent between any levels of punishment if     . This is 
irrespectively of the size of the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. In other words,       ⁄     and 
     ⁄    . If his or her behavior is driven by reciprocity (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Duwfenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004), the punishment should be more likely as    increases (i.e.   𝑖  𝑖  
0), caeteris paribus, and, less likely as   increases (i.e.   𝑖     ), caeteris paribus. If the 
responder cares about equality (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the punishment should be 
more likely as    increases (i.e.   𝑖  𝑖   ), caeteris paribus. For any given level of   , the 
punishment should also be weakly increasing in   (i.e.   𝑖     ). The proofs are in the 
appendix. 
70
 Note that, in this study, we are not interested in how different constant levels of   impact 
on the decision to punish. Our aim is to establish how much of the punishing behavior 
observed in PTTG experiments is actually attributable to negative emotions rather than the 
multiplier effect caused by the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
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multiplier effect rather than emotional distress,
71
 but also whether negative 
emotions matter at all. Note in fact that it is possible that         ⁄  and 
        ⁄ . If the latter is the case, punishment is better explained by the 
parameter    rather than anger, irritation or contempt. 
Based on this simple model that describes the motivations of the 
responder to punish, we can formulate the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. In the standard PTTG, the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
produces a multiplier effect on the decision to punish, that is 
(      )⁄ (      )⁄    , and thus the role of other factors, including 
negative emotions, is overstated. 
We can test this hypothesis by studying how the difference in 
punishment evolves between a constant and a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
when the take rate increases. The null hypothesis is that there is no such 
multiplier effect, that is (      )⁄ (      )⁄    . 
Hypothesis 2. Once the multiplier effect is removed, the intensity of 
anger, irritation, or contempt does still explain the punishing behavior of the 
responder, that is         ⁄ .  
We can test this hypothesis against the null hypothesis that 
punishing is due to something else (e.g. confusion, experimenter demand 
effects) by looking at whether these negative emotions do still explain 
punishing behavior when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is constant.  
Hypothesis 3. Due to the multiplier effect, anger, irritation, and 
contempt erroneously predict much more punishing behavior under a 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio compared to a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, that is 
   
        
    ⁄⁄ , where   
  is the level of punishment with a variable 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, and   
  is the level of punishment with a constant ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio.  
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 Note that it is not possible to separate the multiplier effect, caused by the variable ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio, from the arousal effect, caused by the negative emotion, using statistical 
analysis on the data collected from previous PTTG studies. This is because of the very high 
correlation between negative emotions and the take rate.   
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Hypothesis 3 can be tested by comparing how much of the punishing 
behavior is explained by these negative emotions under a variable versus a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
On top on these hypotheses, we are also able to investigate the two 
following conjectures. 
Conjecture 1. The emotional response of UK and non-UK students is 
different and produces different patterns of punishing behavior. 
Conjecture 1 is motivated by two streams of research: one, from 
psychology, suggesting that there are cultural differences in the elicitation 
and manifestation of emotions (e.g. Mesquita and Frijda, 1992), the other, 
from economics, showing that punishment may vary across societies and 
cultures (e.g. Hermann et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2006; Gächter et al., 
2005). There may be a link between these two lines of research insofar as 
emotions may play an important role for the decision to punish. We look at 
this from a methodological point of view. In particular, given the common 
practice of many economic experiments to employ students with different 
culture background, we investigate whether the emotional basis of economic 
behavior may be affected by the cultural background of the participants.  
Conjecture 2. More experienced subjects are able to better cope with 
their emotional urges to punish.  
This second conjecture stems from the evidence that, in many 
contexts, experienced participants behave differently compared to 
inexperienced or less experienced subjects, both in the field and in the lab 
(e.g. Kagel and Levine, 1999; Myagkov and Plott, 1997; Levitt and List, 
2007; List and Levitt, 2005). In particular, experienced subjects seem to 
behave more rationally and take more “cold-blooded” decisions compared 
to inexpert subjects. One possible explanation, which has not so far been 
investigated in the literature, is that subjects with more experience are more 
aware of what they should expect in the economic environment where they 
operate, and, therefore, they might experience less strong emotions and/or 
be better able to cope with their emotional urges than inexperienced 
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subjects. We investigate this possibility in the context of the PTTG with 
respect to the punishing behavior of the responders. 
4. Results 
In this section, we first check whether there is any difference in the 
behavior of the take authorities across the treatments. Then, we move to the 
main focus of this study, that is the punishing behavior of the responder, to 
test whether there exists any bias in the standard PTTG compared to the 
modified version of the PTTG where the punishment technology embeds a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. Afterwards, we look at emotions and the extent 
to which anger, irritation, and contempt explain the punishing behavior of 
the responders.
72
 Finally, we briefly consider the expectations of the 
responders, and whether they help to understand behavior and emotions. 
Table 2: Take rates 
 Variable σ Constant σ 
 n. Mean St. dev. n. Mean St. dev. 
UK 37 57 26.89 34 54.34 30.11 
non-UK 33 72.27 20.71 37 62.70 25.35 
Total 70 64.2 25.20 71 58.70 27.85 
Behavior of the take authorities. Table 2 displays the take rates of 
UK and non-UK subjects under both constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratios. The results are in line with previous PTTG experiments. However, 
there is evidence of behavioral differences between UK and non-UK 
subjects. In particular, non-UK subjects display statistically significantly 
higher take rates than UK subjects both in aggregate (Mann-Whitney p = 
0.023) and under variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios (Mann-Whitney p = 0.012).73 
If we compare the behavior of the subjects under a constant and variable 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratios, there is no significant difference at 5% level between the 
take rates, both in aggregate, and within the sample of UK and non-UK 
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 In the appendix, we also look at the emotions of the take authorities. 
73
 No significant difference occurs between UK and non-UK subjects under a constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (Mann-Whitney p = 0.351). 
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subjects respectively.
74
 These tests suggest that non-UK take authorities 
appropriate more resources than UK take authorities.  
A Tobit regression analysis confirms this result.
75
 Table 3 presents 
the outcomes of this analysis. The dependent variable is the take rate. In 
Regression 1, explanatory variables include a dummy variable for the 
experimental sessions under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (    ̅), the 
nationality of the subjects (non-UK = 1 for non-UK subjects), and an 
interaction term between the dummy for the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio and 
nationality. In Regression 2, we also include the experience of the subjects 
in previous experiments,
76
 their gender (Male = 1 for male subjects), and 
their age. 
Table 3: Tobit regression on take rate 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 b se P B se p 
    ̅ -2.336 8.202 0.776 -3.232 8.084 0.69 
non-UK 17.913*** 6.788 0.009 22.450*** 6.556 0.001 
    ̅ × non-UK -7.138 10.541 0.499 -8.483 10.92 0.439 
Experience 
   
-0.115 2.665 0.966 
Male 
   
4.673 5.489 0.396 
Age 
   
-1.719*** 0.483 0.001 
Constant 56.445*** 5.202 0 91.046*** 12.09 0 
Obs 141   141   
Pseudo R-Square 0.007   0.015   
Df 138   135   
Prob > F 0.02   0.001   
Notes: Tobit regression with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01,  
The coefficient of the dummy variable non-UK is positive and 
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of the interaction term is not 
statistically significant. This implies that non-UK take authorities take more 
money than UK take authorities both under a variable and constant ‘fine-to-
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 In aggregate, and within the sample of UK subjects, the difference is not statistically 
significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.191 and 0.732 respectively). For non-UK subjects the 
difference is weakly statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.098). 
75
 10 observations are left-censored and 16 right-censored. 
76
 The data for ‘experience’ was collected from the final questionnaire provided to the 
subjects. In particular, subjects were asked to indicate whether they had previously 
participated in “0”, “1”, “2” or “3 or more than 3” experiments. 
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fee’ ratio once covariates are controlled for.77 We should point out that the 
aim of our experiment was not to study the behavior of the take authorities, 
but the punishing behavior and emotions of the responders. Different 
conjectures might explain why non-UK take authorities appropriated more 
resources than UK take authorities. We will briefly examine them in the 
next section. 
Behavior of the responders. We define the punishment rate as the 
proportion of the amount taken by the take authority that was destroyed by 
the responder.
78
 As we discussed in Section 3, the punishment rate may 
depend on the amount taken by the take authority because of several 
psychological reasons such as inequality aversion, and reciprocity. Hence, 
we need to control, in the analysis of the punishing behavior, for the impact 
of the take rate. Figure 2 displays the scatterplots, and the locally weighted 
smoothed regressions of the punishment rate as a function of the take rate, 
for each of the treatments. The behavioral pattern of UK and non-UK 
subjects appears to be very similar. In particular, when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
is variable, the punishment of both UK and non-UK subjects raises 
exponentially as the take rate increases. When the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is 
instead constant, both UK and non-UK subjects increase their punishment 
less in response to higher take rates. This is preliminary evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis 1. In particular, it seems that, under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, 
there is a multiplier effect at work which induces more punishment from the 
responders when the take rate increases. We can test this more formally with 
non-parametric techniques. In particular, we can group the take rates into 
four classes based on their distribution: the very low take rates (the bottom 
25%), the low take rates (between 25% and 50%), the high take rates 
(between 50% and 75%), and the very high take rates (the top 25%).
79
 This 
distinction enables us to investigate the punishing behavior controlling for 
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 There is also evidence that, other things being equal, older subjects take on average less 
than younger subjects. 
78
 The punishment rate coincides with the destroy rate under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, 
and is equal to    ⁄  under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, that is the amount destroyed 
(           ) over the amount taken (           ).  
79
 The 25th quartile corresponds to a take rate of 0.5; the 50
th
 quartile (median) to a take 
rate of 0.6; while the 75
th
 quartile to a take rate of 0.8. Hence,    is classified as very low 
take rate if       , low take rate if           , high take rate if           , and 
very high take rate if       . 
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different level of the take rate, and also discriminating between take rates 
for which the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is lower than the variable ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio, and vice versa. Note in fact that the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
crosses the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio at      ⁄  (see Figure 1), which is 
slightly above the median of the distribution of the take rates. Hence, for the 
very low and low take rates, the incentive to punish is higher under a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. In contrast, for the high and very high take rates, 
the opposite is true, that is the incentive to punish is higher under the 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.80  
Figure 2: Relationship between punishment rate and take rate 
 
Notes: The locally weighted regressions are computed using a bandwith of 
0.8 (80% of the data). 
Table 4 displays the punishment rates for UK and non-UK subjects 
under both constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios. First of all, we can 
check, for each class of the take rates, whether the behavior of UK subjects 
is statistically different from the behavior of non-UK subjects. We do not 
find any statistically significant differences between the behavior of UK and 
non-UK subjects for each class of the take rates, either under a variable and 
                                                          
80
 To be precise, among the high take rates, there are 3 out of 38 observations at        , 
which are slightly below      ⁄ , and where, therefore, the incentive to punish can be 
considered as identical between the constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.  
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constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.81 We can thus pool the data of UK and non-UK 
participants together to increase the power of our tests. If we compare the 
punishment rate of sessions characterized by a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
with sessions where the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is variable, we find that, when the 
take rates are very high, punishment is strongly significantly more severe 
under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.017). In 
contrast, when the take rates are very low, subjects seem to punish more 
under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. However, the difference is not 
statistically significant (p = 0.286). For low and high take rates, the 
punishment rates are very similar across the two treatments, and the 
difference is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.1). 
Table 4: Punishment rates 
 
σ Very Low t Low t High t Very High t 
UK 
Constant 32.94 59 76.25 93 
Variable 26.96 58.89 75 98 
non-UK 
Constant 42.63 57.00 76.92 93 
Variable 36.15 59.38 71.43 97.22 
All 
Constant 36.17 58.43 76.60 93 
Variable 31.39 59.12 73.08 97.50 
We can test the robustness of these findings in a Tobit regression 
analysis (see Table 5).
82
 The dependent variable is the punishment rate (  ). 
The independent variables are, in Regression 1, the take rate received from 
the take authority (  ), a dummy variable which takes value 1 when a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was employed, the nationality of the subjects 
(non-UK = 1 for non-UK), and two interaction terms of the dummy used to 
                                                          
81
 All the differences are not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.1) except 
for the punishment rates selected in response to take rates classified as very low, when the 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is constant. In that case, the difference between the punishment rate of 
UK and non-UK subjects is weakly significant (p = 0.063). This is due the fact that more 
UK take authorities selected a take rate of zero, compared to non-UK take authorities. 
Hence, a higher proportion of UK responders did not destroy at all. If we exclude the take 
rates equal to zero, the difference in the punishment rate is not anymore statistically 
significant. 
82
 There are 87 left-censored observations and 19 right-censored. We also tried a logit 
regression where the dependent variable was a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the 
responder destroyed and 0 otherwise. The results are similar to those presented in the paper. 
However, this approach omits much of the information about the punishment rate and, 
therefore, is less preferred than the approach based on the Tobit model. The results of the 
logit are reported in the appendix. 
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identify the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio with nationality, and the take rate 
respectively. In Regression 2, we also control for the experience, gender 
(Male = 1 for male subjects), and age of the subjects. The coefficient of the 
variable take rate is positive and statistically significant, meaning that the 
take rate from the take authority negatively affects the punishment behavior 
of the responder when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is variable. Under a constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the relationship between the take rate and the punishment 
rate is also negative but markedly weaker. This brings us to the following 
result which supports Hypothesis 1. 
Result 1. Consistently with Hypothesis 1, under a variable ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio, 70% (-2.727/3.885) of the punishment triggered by the take rate is 
attributable to the multiplier effect. 
Table 5: Tobit regression on punishment rate 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 B se p b se p 
   3.885*** 1.077 0 4.009*** 1.005 0 
    ̅  ×    -2.727** 1.126 0.017 -2.841*** 1.063 0.008 
    ̅ 162.285** 79.792 0.044 158.868** 74.332 0.034 
    ̅ × non-UK -6.019 39.41 0.879 3.95 39.673 0.921 
non-UK 26.465 29.38 0.369 30.978 29.276 0.292 
Experience    -5.528 8.564 0.52 
Male    -30.789 19.387 0.115 
Age    -3.951** 1.972 0.047 
Constant -285.573*** 81.39 0.001 -172* 89.096 0.056 
Obs 141   141   
Pseudo R-Square 0.075   0.085   
Df 136   133   
Prob > F 0.001   0.002   
Notes: Tobit regression with robust standard errors.  𝑖 and  𝑖 are expressed in percentage  
Hence, the beta coefficients identifies percentages. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the punishment rates are 
generally higher compared to a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. This is captured 
by the positive and significant coefficient of the dummy     ̅. Hence, when 
the take rates are low, punishment is higher under the constant ‘fine-to-fee’, 
and, when the take rates are high, it is higher under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio. This is shown in Figure 3 where we plot the predicted punishment rate 
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for the constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio respectively against the take 
rate. In particular, for take rates lower than 56%, the punishment is higher 
under the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, whereas, for take rates higher than 
56%, the punishment is higher under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.83 
Figure 3: Predicted punishment rate against take rate 
 
Notes: The dashed line is the predicted punishment rate under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio; 
the solid line is the predicted punishment rate under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. The 
crossed area measures the extent to which the punishment is inflated (t >56%) or deflated (t 
< 56%) under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio compared to the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
Role of emotions. We now turn to the analysis of the emotions 
experienced by the responders. We will initially consider all the emotions 
(positive, negative, and neutral) to check whether there exists any similarity 
between them and to investigate which emotions were driven by the take 
rate. We will then focus on anger, irritation, and contempt, to study the 
emotional basis of the punishing behavior. 
                                                          
83
 Among the other explanatory variables, the only coefficient statistically significant is the 
one for age. In particular, older subjects punish less than younger ones. 
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First, it is worth pointing out that, as seen in the previous literature, 
different emotions capture similar underlying emotional states. In particular, 
anger is strongly positively correlated to irritation (Spearman ρ = 0.81 and 
0.74, p = 0.000), envy to jealousy (ρ = 0.84 and 0.81, p = 0.000), and 
happiness to joy (ρ = 0.86 and 0.72, p = 0.000) for UK and non-UK subjects 
respectively. 
In order to study whether and which emotions are driven by the take 
rate, we first look at the patterns of the locally weighted smoothed 
regression lines between the intensity of each emotion and the take rate, for 
each of the treatments (Figure 4). There seems to be no differences across 
treatments on how the take rate impacts on each emotion. This is confirmed 
in non-parametric tests where, for each class of the take rates, we compare 
the intensity of each emotion between UK and non-UK subjects, and 
between the variable and constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. None of these 
comparisons result statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.1). 
Figure 4 also provides some preliminary evidence of a positive relationship 
between take rate and negative emotions, and of a negative relationship 
between take rate and positive emotions.   
Figure 4: Relationship between emotions and take rate  
 
Notes: The locally weighted regressions are computed using a bandwith of 0.8 (80% of the 
data). 
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We can test for this using some ordered logit regressions,
84
 one for 
each emotion. The dependent variable is the emotion of interest (  ), 
whereas the independent variables are the take rate received from the take 
authority, a dummy variable which takes value 1 when a constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio was employed, experience, gender (Male = 1 for male subjects), 
age, nationality of the subjects (non-UK = 1 for non-UK), and two 
interaction terms, one between the dummy for the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio and nationality, and another between the dummy for the constant ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio and the take rate. The results of these regressions are shown in 
Table 6.
85
 
Negative emotions (in particular, anger, and irritation) are 
significantly positively related to the take rate. Similarly, happiness is 
significantly negatively related to the take rate. This evidence is consistent 
with previous PTTG studies, and the theory presented earlier.
86
 It is also 
robust regardless of the background of the subjects (UK versus non-UK 
students) and the type of punishment technology employed. 
  
                                                          
84
 Robust standard errors are employed to control for heteroscedasticity. Due to some 
subjects failing to report all the emotions, we have 1 missing observation for sadness, 
shame and envy (140 observations instead of 141), and 3 missing observations for contempt 
(138 observations instead of 141). 
85
 The qualitative results do not change if we do not include the demographic variables 
among the explanatory variables. The results of these regressions are reported in the 
appendix. 
86
 The coefficients of the other explanatory variables are mostly not significant. We briefly 
mention here those which are significant. In particular, subjects with increasing experience 
in laboratory experiments experience less fear (p = 0.012) and joy (p = 0.027). Older 
subjects experience less fear (p = 0.044), anger (p = 0.043) , sadness (p = 0.055), and 
Jealousy (p = 0.049). Non-UK subjects under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio are on average 
sadder (p = 0.041). Finally, male subjects experience more sadness (p = 0.052), and 
jealousy (p = 0.056). 
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Table 6: Ordered logit regressions on emotions  
 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness Happiness Shame 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   0 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.04*** 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.66 -0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.31 
    ̅ 0.11 0.86 0.9 -0.61 0.92 0.51 0.48 0.81 0.56 -1.07 0.79 0.18 0.66 1.09 0.54 1.19 1.39 0.39 
    ̅ ×    0 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.01 0.62 -0.01 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.01 0.58 -0.01 0.02 0.51 -0.02 0.02 0.41 
non-UK 1.09* 0.57 0.06 0.17 0.51 0.74 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.6 0.46 0.19 0.29 0.52 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.32 
Experience -0.37** 0.15 0.01 -0.12 0.14 0.41 -0.02 0.16 0.88 -0.19 0.15 0.2 -0.07 0.19 0.72 -0.11 0.19 0.56 
    ̅ × non-UK 0.05 0.77 0.95 -0.08 0.65 0.9 0.34 0.67 0.61 1.37** 0.67 0.04 -0.11 0.7 0.88 0.5 0.84 0.55 
Male -0.28 0.4 0.48 0.2 0.35 0.57 0.42 0.38 0.27 0.66* 0.34 0.05 0.29 0.4 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.32 
Age -0.08** 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.13 -0.07** 0.03 0.04 -0.06* 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.89 0.04 0.04 0.38 
Obs. 141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.05 
  
0.02 
  
0.07 
  
0.06 
  
0.08 
  
0.05 
  
Prob > F 0.01 
  
0.31 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0.31 
  
 
 
Irritation Contempt Joy Jealousy Surprise 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   0.03*** 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.2 -0.01 0.01 0.64 
    ̅ 0.14 0.7 0.84 0.19 0.92 0.84 1.06 1.08 0.33 0.16 0.78 0.84 0.79 1.01 0.43 
    ̅ ×    0 0.01 0.83 0 0.01 0.97 -0.02 0.02 0.3 -0.01 0.01 0.6 -0.01 0.01 0.44 
non-UK -0.47 0.45 0.3 0.48 0.46 0.3 0.27 0.51 0.6 0.33 0.51 0.52 0.19 0.47 0.69 
Experience -0.08 0.14 0.59 0.05 0.15 0.74 -0.35** 0.16 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.55 -0.16 0.13 0.22 
    ̅ × non-UK -0.08 0.67 0.91 0 0.66 0.99 0.14 0.68 0.84 0.36 0.64 0.57 0.38 0.61 0.53 
Male 0.52 0.36 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.58 0.15 0.37 0.67 0.63* 0.33 0.06 -0.23 0.33 0.49 
Age -0.07 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.85 0.01 0.04 0.74 -0.09** 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.74 
Obs 141 
  
138 
  
141 
  
141 
  
141 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.07   0.02   0.04   0.03   0.02   
Prob > F 0   0.4   0.09   0.2   0.05   
Notes: Ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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We now consider the punishing behavior of the subjects and to what 
extent it can be explained by negative emotions. In the previous analysis of 
the relationship between punishing behavior and take rate, we have found 
that, for take rates below the median, the punishment is higher under the 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, whereas, for take rates above the median, the 
punishment is higher under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (see Result 3). 
This means that the bias in the predictive power of negative emotions that 
may characterize the PTTG with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio may be 
negative when the take rates are below the median, and positive, when take 
rates are above the median, compared to the PTTG with a constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio. It is thus important to distinguish between the role played by 
emotions when the take rates are low, and their role when the take rates are 
high. To do so, we estimate, for each emotion, the following model: 
                   ̃            ̃            ̅    
        ̃      ̅                   𝑖    
              ̅          𝑖           
              
where    is the punishment rate,    the intensity of the emotion of 
interest,     ̃ a dummy which is equal to 1 when the responder experiences 
a take rate below the median take rate ( ̃),     ̅ the dummy which identifies 
the treatment with a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio,      a dummy for the 
nationality of the subject (= 1 for non-UK subjects),      𝑖     the 
experience of the subject in economic experiments, and     and      the 
age and gender (Male = 1 for male subjects) respectively of the subject. To 
estimate the model, we run a battery of Tobit regressions, one for each 
emotion.
87
 Table 7 displays the results of the regressions for anger, 
contempt, and irritation. We focus on these emotions as they were the 
emotions which more likely predicted the punishing behavior in previous 
PTTG studies. In the appendix we report the analysis of each of the other 
emotions. 
                                                          
87
 We use robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. If we exclude the 
demographic variables from the explanatory variables, the results remain qualitatively the 
same. The results of these regressions are reported in the appendix. 
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Table 7: Tobit regressions on punishment for anger, irritation and contempt 
 
Anger Irritation Contempt 
 
b se p b se p b se p 
    ̃ 40.29 38.31 0.29 44.76 38.78 0.25 130.84*** 40.41 0 
non UK 46.54 28.48 0.1 54.57* 28.17 0.05 40.99 27.56 0.14 
    ̅ × nonUK -26.22 34.97 0.45 -16.79 33.68 0.62 -3.15 35.58 0.93 
Experience 1.39 16.24 0.93 19.46 19.32 0.32 33.51* 17.75 0.06 
Male -35.21* 20.07 0.08 -29.1 20.12 0.15 -22.16 19.39 0.26 
Age -2.21 1.86 0.24 -3.02 1.89 0.11 -4.27** 1.83 0.02 
Anger 0.03 12.8 1 
   
   
    ̃ × Anger 28.37** 11.59 0.02    
   
    ̅ ×     ̃ × Anger -23.92** 10.15 0.02    
   
    ̅ × Anger 11.96 9.16 0.19    
   
Experience × Anger -1.33 3.68 0.72 
   
   
Irritation 
   
5.14 14.52 0.72    
    ̃ × Irritation    
32.04*** 12.01 0.01    
    ̅ ×     ̃ × Irritation    
-29.08*** 10.77 0.01    
    ̅ × Irritation    
14.93 9.36 0.11    
Experience × Irritation 
   
-5.95 4.33 0.17    
Contempt 
      
45.42** 17.55 0.01 
    ̃ × Contempt       
1.76 13.01 0.89 
    ̅ ×     ̃ × Contempt       
-32.01*** 11.66 0.01 
    ̅ × Contempt       
10.01 9.06 0.27 
Experience × Contempt 
      
-13.44** 5.27 0.01 
Constant 85.83*** 12.58 0 88.19*** 12.92 0 84.38*** 12.23 0 
Obs 141 
  
141 
  
138   
Pseudo R-Square 0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.09   
Df 130 
  
130 
  
127   
Prob > F 0 
  
0 
  
0   
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors.  
𝑖
 is expressed in percentage  Hence, the beta coefficients 
identifies percentages.* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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For low take rates, an increase in the intensity of contempt induces 
responders to punish more (  = 45.42) both under a variable and constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.88 None of the other two negative emotions seem to 
explain the punishing behavior for low take rates. This brings us to the 
following result which, with respect to contempt, supports Hypothesis 2 and 
rejects Hypothesis 3. 
Result 2. In line with Hypothesis 2, but in contrast to Hypothesis 3, 
contempt is the only negative emotion that explains the punishing behavior 
of the responders for low take rates, and its effect is similar under a variable 
and constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.  
If we now look at high take rates, in line with previous literature, 
subjects who experience higher anger, irritation, and contempt punish more. 
In particular, under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, a one-unit increase in the 
intensity of anger, irritation, and contempt respectively produces a 28.37%, 
32.04%, and 45.42% increase respectively in the punishment rate.
89
 
However, much of this increase is due to the multiplier effect caused by the 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. Indeed the impact of irritation, anger, and contempt on 
the decision to punish in response to high take rates is hugely attenuated 
when we employ a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. In particular, a one-unit 
increase in irritation, anger, and contempt respectively raises the punishment 
by only 2.96%, 4.45%, and 13.41% respectively when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
is constant. This evidence supports both Hypotheses 2 and 3. We can 
present Results 3 and 4. 
Result 3. In line with Hypothesis 2, anger, irritation, and contempt 
explain the punishing behavior even when the confound caused by the 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is removed.  
                                                          
88
 The interaction between contempt and the dummy for the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is 
positive (as expected) but not significant. 
89
 Note that the interaction between contempt and the dummy for high take rates is not 
significant, meaning that the effect of contempt for high take rate is the same as for low 
take rate. 
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Result 4. Consistently with Hypothesis 3, the multiplier effect 
causes a bias when the take rates are high, and this bias accounts for 
90.76%, 87.31%, and 70.48% respectively of how much irritation, anger, 
and contempt respectively explain the punishing behavior in the PTTG with 
a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.90 
Looking at the other covariates, we do not find any support to 
Conjecture 1. In particular, the emotional response of UK and non-UK 
subjects have a similar impact on the decision to punish, and is not affected 
by which technology punishment is employed. In contrast, we find some 
support to Conjecture 2 with respect to contempt. In particular, subjects with 
increasing experience in economic experiments are able to better cope with 
contempt, as they punish significantly less when they experience such 
emotion compared to inexperienced or less experienced subjects.
91
 Note that 
experience in previous economic experiments does not eliminate the effect 
of contempt on punishing behavior, but only reduces it. We can thus present 
Result 5. 
Result 5. Consistently with Conjecture 2, the impact of contempt on 
the decision to punish is lessened for subjects who have more experience in 
economic experiments. There is no support for Conjecture 1. 
Role of expectations. As in previous PTTG studies, we also consider 
the role played by expectations in driving behavior and emotions.
92
 First, we 
shall note that there is no statistically significant difference in the way in 
which responders reported their expectations under a constant and variable 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (Mann-Whitney p = 0.422). Similarly, no difference in 
                                                          
90
 The bias is calculated as           ⁄  for anger,           ⁄  for irritation, and 
          ⁄  for contempt. 
91
 The differences in contempt due to experience may be attributed to a difference in 
expectations concerning the take rate rather than to a difference in coping. To test for this 
possibility, we also conducted a tobit regression where we included the expected take rate 
among the explanatory variables. The result does not change. Hence, we can conclude that 
more experienced subjects punish less because they are able to better cope with contempt, 
and not because they have different expectations compared to less experienced subjects. 
92
 As in previous PTTG studies, expectations were not incentivized. This is because we did 
not want to introduce any distortion that would have limited the comparability of our study 
with the previous literature. For a discussion of the reliability of measuring expectations 
without financial incentives, see Bosman et al. (2005). 
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expectations occur between UK and non-UK subjects (Mann-Whitney p = 
0.242).  
Figure 5 shows that responders who punish are generally subjects 
who expect lower take rates than the actual ones (dots above the 45° line). 
This is consistent with previous findings on the PTTG. In particular, 37 out 
of 77 optimistic responders (48.05%) punish the take authority, whereas 
only 17 out of 64 pessimistic responders (26.56%) punish. The difference 
achieves statistical significance (χ2 = 6.83, p = 0.009).93 
Figure 5: Scatter plot of expected and actual take rates 
 
 
Notes: optimistic responders (who expect a higher take rate than the actual take rate) are 
identified by dots above the 45 line; pessimistic responders (who expect a lower take rate 
than the actual take rate) are identified by dots below the 45 line. 
We also study whether emotions and behavior are affected by 
expectations. In particular, we include expectations in each regression of 
                                                          
93
 The result holds if we conduct a separate test for the treatment with a variable ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio (χ2 = 3.544, p = 0.060) and one for the treatment with a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
(χ2 = 3.077, p = 0.079). Since expectations were elicited at the end of the experiment, it 
might be possible that subjects wrongly reported them. In particular, too optimistic 
responders might have found difficult to admit that they were wrong. If such bias exists, we 
should observe a correlation between expected take rates and actual take rates. However, 
this correlation is low and not significant (Spearman ρ = 0.025, p = 0.772). 
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Table 6.
94
 It turns out that expectations have a significant positive impact on 
envy and jealousy respectively (p = 0.031 and 0.015 respectively). In other 
words, responders who expect higher take rates from the take authority, 
especially in comparison to the actual take rate, are more envious and 
jealous when they learn about the decision of their counterpart. Finally, we 
include expectations in the regression of Tables 5 and 7. However, they do 
not seem to play a significant role in explaining the punishment behavior of 
the responders.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This study contributes to the experimental literature in economics 
that looks at the role of emotions on the decision to punish. In particular, we 
investigated whether previous findings about emotions and behavior in the 
PTTG were confounded by the punishment technology adopted, and to what 
extent punishment can be truly attributed to negative emotions. We 
complemented this important analysis by also testing the robustness of our 
findings against possible differences due to the different backgrounds of the 
subjects, and whether experience in previous economic experiments affects 
how emotions drive the punishing behavior of the subjects. 
Our results provide clear-cut evidence that previous PTTG studies 
provided an inflated measure of the punishment. In particular, in the 
standard PTTG, as much as 70% of the punishment triggered by the take 
rate is attributable to the multiplier effect caused by the variable ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio.95 This confirms Hypothesis 1. When we turn to the role played by 
negative emotions, we find that, consistently with Hypothesis 2, they are 
                                                          
94
 We tried different specifications to account for expectations. In one specification, we 
simply add among the explanatory variables the expected take rate. In another specification, 
we include the difference between the take rate and the expected take rate. The results are 
the same.  
95
 If we look at the behavior of the take authorities, we do not find any significant 
difference between treatments under a variable or constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio once 
covariates are controlled for. In particular, the take authorities do not seem to anticipate the 
fact that, under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, responders punish less when the take rates are 
higher. A possible explanation is that the take authorities feel guiltier to appropriate too 
much money when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is constant because it is more costly for the 
responders to punish compared to a situation with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
Alternatively, the take authorities might adopt a general norm of fairness on how to split the 
resources that, conditional to no destruction from the responders, should apply equally to 
all of the treatments. 
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still important predictors of the punishing behavior in the PTTG. In 
particular, irritation, anger, and contempt appear to be important driving 
forces for the punishing behavior of the responders, especially in response 
to high take rate, and even once we control for the punishment technology 
and cultural background of the subjects. However, as it is postulated by 
Hypothesis 3, in the PTTG with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, their effect is 
overstated by as much as 90% for high take rates. This means that, in the 
previous literature, a confound exists and it affects both the punishing 
behavior, and the extent to which the latter is driven by negative emotions.  
If we turn to the cultural background of the subjects, we do not find 
any support for Conjecture 1. In particular, UK and non-UK subjects 
experience similar emotions, and their punishment is motivated by the same 
underlying visceral states. The only significant effect of the subjects’ 
cultural background is on the take authorities’ behavior. In particular, we 
find that non-UK students in the role of take authorities appropriate more 
resources than UK students, particularly when the punishment technology 
embeds a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. As we have already mentioned earlier, 
the purpose of this study was not to study the behavior of the take 
authorities, and how this may vary depending on the cultural background of 
the subjects. Different factors may explain why non-UK students 
appropriated more resources than UK students. We mention here a few. 
First of all, non-UK students might be more sensitive to social distance 
since, as a minority, they are more likely to be matched with students from a 
different country than their own. Several experimental studies have indeed 
shown that as social distance increases people become more anti-social (e.g. 
Buchan and Croson, 2004; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Another 
explanation might be related to potential cultural differences between 
Western societies and non-Western societies. Note that almost all the non-
UK students who played in the role of take authority were from non-
Western societies (in particular East Asia) and they were also those who 
displayed the highest take rates. This however is a rather speculative 
explanation, since it is based on an extreme cultural separation. In addition, 
we were not able to control for other unobserved variables which might 
instead better explain the difference in behavior. For instance, non-UK 
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students are more likely to represent the wealthiest subset of the population 
of their countries of origin, and this might explain their different behavior. 
Similarly, the fact that non-UK students are studying abroad could indicate 
that they are a different self-selected subsample of their native populations 
in terms of risk attitude. In particular, non-UK students might be less risk 
averse, which could explain why they choose higher take rates.
96
 Future 
research could investigate what are the specific differences between 
university subject pools that explain the differences in behavior. 
Finally, we find that experience in previous economic experiments 
has a marginal impact on our experiment. In particular, the more 
experienced subjects do not appear to cope better with their anger and 
irritation when these drive subjects to inefficient behaviors compared to less 
experienced subjects. Only the impact of contempt on punishing behavior 
appears to be lower for the more experienced subjects, consistently with 
Conjecture 2. 
To conclude, our findings contribute to the current state of the 
experimental literature in economics, particularly from a methodological 
point of view. First, our results suggest that a large part of the punishment 
behavior observed in previous PTTG studies is explained by the technology 
of punishment adopted, and that the role played by emotions is overstated. 
Second, we find that the cultural background of the subjects does not seem 
to be particularly relevant for experiments which use university students to 
investigate the emotional basis of economic punishing behavior. Finally, we 
find some evidence that experimental learning works as a potential 
moderator for the impact of contempt – but not for that of anger and 
irritation – on punishing behavior, without however nullifying its effect. 
 
 
 
                                                          
96
 Another possible explanation is that non-UK students might have found it more difficult 
to understand the instructions because of the language gap. However, we do not find any 
evidence of that. In particular, the number of mistakes in the comprehension questionnaire 
was the same between the UK and non-UK subjects (Mann-Whitney p = 0.627). In 
addition, both UK and non-UK students with incorrect answers were equally provided with 
individual clarification in order to ensure that everyone understood the instructions. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: On the Robustness of Emotions and Behavior 
in a Power-to-Take Game Experiment 
 
A. Experimental instructions 
B. Form 
C. Background information on participants 
D. Theoretical predictions 
E. Logit regressions on the decision to punish 
F. Ordered logit regressions on emotions (without demographics) 
G. Tobit regressions on punishment for all emotions 
H. Tobit regressions on punishment for all emotions (without 
demographics) 
I. Logit regressions on punishment for all emotions 
J. Emotions of the take authority 
 
A. Experimental Instructions 
 
VARIABLE ‘FINE-TO-FEE’ RATIO TREATMENT 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on decision making. During the experiment, you are 
not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please raise your hand 
if you have any questions at any point in the experiment. 
The experiment is expected to last no more than 60 minutes. All the money 
that you will earn during this experiment will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of this experiment. 
All the participants in the experiment have received the same set of 
instructions as you have. Each participant has been assigned randomly the 
role of participant A or participant B.  
Each participant in this experiment receives a show up fee of 5 pounds. 
Initial endowment 
In this experiment each participant, participant A as well as participant B, 
will receive an endowment of 5 pounds. 
Two phases 
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The experiment consists of two phases. In phase 1 only participant A must 
make a decision whereas in phase 2 only participant B must make a 
decision. Every participant thus makes one decision. 
Phase 1: participant A chooses percentage 
In this phase, each participant A will be paired with a participant B. This 
will be done by letting participant A draw a coded envelope. With the help 
of the code only we know which seat numbers are paired. Both participant 
A and B are thus anonymous. The envelope contains a form. Participant A 
must choose a percentage and fill this in on the form. This percentage 
determines how much of participant B’s endowment after phase 2 will be 
transferred to participant A. The percentage chosen by participant A must be 
a number between and including 0 and 100. 
When participant A has completed the form, it must be put in the envelope 
again. After this we will collect the envelopes and bring them to the 
participants B who are paired with the participants A by means of the code. 
Phase 2: participant B chooses percentage 
In this phase participant B has to fill in on the form which percentage of his 
or her own endowment of 5 pounds will be destroyed. The percentage 
chosen by participant B must be a number between and including 0 and 100. 
The transfer from participant B to participant A will be based on the 
endowment of participant B that is left. Note that the transfer equals the 
percentage chosen by participant A of the endowment of participant B that 
is left after phase 2. 
When participant B has completed the form, it must be put in the envelope 
again. After this we will collect the envelopes and bring them to the 
participants A who are paired with the participants B. Participant A will take 
note of the decision of participant B and, subsequently, puts the form back 
into the envelope. Finally, the envelopes will be collected for the payment 
procedure which will be clarified below. 
Example how to determine one’s payoffs 
We will now give an example for the purpose of illustration. As you know 
both participant A and participant B have an endowment of 5 pounds. 
Suppose participant A decides that 60% of the endowment of participant B 
will be transferred to him or her (participant A). In the second phase, 
participant B can destroy part or everything of his or her endowment. 
Suppose participant B decides to destroy zero percent of his or her 
endowment. The transfer from B to A is then equal to 3 pounds (60% of 5 
pounds). The total payoff for B at the end of the experiment is equal to 7 
pounds (namely, the show-up fee of 5 pounds plus the endowment of 5 
pounds minus the transfer of 3 pounds). The total payoff for A at the end of 
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the experiment is equal to 13 pounds (namely, the show up fee of 5 pounds 
plus the endowment of 5 pounds plus the transfer of 3 pounds). 
Now suppose that in this example participant B had decided to destroy 50% 
of his or her own endowment. In this case the transfer from B to A is only 1 
pound and 50 pence (namely, 60% of the remaining endowment of 
participant B after phase II, which is 60% of 2 pounds and 50 pence). The 
total payoff for A at the end of the experiment is equal to 11 pounds and 50 
pence (namely, the show up fee of 5 pounds plus the endowment of 5 
pounds plus the transfer of 1 pound and 50 pence) and for participant B 6 
pounds (namely, the show-up fee of 5 pounds plus the remaining 
endowment of 2 pounds and 50 pence after destruction minus the transfer of 
1 pounds and 50 pence). 
In summary 
In phase 1, each participant A will be paired with a participant B by drawing 
an envelope. The envelope contains a Form. Participant A fills in a 
percentage that indicates how much of participant B’s endowment will be 
transferred to participant A. When participant A has completed the form, it 
will be brought to participant B. In phase 2, participant B decides which 
percentage of his or her own endowment will be destroyed, and fills this in 
on the Form. Subsequently, the Form will go to participant A who takes 
note of the decision of participant B. Then, the Form will be collected and 
the payment procedure follows. Note, that the pairing is anonymous so that 
nobody knows whom he or she is paired with. 
Other information 
Completing the Form 
The decision of both participant A and B will be filled in on a Form. You 
have received a specimen of this Form. In phase 1, participant A completes 
the blue block. In phase 2, participant B completes the yellow block. The 
Forms must be completed with the pen that you find on your table in the 
laboratory. If a Form has been completed with another pen, the Form will be 
invalid and you will not be paid. 
Finally, for making calculations you can make use of the electronic 
calculator that is on your table. 
The payment procedure 
When participant A has taken note of the decision of participant B in phase 
2, the envelope containing the Form will be collected and brought to the 
cashier. Next, the participants will go to the reception room of the 
laboratory one by one. The cashier, who will not be present during the 
experiment, will pay the participants in the reception room. The cashier 
determines the payment of each participant with the help of the Form and 
the codes that are linked to the seats. In this way, anonymity is secured with 
regard to who earned what. 
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Exercises 
We ask you to do two exercises in order to become familiar with the 
procedures. These exercises consist of completing the Form for an 
imaginary situation and determining the payoffs. You are not actually paired 
with another participant during these exercises. Your earnings in these 
exercises will not be paid out to you. When the exercises have been 
finished, you have the opportunity to ask questions again. After this the 
experiment will start. 
Finally 
To secure anonymity, participants A and B will be divided by partitions. 
The instructions on the table will be available to you during the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment you are asked to fill in a short questionnaire. 
Anonymity is again secured. After this, you are asked to leave the 
laboratory one by one. You must be silent and refrain from communication 
with others until you have left the laboratory. 
 
COSTANT ‘FINE-TO-FEE’ RATIO TREATMENT  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on decision making. During the experiment, you are 
not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please raise your hand 
if you have any questions at any point in the experiment. 
The experiment is expected to last no more than 60 minutes. All the money 
that you will earn during this experiment will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of this experiment. 
All the participants in the experiment have received the same set of 
instructions as you have. Each participant has been assigned randomly the 
role of participant A or participant B.  
Each participant in this experiment receives a show up fee of 5 pounds. 
Initial endowment 
In this experiment each participant, participant A as well as participant B, 
will receive an endowment of 5 pounds. 
Two phases 
The experiment consists of two phases. In phase 1 only participant A must 
make a decision whereas in phase 2 only participant B must make a 
decision. Every participant thus makes one decision. 
Phase 1: participant A chooses percentage 
In this phase, each participant A will be paired with a participant B. This 
will be done by letting participant A draw a coded envelope. With the help 
of the code only we know which seat numbers are paired. Both participant 
118 
 
A and B are thus anonymous. The envelope contains a form. Participant A 
must choose a percentage and fill this in on the form. This percentage 
determines how much of participant B’s endowment after phase 2 will be 
transferred to participant A. The percentage chosen by participant A must be 
a number between and including 0 and 100. 
When participant A has completed the form, it must be put in the envelope 
again. After this we will collect the envelopes and bring them to the 
participants B who are paired with the participants A by means of the code. 
Phase 2: participant B chooses percentage 
In this phase participant B has to fill in on the form which percentage of his 
or her own endowment of 5 pounds will be destroyed. For each 1% of his or 
her endowment that participant B decides to destroy, 10 pence of the 
transfer to participant A will be destroyed as well. The percentage chosen by 
participant B must be a number between and including 0 and the maximum 
percentage required to destroy all the transfer to participant A. 
The transfer from participant B to participant A will be based on the initial 
endowment of participant B (that is 5 pounds). Note that the transfer equals 
the percentage chosen by participant A of participant’s B initial endowment 
of 5 pounds. However, participant A will receive 10 pence less for each 1% 
that participant B decides to destroy of his or her initial endowment of 5 
pounds. 
When participant B has completed the form, it must be put in the envelope 
again. After this we will collect the envelopes and bring them to the 
participants A who are paired with the participants B. Participant A will take 
note of the decision of participant B and, subsequently, puts the form back 
into the envelope. Finally, the envelopes will be collected for the payment 
procedure which will be clarified below. 
Example how to determine one’s payoffs 
We will now give an example for the purpose of illustration. As you know 
both participant A and participant B have an endowment of 5 pounds. 
Suppose participant A decides that 60% of the endowment of participant B 
will be transferred to him or her (participant A). In the second phase, 
participant B can destroy up to 30% of his or her endowment. Suppose 
participant B decides to destroy zero percent of his or her endowment. The 
transfer from B to A is then equal to 3 pounds (60% of 5 pounds). The total 
payoff for B at the end of the experiment is equal to 7 pounds (namely, the 
show-up fee of 5 pounds plus the endowment of 5 pounds minus the transfer 
of 3 pounds). The total payoff for A at the end of the experiment is equal to 
13 pounds (namely, the show up fee of 5 pounds plus the endowment of 5 
pounds plus the transfer of 3 pounds). 
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Now suppose that in this example participant B had decided to destroy 15 % 
of his or her own initial endowment. In this case the transfer from B to A is 
still equal to 3 pounds (60% of 5 pounds). However, participant A receives 
only 1 pound and 50 pence of this transfer (namely, 60% of the endowment 
of participant B, which is 60% of 5 pounds, minus 10 pence for each 1% 
that Participant B has destroyed of his or her initial endowment, which is 10 
pence × 15 = 1 pound and 50 pence). The total payoff for A at the end of the 
experiment is equal to 11 pounds and 50 pence (namely, the show up fee of 
5 pounds plus the endowment of 5 pounds plus the remaining transfer of 1 
pound and 50 pence) and for participant B 6 pounds and 25 pence (namely, 
the show-up fee of 5 pounds plus the remaining endowment of 4 pounds and 
25 pence after destruction minus the transfer of 3 pounds). 
In summary 
In phase 1, each participant A will be paired with a participant B by drawing 
an envelope. The envelope contains a Form. Participant A fills in a 
percentage that indicates how much of participant B’s endowment will be 
transferred to participant A. When participant A has completed the form, it 
will be brought to participant B. In phase 2, participant B decides which 
percentage of his or her own endowment will be destroyed, and fills this in 
on the Form. Subsequently, the Form will go to participant A who takes 
note of the decision of participant B. Then, the Form will be collected and 
the payment procedure follows. Note, that the pairing is anonymous so that 
nobody knows whom he or she is paired with. 
Other information 
Completing the Form 
The decision of both participant A and B will be filled in on a Form. You 
have received a specimen of this Form. In phase 1, participant A completes 
the blue block. In phase 2, participant B completes the yellow block. The 
Forms must be completed with the pen that you find on your table in the 
laboratory. If a Form has been completed with another pen, the Form will be 
invalid and you will not be paid. 
Finally, for making calculations you can make use of the electronic 
calculator that is on your table. 
 
The payment procedure 
When participant A has taken note of the decision of participant B in phase 
2, the envelope containing the Form will be collected and brought to the 
cashier. Next, the participants will go to the reception room of the 
laboratory one by one. The cashier, who will not be present during the 
experiment, will pay the participants in the reception room. The cashier 
determines the payment of each participant with the help of the Form and 
the codes that are linked to the seats. In this way, anonymity is secured with 
regard to who earned what. 
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Exercises 
We ask you to do two exercises in order to become familiar with the 
procedures. These exercises consist of completing the Form for an 
imaginary situation and determining the payoffs. You are not actually paired 
with another participant during these exercises. Your earnings in these 
exercises will not be paid out to you. When the exercises have been 
finished, you have the opportunity to ask questions again. After this the 
experiment will start. 
Finally 
To secure anonymity, participants A and B will be divided by partitions. 
The instructions on the table will be available to you during the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment you are asked to fill in a short questionnaire. 
Anonymity is again secured. After this, you are asked to leave the 
laboratory one by one. You must be silent and refrain from communication 
with others until you have left the laboratory. 
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B. Form 
 
Code: ______ 
 
FORM 
 
 
 
Participant A fills in this block: 
 
 
Endowment of participant A: 5 pounds 
 
 
Endowment of participant B: 5 pounds 
 
 
I (participant A) decide that ………. % of the endowment of participant B will be transferred to me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant B fills in this block: 
 
 
I (participant B) destroy ………. % of my endowment. 
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C. Background of Experimental Participants 
 
 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Female 135 47.87 
Male 147 52.13 
Total 282 100.00 
 
 
Degree Frequency Percent 
INTO 1 0.35 
Bachelor  203 71.99 
Master 49 17.38 
MPhil/PhD 26 9.22 
Staff 1 0.35 
Other 2 0.70 
Total 282 100 
 
 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Age 282 22.34 4.93 18 64 
 
 
Economics Frequency Percent 
No 229 81.21 
Yes 53 18.79 
Total 282 100.00 
 
 
Religion Frequency Percent 
No religion 165 58.51 
Buddhist 14 4.96 
Christian 63 22.34 
Confucian 2 0.71 
Hindu 6 2.13 
Jain 1 0.35 
Jewish 1 0.35 
Muslim 13 4.61 
Other 1 0.35 
Prefer not to answer 16 5.67 
Total 282 100 
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Relationship Status Frequency Percent 
Single 144 51.06 
Engaged 5 1.77 
In a relationship 97 34.40 
Married 17 6.03 
Separated/Divorced 1 0.35 
Prefer not to answer 18 6.38 
Total 282 100 
 
 
Experience* Frequency Percent 
0 32 11.35 
1 20 7.09 
2 19 6.74 
3 or more 211 74.82 
Total 282 100 
                                                    * n. of experiments attended in the past. 
 
Nationality Freq. Percent 
Australia 1 0.35 
Azerbaijan 1 0.35 
Bahrian 1 0.35 
Botswana 1 0.35 
Bulgaria 1 0.35 
China** 51 18.09 
Ghana 1 0.35 
Hong Kong 14 4.96 
Hungary 2 0.71 
India 7 2.48 
Indonesia 1 0.35 
Japan 2 0.71 
Jordania 1 0.35 
Kazakistan 3 1.06 
Kenya 1 0.35 
Liberia 1 0.35 
Lithuania 1 0.35 
Malaysia 4 1.42 
Mexico 2 0.71 
Nigeria 7 2.48 
Nationality Freq. Percent 
Pakistan 3 1.06 
Palestine 1 0.35 
Peru 2 0.71 
Poland 2 0.71 
Romania 1 0.35 
Russia 3 1.06 
Singapore 3 1.06 
Sri Lanka 4 1.42 
Thailand 3 1.06 
UK 142 50.35 
UK/China* 1 0.35 
UK/Hong Kong* 1 0.35 
UK/Nigeria* 2 0.71 
UK/Pakistan* 1 0.35 
UK/Poland* 2 0.71 
UK/Uganda* 1 0.35 
Venezuela 1 0.35 
Vietnam 5 1.77 
Zimbabwe 1 0.35 
Total 282 100 
* Subjects who have been naturalized as 
British citizens later on in life. In the chapter, 
we treat them as non-UK subjects. We also 
analyzed the data by treating these few 
subjects as UK subjects. The results of the 
chapter do not change.  
** China does not include Hong Kong in the 
table.  
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D. Theoretical predictions 
Rational and self-interested behavior 
As we have already explained in the chapter, if the responder is 
rational and profiting-maximizing, he or she should never punish if the take 
rate is less than 1, and should be indifferent between all possible punishment 
rates if the take rate is 1. This is irrespectively of whether the ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio is constant or variable. 
Inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) 
We use the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to 
describe the behavior of responders who care about equality.  According to 
this model, the utility function of a responder is: 
  (     )    (     )       (  (     )    (     )  )
      (  (     )    (     )  ) 
where    is the level of punishment of the responder i,    the take 
rate of the take authority j,   ( ) the profit of the responder, and   ( ) the 
profit of the take authority. We also assume, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
that         and       The first term of the utility function is the 
material payoff of the responder; the second term the utility loss which 
stems from disadvantageous inequality, while the third term the utility loss 
which results from advantageous inequality. Note that, in the PTTG,  
  (     )    (     ) for any    and   . In other words, there cannot be 
inequality that favors the responder. Hence, the third term of the utility is 
always equal to zero. We can re-write the utility function as: 
  (     )    (     )    [  (     )    (     )] 
Under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the utility is: 
  (     )   (    )(    )    [     (    )   (    )(    )] 
The responder selects    that maximizes his or her utility, under the 
constraint       . The optimal level of punishment depends on      In 
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particular, the responder selects either full punishment or no punishment at 
all. We can identify the value of    above which the responder select a full 
punishment and below which he or she does not punish at all. We call this 
level   
  . This is equal to: 
  
   
    
     
 
For      
  ,     ; for      
  ,     ; For      
  , the 
responder is indifferent between      and     . Hence, the greater is   , 
the more likely is the responder to punish. 
If we now turn to the case where the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is equal to 2, 
the utility function of the responder can be written as:
97
 
  (     )   (  
   𝑖
 
) (    )
   [     (    )   (  
   𝑖
 
) (    )] 
Let   
   the value of    above which the responder punishes the take 
authority and below which he or she does not punish at all:
98
 
  
   
    
    
 
Also under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the greater is   , the more 
likely is the responder to punish. 
Figure 1B displays the levels of    at which the responder selects 
    , or     , for different values of   . In the figure, we also 
distinguish between a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio and a ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
equal to 2. The white area below the line   
   identifies values of    at which 
the responder destroys all the transfer to the take authority both in the case 
                                                          
97
 Note that, under a ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2, the punishment rate is    
(    ) ( ⁄   ), where     is the destruction rate (for every 5 pence that the responder 
destroys of his or her own income, 10 pence of the transfer to the take authority are 
destroyed as well). Solving for   , we obtain:          ⁄ . For a generic constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio,         ⁄ . 
98
 For a generic constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio,   
   
        
    
. 
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of a variable and constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. The dotted white area between 
the lines   
   and   
  identifies values of    at which the responder punish 
the take authority only when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is constant. The dark 
dotted area below the line   
   identifies values of    at which the responder 
does not punish at all. For any level of   , and both under a constant and 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the higher is the take rate, the more likely is the 
responder to punish. Also, the greater is the sensitiveness of the responder to 
disadvantageous inequality (  ), the lower is the    above which the 
responder punishes the take authority.   
Figure D1: Punishment of responders who care about equality as a function 
of    and    
 
Figure 2B displays the levels of    at which the responder selects 
    , or     , for different values of   , and different constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratios. The higher is the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the more likely is the 
responder to punish when the take rate is high. 
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Figure D2: Punishment of responders who cares about equality as a 
function of   ,   , and  ̅  
 
Reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) 
To understand the implications of reciprocity on the responder’s 
decision to punish, we apply the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004) developed to capture reciprocity in sequential games.
99
 We can 
define the utility function of the responder i, evaluated at the second stage of 
the PTTG, as: 
  (      (    )   )
   (     )     
 (  (     )  
 
 
(   
     
  (     )     
     
  (     )))
 (  (       )  
 
 
(   
     
  (       )     
     
  (       ))) 
                                                          
99
 This model is an adaption of Rabin (1993)’s theory of reciprocity. The model of Rabin 
(1993) can be applied to normal form games with two players. The model of Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger (2004) can be applied to a larger set of games, including games with more 
than 2 players, and extensive games. 
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where    is the level of punishment of the responder i,    the take 
rate of the take authority j, and      the responder’s belief of the take 
authority’s belief about the responder’s decision after the take authority has 
chosen   .
100
 The first term of the equation identifies the material payoff of 
the responder, while the second term the reciprocity payoff.     is the a 
constant which captures the sensitiveness of i to reciprocity concerns. The 
term in the first parenthesis identifies the kindness of i to j, and is measured 
as the difference between the material payoff of j for a given level of 
punishment    chosen by i, and the so-called “equitable payoff” for j, that is 
the average between the lowest and highest material payoff of j that could 
result from the possible punishment choices of i. The term in the second 
parenthesis measures the belief of i about the kindness of j, and is given by 
the difference between the belief of i about how much material payoff j 
intends to give to i by choosing   , and the “equitable payoff” for i, that is 
the average between the lowest and highest material payoff of i that could 
have resulted from the possible choices of j. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that i believes that j expects no 
punishment from him or her, that is       .
101
 Under a variable ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio, the utility function can be written as: 
  (     )   (    )(    )      (   (    )   
 
 
(      ))
 ( (   )  
 
 
) 
 We can maximize this function with respect to   , subject to 
      , to obtain the optimal level of punishment for the responder. 
This optimal level depends on      In particular, we can identify the value of 
                                                          
100
 Note that we do not include the belief of the responder about the behavior of the take 
authority. This is because we are already in the second node of the game tree, where the 
take authority has already chosen a level   , and the responder already knows what the take 
authority has done.  
101
 This assumption is quite realistic since the take authority has no reason to induce a 
punishment from the responder. This is true for rational and self-interested take authorities, 
but also socially motivated take authorities. Note also that this simplification does not 
change the results in terms of the relationship between punishment and take rate. The only 
implication is that the optimal punishment rate can be only either 0 or 1. If we relax this 
assumption, the optimal punishment rate can also take values between 0 and 1. 
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   above which the responder select a full punishment and below which he 
or she does not punish at all. We call this level   
  . This is equal to: 
  
   
  
 
      √   
   
 
   
        
     
. 
 For      
  ,     ; for      
  ,     ; For      
  , the 
responder is indifferent between      and     . Hence, the greater is   , 
the more likely is the responder to punish. 
We can do the same exercise assuming now that the ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio is equal to 2. The utility function of the responder is: 
  (     )   (  
    
 
)(    )      (   (    )   
 
 
(      ))
 ( (   )  
 
 
) 
In this case, we call   
   the value of    above which the responder 
punishes the take authority, and below which he or she does not punish at 
all:
102
 
  
   
 
  
 
    
 
      
 
Similar to the case where the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is variable, the 
greater is   , the more likely is the responder to punish. 
Figure 3B displays the levels of    at which the responder selects 
    , or     , for different values of    , and distinguishing between a 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio and a ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2. The white area 
below the line   
   identifies values of    at which the responder destroys all 
the transfer to the take authority both in the case of a variable and constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. The dotted white area between the lines   
   and 
  
  identifies values of    at which the responder punish the take authority 
                                                          
102
 For a generic constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio,   
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
      
. 
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only when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is constant. The dark dotted area below the 
line   
   identifies values of    at which the responder does not punish at all. 
For any level of    , and both under a constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio, the higher is the take rate, the more likely is the responder to punish. 
Also, the greater is the sensitiveness of the responder to reciprocity 
concerns, the lower is the    above which the responder punishes the take 
authority.   
Figure D3: Punishment of reciprocal responders as a function of    and     
 
Figure 4B displays the levels of    at which the responder selects 
    , or     , for different values of    , and different constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratios. The higher is the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the more likely is the 
responder to punish when the take rate is high. 
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Figure D4: Punishment of reciprocal responders as a function of   ,    , and  ̅ 
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E. Logit regressions on the decision to punish 
The dependent variable is the a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 
when the responder destroyed, and 0 otherwise. 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 b se p b se p 
   0.062*** 0.019 0.001 0.066*** 0.017 0 
    ̅  ×    -0.047** 0.021 0.026 -0.049** 0.02 0.014 
    ̅ 2.771* 1.509 0.066 2.598* 1.438 0.071 
    ̅ × non-UK 0.228 0.793 0.774 0.322 0.824 0.696 
non-UK 0.047 0.595 0.937 0.157 0.618 0.799 
Experience    -0.314 0.191 0.1 
Male    -0.817* 0.469 0.081 
Age    -0.072* 0.041 0.081 
Constant -4.537*** 1.361 0.001 -1.854 1.668 0.266 
Obs 141   141   
Pseudo R-Square 0.141   0.186   
Df 136   133   
Prob > F 0.001   0.001   
Notes: Logit regressions with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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F. Ordered logit regressions on emotions (without demographics) 
 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness Happiness Shame 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   0 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.46 0.04*** 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.39 -0.03** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.21 
    ̅ -0.11 0.85 0.9 -0.61 0.89 0.5 0.46 0.82 0.58 -1.1 0.78 0.16 0.58 1.09 0.59 1.03 1.3 0.43 
    ̅ ×    0.01 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.48 -0.01 0.01 0.65 0.01 0.01 0.48 -0.01 0.02 0.53 -0.02 0.02 0.39 
non-UK 0.9 0.55 0.1 -0.01 0.48 0.98 0.07 0.46 0.88 0.28 0.44 0.53 0.23 0.48 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.34 
    ̅ × non-UK -0.01 0.74 0.99 -0.23 0.62 0.71 0.22 0.66 0.74 1.36** 0.66 0.04 -0.04 0.66 0.95 0.67 0.82 0.42 
Obs. 141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.03 
  
0.01 
  
0.06 
  
0.04 
  
0.07 
  
0.04 
  
Prob > F 0.1 
  
0.32 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0.1 
  
 
 
Irritation Contempt Joy Jealousy Surprise 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   0.03*** 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.61 
    ̅ 0.13 0.7 0.85 0.17 0.9 0.85 0.82 1.05 0.43 0.16 0.77 0.83 0.77 1 0.44 
    ̅ ×    0 0.01 0.71 0 0.01 1 -0.01 0.02 0.41 0 0.01 0.78 -0.01 0.01 0.45 
non-UK -0.76* 0.44 0.08 0.44 0.42 0.3 0.24 0.49 0.63 -0.04 0.49 0.93 0.22 0.47 0.64 
    ̅ × non-UK -0.06 0.66 0.92 0.03 0.65 0.96 0.24 0.67 0.72 0.27 0.62 0.67 0.45 0.6 0.45 
Obs 141 
  
138 
  
141 
  
141 
  
141 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.06 
  
0.02 
  
0.03 
  
0.01 
  
0.02 
  
Prob > F 0 
  
0.15 
  
0.05 
  
0.43 
  
0.01 
  
Notes: Ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001. 
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G. Tobit regressions on punishment for all emotions 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors.  
𝑖
 is expressed in percentage  Hence, the beta coefficients identifies percentages.* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 131.41*** 43.39 0 134.95*** 48.46 0.01 40.29 38.31 0.29 131.82*** 46.27 0.01 
non UK 65.22** 31.61 0.04 48.74 29.67 0.1 46.54 28.48 0.1 44.46 32 0.17 
Constant ratio × nonUK -58.25 41.61 0.16 -14.71 37.51 0.7 -26.22 34.97 0.45 -29.16 42.67 0.5 
Experience -22.41 18.45 0.23 -23.69 19.08 0.22 1.39 16.24 0.93 20.59 20.75 0.32 
Male -30.6 22.07 0.17 -30.64 21.4 0.15 -35.21* 20.07 0.08 -31.73 21.63 0.14 
Age -3.43 2.31 0.14 -4.61* 2.37 0.05 -2.21 1.86 0.24 -3.04 2.15 0.16 
Fear -18.55 20.59 0.37 
      
   
   ̃ × Fear -3.77 18.05 0.84 
      
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Fear -11.01 16.41 0.5 
      
   
Constant ratio × Fear 16.88 14.49 0.25 
      
   
Experience × Fear 7.02 5.72 0.22 
      
   
Envy 
   
-15.75 13.86 0.26 
   
   
   ̃ × Envy 
   
4.78 10.73 0.66 
   
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Envy 
   
-22.07** 9.42 0.02 
   
   
Constant ratio × Envy 
   
9.84 7.49 0.19 
   
   
Experience × Envy 
   
4.33 4.48 0.34 
   
   
Anger 
      
0.03 12.8 1    
   ̃ × Anger 
      
28.37** 11.59 0.02    
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Anger 
      
-23.92** 10.15 0.02    
Constant ratio × Anger 
      
11.96 9.16 0.19    
Experience × Anger 
      
-1.33 3.68 0.72    
Sadness 
         
18.01 18.04 0.32 
   ̃ × Sadness 
         
5.31 14.12 0.71 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Sadness 
         
-23.88* 12.28 0.05 
Constant ratio × Sadness 
         
12.08 10.77 0.26 
Experience × Sadness 
         
-7.08 5.47 0.2 
Constant 94.27*** 13.74 0 91.39*** 12.99 0 85.83*** 12.58 0 92.31*** 13.62 0 
Obs 141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140   
Pseudo R-Square 0.07 
  
0.08 
  
0.09 
  
0.08   
Df 130 
  
129 
  
130 
  
129   
Prob > F 0.01 
  
0.01 
  
0 
  
0.01   
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Happiness Shame Irritation Contempt 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 150.89*** 42.75 0 119.98*** 36 0 44.76 38.78 0.25 130.84*** 40.41 0 
non UK 50.12* 28.79 0.08 42.15 28.11 0.14 54.57* 28.17 0.05 40.99 27.56 0.14 
Constant ratio × nonUK -7.86 36.46 0.83 -18.14 36.37 0.62 -16.79 33.68 0.62 -3.15 35.58 0.93 
Experience 9.85 14.66 0.5 15.08 14.07 0.29 19.46 19.32 0.32 33.51* 17.75 0.06 
Male -35.79* 20.78 0.09 -38.60** 19.21 0.05 -29.1 20.12 0.15 -22.16 19.39 0.26 
Age -3.92* 2.1 0.06 -4.77** 2.18 0.03 -3.02 1.89 0.11 -4.27** 1.83 0.02 
Happiness 16.46 16.87 0.33 
         
   ̃ × Happiness -6.21 16.87 0.71 
         
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Happiness -37.04* 19.06 0.05 
         
Constant ratio × Happiness 10.38 11.31 0.36 
         
Experience × Happiness -8.45 6.07 0.17 
         
Shame    40.67* 22.57 0.07 
      
   ̃ × Shame    6.98 21.24 0.74 
      
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Shame    -30.82 18.91 0.11 
      
Constant ratio × Shame    8.67 17.39 0.62 
      
Experience × Shame    -10.19* 5.23 0.05 
      
Irritation    
   
5.14 14.52 0.72 
   
   ̃ × Irritation    
   
32.04*** 12.01 0.01 
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Irritation    
   
-29.08*** 10.77 0.01 
   
Constant ratio × Irritation    
   
14.93 9.36 0.11 
   
Experience × Irritation    
   
-5.95 4.33 0.17 
   
Contempt    
      
45.42** 17.55 0.01 
   ̃ × Contempt    
      
1.76 13.01 0.89 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Contempt    
      
-32.01*** 11.66 0.01 
Constant ratio × Contempt    
      
10.01 9.06 0.27 
Experience × Contempt    
      
-13.44** 5.27 0.01 
Constant 92.10*** 13.24 0 86.62*** 12.96 0 88.19*** 12.92 0 84.38*** 12.23 0 
Obs 141   140 
  
141 
  
138 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.07   0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.09 
  
Df 130   129 
  
130 
  
127 
  
Prob > F 0.01   0 
  
0 
  
0 
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 Joy Jealousy Surprise 
 b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 157.14*** 39.83 0 130.39** 47.64 0.01 97.75* 41.31 0.02 
non UK 55.19* 27.63 0.05 53.25 29.74 0.08 44.97 30.14 0.14 
Constant ratio × nonUK -16.87 35.25 0.63 -25.25 37.03 0.5 -24.83 39.1 0.53 
Experience 27.88 15.59 0.08 -31.6 18.32 0.09 28.61 20.76 0.17 
Male -36.32 20 0.07 -34 21.92 0.12 -25.85 19.71 0.19 
Age -3.87 2.18 0.08 -4.29 2.33 0.07 -3.51 2 0.08 
Joy 27.77 18.33 0.13 
      
   ̃ × Joy -7.59 16.91 0.65 
      
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Joy -36.44* 18.4 0.05 
      
Constant ratio × Joy 18.12 12.77 0.16 
      
Experience × Joy -16.37** 6.08 0.01 
      
Jealousy 
   
-22.75 13.68 0.1 
   
   ̃ × Jealousy 
   
5.58 11.12 0.62 
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Jealousy 
   
-17.74 9.76 0.07 
   
Constant ratio × Jealousy 
   
10.24 7.77 0.19 
   
Experience × Jealousy 
   
6.62 4.35 0.13 
   
Surprise 
      
16.21 15.21 0.29 
   ̃ × Surprise 
      
14.39 11.96 0.23 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Surprise 
      
-22.16* 10.7 0.04 
Constant ratio × Surprise 
      
10.87 8.36 0.2 
Experience × Surprise 
      
-8.86 4.98 0.08 
Constant 88.04*** 12.75 0 92.75*** 13.4 0 91.50*** 13.41 0 
Obs 141 
  
141 
  
141 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.09 
  
0.07 
  
0.07 
  
Df 130 
  
130 
  
130 
  
Prob > F 0.01 
  
0.01 
  
0.01 
  
  
137 
 
H. Tobit regressions on punishment for all emotions (without demographics) 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors.  
𝑖
 is expressed in percentage  Hence, the beta coefficients identifies percentages.* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 129.86*** 41.42 0 126.78*** 47.48 0.01 27.21 38.8 0.48 109.45** 43.89 0.01 
non UK 53.09* 29.06 0.07 40.57 28.34 0.15 46* 27.14 0.09 48.39 29.51 0.1 
Constant ratio × nonUK -54.59 39.68 0.17 -23.01 37.08 0.54 -32.12 34.32 0.35 -49.64 41.96 0.24 
Fear -0.3 13.51 0.98 
      
   
   ̃ × Fear -3.68 18.33 0.84 
      
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Fear -15.96 16.18 0.33 
      
   
Constant ratio × Fear 18.88 14.33 0.19 
      
   
Envy 
   
-4.95 7.47 0.51 
   
   
   ̃ × Envy 
   
5.15 10.93 0.64 
   
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Envy 
   
-22.39** 9.72 0.02 
   
   
Constant ratio × Envy 
   
12.29 7.52 0.1 
   
   
Anger 
      
-4.63 10.05 0.65    
   ̃ × Anger 
      
29.85** 12.49 0.02    
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Anger 
      
-24.04** 10.66 0.03    
Constant ratio × Anger 
      
13.35 9.59 0.17    
Sadness 
         
-3.19 10.19 0.75 
   ̃ × Sadness 
         
8.73 14.35 0.54 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Sadness 
         
-18.43 12.47 0.14 
Constant ratio × Sadness 
         
13.94 11.02 0.21 
Constant -115.49*** 31.06 0 -101.83*** 34.41 0 -98.41*** 30.13 0 -109.19*** 32.72 0 
Obs 141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140   
Pseudo R-Square 0.06 
  
0.07 
  
0.09 
  
0.07   
Df 134   133   134   133   
Prob > F 0 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0.01   
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Happiness Shame Irritation Contempt 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 123.44*** 42.46 0 90.61** 35.29 0.01 31.83 40.14 0.43 119.62*** 41.25 0 
non UK 41.44 28.36 0.15 37.27 27.38 0.18 50.93* 27.81 0.07 27.73 27.79 0.32 
Constant ratio × nonUK -11.75 37.45 0.75 -35.7 36.46 0.33 -27.09 33.22 0.42 -1.77 35.04 0.96 
Happiness -6.16 12.04 0.61 
         
   ̃ × Happiness 2.4 18.47 0.9 
         
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Happiness -31.26* 18.07 0.09 
         
Constant ratio × Happiness 7.81 10.85 0.47 
         
Shame    1.81 19.58 0.93 
      
   ̃ × Shame    21.45 23.02 0.35 
      
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Shame    -30.56 21.43 0.16 
      
Constant ratio × Shame    18.15 18.47 0.33 
      
Irritation    
   
-13.45 8.41 0.11 
   
   ̃ × Irritation    
   
35.54*** 12.07 0 
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Irritation    
   
-30.81*** 10.77 0 
   
Constant ratio × Irritation    
   
18.62** 8.89 0.04 
   
Contempt    
      
7.82 11.2 0.49 
   ̃ × Contempt    
      
7.41 14.39 0.61 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Contempt    
      
-32.21** 12.81 0.01 
Constant ratio × Contempt    
      
12.25 10.13 0.23 
Constant -96.03*** 32.83 0 -109.34*** 30.62 0 -92.57*** 29.6 0 -125.40*** 33.79 0 
Obs 141   140 
  
141 
  
138 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.06   0.07 
  
0.08 
  
0.07 
  
Df 134   133   134   131   
Prob > F 0.01   0 
  
0 
  
0 
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 Joy Jealousy Surprise 
 b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 126.17*** 39.75 0 112.84** 45.73 0.01 78.1* 42.75 0.07 
non UK 47.96* 28.25 0.09 45.89 28.37 0.11 41.16 30.77 0.18 
Constant ratio × nonUK -17.77 37.24 0.63 -32.81 36.71 0.37 -30.52 39.88 0.45 
Joy -12.58 12.85 0.33 
      
   ̃ × Joy 2.16 18.08 0.91 
      
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Joy -27.1 16.69 0.11 
      
Constant ratio × Joy 13.23 11.74 0.26 
      
Jealousy 
   
-7.21 8.47 0.4 
   
   ̃ × Jealousy 
   
8.01 11.65 0.49 
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Jealousy 
   
-18.63* 10.32 0.07 
   
Constant ratio × Jealousy 
   
12.39 8.2 0.13 
   
Surprise 
      
-8.82 9.53 0.36 
   ̃ × Surprise 
      
18.27 12.54 0.15 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Surprise 
      
-18.34* 10.9 0.09 
Constant ratio × Surprise 
      
11.63 8.8 0.19 
Constant -90.61*** 32.01 0.01 -97.26*** 32.94 0 -89.37*** 34.19 0.01 
Obs 141 
  
141 
  
141 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.07 
  
0.06 
  
0.06 
  
Df 134   134   134   
Prob > F 0 
  
0 
  
0.01 
  
 
 
 
 
  
140 
 
 
I. Logit regressions on punishment for all emotions 
Notes: Logit regressions with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 2.08*** 0.71 0 2.38*** 0.88 0.01 1.15 0.78 0.14 2.08*** 0.81 0.01 
non UK 0.86 0.61 0.16 0.51 0.61 0.4 0.51 0.63 0.42 0.44 0.66 0.5 
Constant ratio × nonUK -1.16 0.79 0.14 -0.14 0.73 0.85 -0.4 0.76 0.59 -0.47 0.86 0.58 
Experience -0.57* 0.34 0.09 -0.5 0.35 0.15 -0.19 0.33 0.57 0.01 0.36 0.99 
Male -0.77 0.48 0.11 -0.8* 0.47 0.09 -0.85* 0.48 0.08 -0.81* 0.47 0.08 
Age -0.06 0.05 0.19 -0.08* 0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.28 -0.05 0.04 0.26 
Fear -0.3 0.39 0.43 
      
   
   ̃ × Fear -0.11 0.31 0.73 
      
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Fear -0.03 0.34 0.92 
      
   
Constant ratio × Fear 0.35 0.28 0.21 
      
   
Experience × Fear 0.15 0.11 0.19 
      
   
Envy 
   
-0.19 0.24 0.42 
   
   
   ̃ × Envy 
   
0.03 0.2 0.86 
   
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Envy 
   
-0.36* 0.19 0.06 
   
   
Constant ratio × Envy 
   
0.18 0.15 0.24 
   
   
Experience × Envy 
   
0.06 0.08 0.47 
   
   
Anger 
      
0.01 0.29 0.98    
   ̃ × Anger 
      
0.35 0.25 0.16    
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Anger 
      
-0.38 0.23 0.11    
Constant ratio × Anger 
      
0.25 0.21 0.25    
Experience × Anger 
      
-0.03 0.08 0.76    
Sadness 
         
0.19 0.32 0.55 
   ̃ × Sadness 
         
0.09 0.26 0.73 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Sadness 
         
-0.35 0.25 0.16 
Constant ratio × Sadness 
         
0.23 0.22 0.29 
Experience × Sadness 
         
-0.07 0.09 0.43 
Constant 1.15 1.49 0.44 1.61 1.48 0.28 0.08 1.42 0.95 -0.41 1.65 0.81 
Obs 141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140   
Pseudo R-Square 0.17 
  
0.17 
  
0.18 
  
0.16   
Prob > F 0.01 
  
0.01 
  
0 
  
0   
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Happiness Shame Irritation Contempt 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 2.40*** 0.7 0 2.70*** 0.72 0 0.93 0.77 0.23 2.32*** 0.74 0 
non UK 0.6 0.57 0.3 0.58 0.59 0.33 0.59 0.59 0.32 0.45 0.64 0.49 
Constant ratio × nonUK -0.14 0.73 0.85 -0.51 0.78 0.51 -0.21 0.7 0.76 0.07 0.82 0.93 
Experience -0.24 0.28 0.38 -0.07 0.28 0.8 0.29 0.41 0.48 0.34 0.34 0.32 
Male -0.8* 0.46 0.08 -0.96** 0.47 0.04 -0.76 0.46 0.1 -0.62 0.46 0.18 
Age -0.06 0.04 0.13 -0.09** 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.08** 0.04 0.03 
Happiness 0.01 0.3 0.96 
         
   ̃ × Happiness -0.11 0.29 0.7 
         
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Happiness -0.5 0.41 0.22 
         
Constant ratio × Happiness 0.18 0.23 0.44 
         
Experience × Happiness -0.04 0.11 0.73 
         
Shame    0.86* 0.5 0.09 
      
   ̃ × Shame    -0.35 0.46 0.45 
      
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Shame    -0.39 0.42 0.35 
      
Constant ratio × Shame    0.18 0.38 0.64 
      
Experience × Shame    -0.14 0.11 0.18 
      
Irritation    
   
0.19 0.36 0.6 
   
   ̃ × Irritation    
   
0.50** 0.25 0.04 
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Irritation    
   
-0.47** 0.24 0.05 
   
Constant ratio × Irritation    
   
0.29 0.21 0.18 
   
Experience × Irritation    
   
-0.16 0.11 0.14 
   
Contempt    
      
0.90** 0.4 0.02 
   ̃ × Contempt    
      
-0.03 0.29 0.92 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Contempt    
      
-0.55** 0.28 0.05 
Constant ratio × Contempt    
      
0.19 0.21 0.38 
Experience × Contempt    
      
-0.26** 0.12 0.03 
Constant 0.69 1.22 0.57 0.17 1.1 0.88 -0.76 1.53 0.62 -1.12 1.22 0.36 
Obs 141   140 
  
141 
  
138 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.16   0.2 
  
0.19 
  
0.21 
  
Prob > F 0.01   0 
  
0 
  
0 
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 Joy Jealousy Surprise 
 b se p b se p b se p 
   ̃ 2.39*** 0.67 0 2.40*** 0.87 0.01 1.60** 0.76 0.04 
non UK 0.63 0.56 0.26 0.67 0.6 0.27 0.6 0.6 0.32 
Constant ratio × nonUK -0.13 0.71 0.85 -0.42 0.74 0.57 -0.54 0.78 0.49 
Experience 0.01 0.31 0.98 -0.73** 0.36 0.04 0.19 0.42 0.64 
Male -0.84* 0.47 0.08 -0.88* 0.49 0.07 -0.73 0.45 0.1 
Age -0.06 0.04 0.15 -0.07* 0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.04 0.16 
Joy 0.17 0.35 0.64 
      
   ̃ × Joy -0.03 0.33 0.93 
      
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Joy -0.56 0.38 0.14 
      
Constant ratio × Joy 0.28 0.27 0.3 
      
Experience × Joy -0.15 0.11 0.17 
      
Jealousy 
   
-0.38 0.26 0.14 
   
   ̃ × Jealousy 
   
0 0.21 0.99 
   
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Jealousy 
   
-0.24 0.19 0.22 
   
Constant ratio × Jealousy 
   
0.19 0.16 0.24 
   
Experience × Jealousy 
   
0.12 0.08 0.16 
   
Surprise 
      
0.17 0.29 0.55 
   ̃ × Surprise 
      
0.21 0.23 0.35 
Constant ratio ×    ̃ × Surprise 
      
-0.3 0.22 0.18 
Constant ratio × Surprise 
      
0.23 0.18 0.19 
Experience × Surprise 
      
-0.13 0.1 0.2 
Constant 0.21 1.23 0.86 2.2 1.46 0.13 -0.37 1.61 0.82 
Obs 141 
  
141 
  
141 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.18 
  
0.17 
  
0.16 
  
Prob > F 0.01 
  
0.01 
  
0.01 
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J. Emotions of the take authority  
 
We also analyzed the emotional response of the take authorities to 
different levels of punishment of the responder. In particular, we ran some 
ordered logit regressions,
103
 one for each emotion, where the dependent 
variable is the emotion of interest, whereas the independent variables are the 
take rate of the take authority, the punishment rate received from the 
responder, a dummy variable which takes value 1 when a constant fine-to-
fee ratio is employed, the experience, gender (Male = 1 for male subjects), 
age, and nationality (non-UK = 1 for non-UK) of the subjects, and an 
interaction term between the dummy for the constant fine-to-fee ratio and 
nationality. We report the results of these regressions in Table J1 below, 
focusing on the role played by the punishment rate. 
Negative emotions such as anger, sadness, irritation, and contempt 
are strongly significantly positively related to the punishment rate. Jealousy 
appears to be only weakly positively related to the punishment rate. Among 
positive emotions, happiness and joy are significantly negatively related to 
the punishment rate. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables are 
mostly not significant. We briefly mention here those which are significant. 
Take authorities who selected higher take rates experienced increasing 
surprise (p = 0.022). Caeteris paribus, non-UK subjects experienced more 
envy (p = 0.000), jealousy (p=0.004), and sadness (p = 0.049). Older 
subjects experienced less envy (p = 0.031), anger (p = 0.079), irritation (p = 
0.045), contempt (p = 0.021), and jealousy (p = 0.017). Subjects under a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio experienced on average less anger (p = 0.029). 
Finally, male subjects were more irritated (p = 0.022) and angry (p = 0.088) 
than female subjects. 
                                                          
103
 Robust standard errors are employed to control for heteroscedasticity. Due to one 
subject failing to report the intensity of jealousy, we have only 140 observations (instead of 
141) for this emotion. 
Table J1: Ordered logit regressions on emotions 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness Happiness Shame 
 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
Take rate 0.006 0.411 -0.003 0.83 0.003 0.73 0.004 0.561 0.007 0.307 0.009 0.225 
Destruction rate 0.004 0.499 0.007 0.389 0.019*** 0.009 0.020*** 0 -0.019*** 0 0.002 0.641 
Constant ratio -0.336 0.571 0.889 0.456 -1.809** 0.029 0.4 0.468 -0.464 0.276 -0.058 0.903 
non-UK 0.509 0.446 3.586*** 0 0.908 0.148 1.105** 0.049 -0.37 0.389 -0.125 0.765 
Experience -0.038 0.859 -0.289 0.231 0.393 0.119 0.191 0.311 0.146 0.474 -0.011 0.944 
Constant ratio × non-UK 0.575 0.497 -1.884 0.155 0.843 0.4 -0.932 0.216 0.838 0.231 0.073 0.913 
Male 0.031 0.944 0.44 0.412 0.789* 0.088 -0.266 0.511 -0.11 0.743 -0.113 0.734 
Age -0.08 0.417 -0.224** 0.031 -0.168* 0.079 -0.067 0.372 -0.025 0.237 -0.016 0.629 
Obs 141 
 
141 
 
141 
 
141 
 
141 
 
141 
 Pseudo R-Square 0.029 
 
0.141 
 
0.143 
 
0.09 
 
0.036 
 
0.009 
 Prob > F 0.602 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.002 
 
0.023 
 
0.835 
  Irritation Contempt Joy Jealousy Surprise   
 b p b p b b b p b p   
Take rate 0 0.957 0.004 0.534 0.012* 0.093 -0.009 0.462 0.017** 0.022   
Destruction rate 0.013** 0.013 0.015*** 0.009 -0.013** 0.017 0.015* 0.096 -0.004 0.412   
Constant ratio -0.324 0.54 -0.304 0.598 0.125 0.729 -1.043 0.379 0.21 0.606   
non-UK 0.664 0.28 -0.121 0.834 -0.116 0.804 2.215*** 0.004 0.184 0.689   
Experience 0.064 0.727 0.209 0.316 0.035 0.872 0.479 0.131 -0.06 0.716   
Constant ratio × non-UK 0.101 0.894 0.8 0.282 0.489 0.491 0.487 0.728 -0.572 0.37   
Male 0.850** 0.022 -0.019 0.957 0.064 0.835 0.413 0.438 0.096 0.754   
Age -0.133** 0.045 -0.209** 0.021 0.005 0.816 -0.256** 0.017 -0.028 0.398   
Obs 141  141  141  140  141    
Pseudo R-Square 0.062  0.064  0.02  0.154  0.017    
Prob > F 0.003  0.004  0.495  0.004  0.377    
Notes: Ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Chapter 3: Competence versus Trustworthiness: 
What Do Voters Care About?
104 
I. Introduction 
We present an experiment on the preferences of voters over 
candidates in public elections. We are interested in two main characteristics 
that define the quality of a candidate: competence and trustworthiness.105 
Competence refers to the ability of a potential public official to properly 
perform his/her job, identifying and employing the appropriate policies that 
enable her to get the job done. Trustworthiness refers to the general attitude 
of the potential public official to fulfill the trust that the voters have placed 
on him or her; it usually implies a general aversion towards corrupted 
practices such as bribery, kickbacks, and public embezzlement which would 
benefit the public official to the detriment of the public.  
Why may people have a preference over one of the two 
characteristics that define the quality of a public official? From a traditional 
economic point of view, a rational and purely self-interested voter should 
always select the candidate that ensures the highest expected return for the 
elector irrespectively of everything else. The underlying idea – well 
captured by Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign strategist James 
Carville in his slogan “[it’s] the economy, stupid” – is that people care only 
about the economy and want candidates who are able to improve it, and 
therefore their own financial position, irrespectively of everything else. The 
results of this study will tell us whether this is true or not based on the 
                                                          
104 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Prof. Daniel Zizzo. 
105
 In a previous study by Caselli and Morelli (2004), the authors used the term honesty 
instead of trustworthiness to identify one of the two main characteristics that define the 
quality of a public official. Clearly, the two concepts are related and the difference is 
usually subtle. A person is honest if she is sincere, truthful and reliable, and avoids cheating 
or lying. A person is trustworthy if she is reliable and willing to fulfil the trust that has been 
placed on her.  In the context of electoral choices, when an elector votes for a candidate, he 
places trust on her, hoping that she will fulfil the interests of the public, usually avoiding 
any dishonest practices. Hence, trustworthiness is a more general term to use in order to 
define the quality of a public official, and, under certain conditions, it may be more relevant 
than honesty in driving the electoral choices of voters. For instance, an elector may vote for 
a candidate who is willing to adopt dishonourable measures or cheat in order to realize the 
interests of her constituency. In the context of our experiment, the two concepts are 
perfectly interchangeable as honesty implies trustworthiness and vice versa. 
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preferences of the voters over the characteristics of the candidates. In 
addition, our experiment may help us understand why democracies may at 
times suffer from endemic dishonesty and corruption at the public level. If 
voters in fact display a rational and profit-maximizing voting behavior or a 
preference for competence over trustworthiness, the existence of corruption 
and dishonesty in modern democracies might be explained by people's 
voting preferences. 
Voters may however be reluctant to support an untrustworthy 
candidate if, for instance, they display what has been referred as “betrayal 
aversion”, that is a general dislike to “being betrayed beyond the mere 
payoff consequences” (Bohnet et al., 2008, p. 295), or if they care more 
about the process by which the payoffs are generated rather than the final 
payoffs (see, e.g., Rabin, 1993). Similarly, voters may be sensitive to a 
social norm that prescribes to punish a candidate who proves to be 
untrustworthy.  As a result, voters may vote for a candidate who is more 
reliable but overall less worthwhile than the contender in terms of expected 
payoffs. 
The opposite, also plausible, possibility is that voters may support 
the more competent candidate, quite independently of the trustworthiness of 
the alternative candidates and the expected returns associated to each of 
them. This may be the case if, for instance, voters think that the misuse of 
public power for personal benefit at the public level is a fact of life and, 
hence, justified (Peters and Welch, 1980) or if there is so much distrust in 
the public system that voters believe that the election of a trustworthy public 
official would have no impact whatsoever on the system or only a marginal 
one.106  
There are other possible explanations of why voters choose a certain 
candidate over another which abstract from the pure preferences of the 
voters over trustworthiness and competence. Most notably, voters can be 
affected by the quality and level of information on the candidates available 
                                                          
106
 According to the 2012 corruption perception index published by the Transparency 
Organization (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012), many countries do indeed present 
very high perceived levels of corruption in the public sector that could justify a total 
disinterest of the voters in the trustworthiness of the candidates. 
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to them at the moment of the vote (Peters and Welch, 1980).107 In this study, 
we do not investigate the impact of these other factors that may affect the 
decision making of the voters in elections, but we focus solely on the voters’ 
preferences over trustworthiness and competence, in a context where the 
candidates differ only over these two characteristics and where the voters 
are fully informed about them.  
There can be found many anecdotes, or even more formal evidence, 
of real-world situations which could be used to support either the primacy of 
trust or that of competence for voting behavior. For instance, the success of 
the anti-establishment movement of the comedian Beppe Grillo at the 
general and local elections in Italy over the 2012 and 2013 might be 
explained by a greater weight assigned by a significant proportion of voters 
to trustworthiness rather than competence. Many voters might have voted 
for Grillo’s party because of its choice to propose ordinary voters as 
candidates, with no experience on politics and public offices, but, as Grillo 
emphasized during his political campaign, much more trustworthy than 
conventional politicians (Bartlett, 2013). A dislike of voters for 
untrustworthy candidates may also explain why, in certain cases, candidates 
discovered or suspected to be implicated in corruption scandals fail to be 
elected or experience a significant drop in voters’ support. For instance, in 
the elections of the US House of Representatives Peters and Welch (1980) 
and Welch and Hibbing (1997) found that incumbent candidates touched by 
corruption allegations lost more often their seats and received about 10 
percentage points less than incumbent candidates with no corruption 
accusations.  
A significant number of other cases seem however to support the 
opposite conjecture that voters are motivated by their final expected payoffs 
or care more about the competence of candidates rather than the 
trustworthiness. For instance, many of the parliamentarians who were 
involved in the 2009 UK parliamentary expenses scandal108 held their seats 
                                                          
107
 Other important aspects that may influence the electoral choices of the voters are, for 
example, the electors’ partisanship to a certain ideology or party or the sensitivity of certain 
electors to some attractive characteristics of a candidate such as beauty or charisma.   
108
 In 2009, several members of the UK parliaments misused their permitted allowances and 
made inappropriate expenses claims for personal benefits. 
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in the 2010 general elections and experienced only a marginal drop in 
voters’ support (about 1.5% on average; Eggers and Fischer, 2011). In 
Brazil, the former Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva won the 
2006 general elections regardless of the corruption scandals that plagued his 
previous administration and after a mandate characterized by steady 
economic growth and decrease in poverty for Brazil (Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro, 2013).  
Although these examples may provide important insights on how 
voters vote in public elections, they cannot be used to infer the preferences 
of voters over trustworthiness and competence as many other factors may 
have played a role in voting decisions. Research is needed to uncover these 
preferences and isolate them from other influences. Furthermore, in modern 
democratic elections, the vote is secret and anonymous. As a result, real-
world data on voters’ preferences is typically collected only in aggregate 
form after an election or via public opinion polls or surveys. However, 
aggregate data are usually difficult to interpret due to the lack of control 
over many unobservable variables, in primis the individual characteristics of 
the voters. In addition, the answers of voters to surveys and public opinion 
polls are considered to be highly affected by social pressure, especially 
because voters are asked about sensitive topics such as political preferences, 
and, therefore, not fully reliable (DeMaio, 1984). 
By means of a lab experiment, we are able to bypass these 
limitations. We can collect data on individual voting behavior which is 
usually difficult to analyze with standard empirical approaches. In our 
experiment, we ask voters to select a public official, based on the 
competence and trustworthiness of which their final payoffs depend. We 
measure the competence of the candidates in a real effort task and their 
trustworthiness in a trust game. We then provide this information to the 
voters and ask them to select the public official. By looking at cases where 
there is a competence-trustworthiness trade-off, we can then measure the 
extent to which competence and trustworthiness matter in electoral 
decisions, or whether in the end only the expected financial bottom line for 
voters matters. We find that, in general, most voters tend to select the 
candidate rationally, based on who provides the highest expected profit 
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irrespectively of trustworthiness and competence. That said, there is a bias 
towards caring about trustworthiness when the difference in expected profits 
between the two candidates is small enough. 
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews the literature related to this study. Section 3 presents the 
experimental design. Section 4 describes the hypotheses to be tested and the 
theoretical background. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses 
the results, and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Related literature 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that investigates the 
extent to which competence and trustworthiness matter in electoral 
decisions. That said, one strand of related literature is about electoral 
delegation. In our experiment, a subject is chosen by some voters to be the 
public official and act for them. Several studies investigate the behavioral 
implications of delegating a decision about outcomes to another person (e.g. 
Corazzini et al., 2012; Hamman et al., 2011; Samuelson and Messick, 1986; 
Samuelson et al., 1984; Messick et al., 1983). These studies focus primarily 
on the delegate’s behavior and its implications in term of welfare rather than 
the preferences of the people over the characteristics of the potential 
delegates. Similarly, voting preferences on the characteristics of the 
potential leaders is not a topic covered in the economic research on 
leadership, whereas it is the focus of our chapter.
109
 
Another stream of literature related to our study is about honesty in 
decision making. In our experiment, voters are asked to elect a public 
official who can appropriate part or all of a common good by underreporting 
                                                          
109
 A public official can be in fact seen in many respects as a leader. The literature on 
leadership mostly focuses on the impact of leading-by-example (e.g. Gäcther et al., 2012; 
Güth et al., 2007; Potters et al., 2007; Moxnes and van der Hejden, 2003). Some papers 
compare the implications of having randomly selected leaders with elected leaders (e.g. 
Levy et al., 2011; Brandts et al., 2012; Kocher et al., 2013), leaders appointed based on 
their past contribution (e.g. Gäcther and Renner, 2005), leaders appointed based on 
participant’s performance in a pre-task (e.g. Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010), and self-
selected leaders (e.g. Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Arbak and Villeval, 2011). In our experiment, 
the “leader” is endogenously selected, as in some of this research. However, in contrast to 
this literature, our study is not about leadership-by-example, and we are not interested on 
the leader and followers’ behavior but on subjects’ preferences over the characteristics of 
the potential leaders. 
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its value. Economists have empirically investigated dishonesty mostly using 
experimental data. Some have studied lying and dishonesty in cheap talk 
games where some players can send true or false message regarding some 
kind of private information (e.g. future moves) to other players (e.g. Sutter, 
2009; Gneezy, 2005; Croson, 2005). In these studies, deception is totally 
disclosed to the experimenter. Other scholars – not only in economics – 
have studied unobserved lying behavior by tracing its distribution from 
subjects’ reported results of a dice roll, coin flip or matrix task (e.g. 
Fischbacher and Heusi, 2013; Hao and Houser, 2013; Abeler et al., 2012; 
Houser et al., 2012; Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Mazar and Ariely, 2006).  
Our study is also related to some works on corruption. Barr at al. 
(2009) and Azfar and Nelson (2007) used a Public Servant’s Game to study 
corruption in service delivery. In this game, one subject is assigned the role 
of service provider (or executive), a second subject the role of monitor (or 
attorney general), and the remaining subjects (6 subjects) are community 
members. The decision of the service provider, that is how many tiles (from 
a random distribution) to allocate to the community, is similar to the one of 
the public official in our experiment. A few economists and political 
scientists have also examined the extent to which voters may support 
corrupted incumbents in public elections (e.g. Peters and Welch, 1980; 
Welch and Hibbing, 1997; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro, 2013; Bågenholm, 2013). These studies are to some extent linked 
to ours since corruption may be a sign of untrustworthiness, particularly if 
the interests of the voters are aligned with those of the public. These works 
primarily used aggregate-level empirical approaches and focus solely on the 
impact of corruption on incumbents’ re-election without investigating the 
trade-off between trustworthiness and competence.110 
There is political science research studying the importance of the 
quality of the candidates, defined as a combination of integrity and 
competence, in electoral choices (Mondak and Huckfeldt, 2006; Mondak, 
1995; Kulisheck and Mondak, 1996; McCurley and Mondak, 1995). 
                                                          
110
 An exception is the political study of Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) who employed 
a non-incentivized survey experiment to investigate the attitude of respondents towards 
hypothetical incumbent politicians (vignettes) described in the form of qualitative 
sentences. 
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Mondak (1995) investigated the permanence of incumbents in the US House 
of Representatives in relation to the quality of the incumbents, measured as 
an index of competence and integrity constructed with content analysis. The 
author found that high-quality US House members remained in office longer 
than low-quality members. McCurley and Mondak (1995) combined the 
aggregate-level data on the quality of US House of Representatives’ 
incumbents with individual-level post-election survey data to explore 
whether the skill and integrity of the candidates affect the voters’ evaluation 
of the candidates and their voting choice. They found that the quality scores 
do affect the evaluation of the candidates. Similar findings are provided by 
Kulisheck and Mondak (1996) who investigated whether the information 
concerning the quality of hypothetical candidates influences the voting 
choice of subjects in a survey experiment. Mondak and Huckfeldt (2006) 
collected data from a series of survey experiments and a national survey to 
study the accessibility of the competence and integrity of hypothetical 
candidates in the evaluation of the contenders, and how people respond to 
these characteristics relative to partisanship and ideology. They found that 
competence and integrity are slightly more accessible than partisanship and 
ideology, and are perceived favorably by subjects. Altogether these studies 
provide evidence that the quality of candidates matter in national elections. 
However, they are inconclusive on which dimension of the quality matters 
the most. In addition, they present several features in relation to which our 
laboratory experiment approach based on an incentivized environment is 
able to provide a significant contribution.
111
  
 
                                                          
111
 First, when aggregate-level empirical approaches are used (e.g. Mondak, 1995; 
McCurley and Mondak, 1995), it is usually difficult to isolate and control for the effects of 
important unobservable variables, such as, for instance, the information available upon the 
candidates. In addition, one can question the subjectivity and precision of the measure used 
to identify the quality of a candidate, and the reliability of post-election surveys to measure 
the voters’ support for a candidate (see, e.g., DeMaio, 1984; Lodge et al., 1990). Finally, 
when survey experiments are used (Kulisheck and Mondak, 1996; Mondak and Huckfeldt, 
2006), the situations described to the subjects are hypothetical, there are no economic 
incentives associated with the choices, the focus is more on attitude and perception rather 
than behavior, and the quality of the candidates is identified only with qualitative 
statements and phrases. While these comments are not to deny the value of these studies, 
they suggest that an experimental approach of the kind we use would be especially useful to 
complement them. 
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3. Experimental Design 
A. Outline 
The experiment was conducted at the University of East Anglia 
between March and June 2013. 240 subjects participated in 20 experimental 
sessions (12 subjects per session).112  The experiment was fully 
computerized and programmed with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). Each session consisted of three stages (the Real Effort Task, the Trust 
Game, and the Official’s Dilemma Game) and a final questionnaire.113 At the 
beginning of each stage, subjects received both computerized and printed 
instructions.114 These were context-free and written avoiding any suggestive 
terminology. Each set of instructions was followed by a control 
questionnaire which purpose was to check subjects’ understanding of the 
instructions. Clarifications were given aloud for public knowledge. During 
the experiment, payoffs were calculated in points and converted to British 
pounds at the end of the experiment (1 point = 20 pence). Each subject 
earned on average £12.47 (around 19-20 US dollars) including £2 of show-
up fee. Subjects were paid in private and in cash in a separate room outside 
the lab by a research assistant who was not present during the experiment 
and who was not aware of its content. Each session lasted around 1 hour and 
15 minutes. We ran 2 treatments, described below: the Baseline treatment 
(14 sessions), and the CIL (Conditional Information Lottery) treatment (6 
sessions). For each treatment, in half of the sessions we had the real effort 
task and the trust game second, and in the other half the reverse. Upon 
arrival to the lab, each subject was registered for the experiment and 
randomly assigned to a computer desk which was separated from the others 
                                                          
112
 Subjects were randomly recruited with the on-line software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
Subjects were mostly students with different socio-demographic background (details are 
provided in the online appendix). No subject participated in more than one session.  
113
 At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were informed that there were many stages 
in the experiment, but the details of each stage were revealed to subjects only at the 
beginning of each stage. This is because we want to minimize strategic behavior. We also 
made clear in the instructions that the information provided by the subjects in each stage 
may be reported to other participants at later stage of the experiment but anonymity will be 
preserved. 
114
 Instructions are available in the online appendix. 
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by partitions. Afterwards, subjects received the instructions for the first 
stage.  
B. The Baseline treatment 
The Real Effort Task Stage. The task for this stage was performed 
individually by each subject and consisted in counting the number of 1s in a 
series of tables containing 0s and 1s for 10 minutes (see, e.g., Abeler et al., 
2009; Pokorny, 2008).115 Each subject earned 1 point for each table that he 
or she correctly solved on top of the first 40 tables. This number was 
calibrated based on the results of pilot sessions in order to obtain a similar 
degree of dispersion between our measure of competence and our measure 
of trustworthiness, and to ensure that everyone was able to pass the 
threshold of 40.116 In particular, we wanted to avoid that the voting decisions 
of the subjects were biased towards one characteristic or the other  because 
of the different (normalized) degree of variation of the two characteristics. 
We chose this particular task because it provides enough variation in 
performance. The task is also simple and does not require any particular 
knowledge. At the same time, it is tedious and, therefore, mentally costly for 
the subjects. Finally, the experimenter does not benefit from the output of 
the task.
 117  
In this stage of the experiment, we obtained, for each subject, a 
measure of competence calculated as the number of tables correctly solved 
on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved. 
The Trust Game Stage. The other stage 1 or 2 of the experiment, 
depending on the session sequence, was a modified version of the standard 
one-shot trust game proposed by Berg et al. (1995). In particular, each 
subject was randomly matched with another participant. For each pair of 
subjects, one participant was randomly assigned the role of truster, while the 
                                                          
115
 A table consisted of a 5 × 5 matrix of 0s and 1s. For each table, the computer randomly 
generated a number of 0s and 1s in a random order. In a given session, all the subjects faced 
the same series of randomly generated tables.  
116
 Only 2 subjects out of 240 did not solve more than 40 tables in the first stage of the 
experiment. In particular, one subject solved 36 tables and the other one 40 tables. 
117
 These are all important features of our task since we wanted to minimize the reciprocity 
of subjects towards the experimenter, and to ensure that our measure of competence was 
minimally affected by other external influences (Abeler et al., 2009). 
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other the role of trustee. The truster received an endowment of 30 points and 
decided whether to transfer or not the entire endowment to the trustee (it 
was a binary choice: transfer all/do not transfer at all). If the truster decided 
to transfer the 30 points to the trustee, these were multiplied by 3 and the 
trustee received 90 points. The trustee could then decide to give back any 
amount to the truster between a minimum of 9 points and a maximum of 90 
points. Since the roles were revealed only at the end of the experiment, each 
subject made a decision in both roles118 using a strategy method. In 
particular, each subject first decided how many points he or she wished to 
return to the truster if he or she were to be assigned the role of trustee and 
the truster were to transfer the 30 points to the trustee. Then, each subject 
decided whether he or she wanted to transfer the 30 points or not to the 
trustee if he or she were assigned the role of truster. This mechanism 
allowed us to collect a measure of trustworthiness for each participant. In 
particular, the proportion of points sent back to the truster by each subject in 
the role of trustee was our measure of trustworthiness. Note that, in order to 
minimize reciprocity in the following stage, the subjects could not rematch 
with the same person later in the experiment. In addition, we imposed a 
minimum amount of 9 points to be returned by the trustee in order to avoid 
observations at zero. This is an important aspect for the following stage as 
people may avoid voting for a candidate simply because he or she displays a 
zero in one of the characteristics rather than a minimum positive value.119 
Finally, we asked people to make a decision first in the role of trustee and, 
then, in the role of truster.120 
                                                          
118
 Only one of the two decisions counted for the earnings depending on the role assigned. 
119
 The underlying mechanism may be similar to the one that characterized the so-called 
‘zero-price effect’ (see, e.g., Shampanier et al., 2007). This effect has been studied in the 
marketing research. In this literature, the zero is associated with a cost and induces people 
to choose more often the option with the zero (other things being equal). In our context, the 
zero would be associated with a benefit and may induce people to choose less often the 
option with the zero (other things being equal), resulting in potential biased observations.  
120
 This is because we wanted to minimize the possibility that the decision in the role of 
truster affected the decision in the role of trustee, as the latter provides our measure of 
trustworthiness, whereas we are not interested in the truster’s decision as such in this 
experiment.  
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The Official’s Dilemma Game. In stage 3 of the experiment, each 
participant was matched with two others to form a group of three subjects.121 
The computer assigned a common fund to each triad with an initial value of 
0 points. The task in this stage of the experiment was to count 1s in a series 
of tables as in the first stage of the experiment. However, only the work of 
one of the three subjects counted for the earnings of this stage. This person 
was the public official.122 In particular, for each table that the public official 
solved on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved, the value of the 
common fund increased by 4 points. At the end of the real effort task,123 the 
common fund accumulated a certain value. Only the public official was 
informed of this value. He or she was then asked to report the value of the 
common fund to the other members of the triad, knowing that he or she 
could report any number between 0 and the true value of the common fund. 
The reported value of the common fund was divided equally between the 
three participants. The public official kept the unreported value of common 
fund for himself or herself. All of these rules for generating and distributing 
experimental earnings were common knowledge for all subjects at the point 
of selecting the public official: therefore, in selecting the public official, 
subjects knew that their earnings depended on the competence (in solving 
tables) and the trustworthiness (in reporting the value of the common fund) 
of the public official. 
How was the public official selected? At the beginning of the game, 
each subject was informed of (a) the number of tables correctly solved by 
each other member of the triad in the earlier real effort task stage of the 
experiment; this provided a measure of the competence of each candidate; 
and (b) the proportion of points that each other member of the triad in the 
role of trustee returned to the truster in the earlier trust game stage of the 
experiment; this provided a measure of the trustworthiness of each 
candidate. Based on this information, each subject was asked to vote: that is, 
to choose which of the two other participants he or she wanted to appoint as 
                                                          
121
 In the instructions, we refrained from using any terminology (e.g. group) which could 
induce group identity.  
122
 In the instructions, we used the neutral term appointed co-participant to identify the 
public official. 
123
 Note that everyone could work on the task if they wanted to, and this was known at the 
time of voting. However, the task was incentive compatible only for the public official.  
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the public official. Then, the computer implemented the voting decision of 
one randomly selected subject within each triad; this mechanism ensured 
that voting was incentive compatible, by removing any scope for strategic 
voting behavior. 
Final questionnaire. After stage 3, subjects had to complete a 5-parts 
questionnaire, reproduced in the online appendix. The first two parts were 
incentivized. Part 1 was a belief elicitation questionnaire.124 In part 2, we 
measured the risk attitude of subjects. We employed the Eckel et al. 
(2012)’s task in the domain of gains. In this task, subjects had to choose one 
gamble out of six possible gambles. Each gamble was represented with a 
circle and involved two payoffs with 50% probability of occurrence each. 
Moving from gamble 1 to gamble 6, both expected return and risk 
increased. Part 3 was the Stöber (2001)’s 17-item Social Desirability Scale 
(SDS17 score) which measures how much a person desires to be perceived 
in a positive light. Part 4 was the Christie and Geis (1970)’s 20-item 
Machiavellianism scale (MACH score) which measures a person’s tendency 
to be amoral and opportunist. In the last part of the questionnaire, we 
collected some demographics and elicited subjects’ belief about the 
objective of the experiment.  
Payments. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly 
drew a stage. Subjects were paid the earnings of that stage plus the show-up 
fee of 2 pounds and any additional earnings that they obtained by answering 
the final questionnaire.  
C. The CIL treatment 
The main purpose of the CIL treatment was to collect more data, in 
general and by individual, on the voting behavior of the subjects, without 
deceiving them. In addition, the data collected in this treatment allowed us 
to classify the subjects based on their voting decisions. The CIL treatment 
differs from the Baseline treatment only in third stage of the experiment, 
that is in the Official’s Dilemma Game. In particular, in the CIL treatment, 
we employed the so-called Conditional Information Lottery (Bardsley, 
                                                          
124
 The details are in the online appendix. 
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2000). This technique consists in camouflaging one true task amongst other 
fictional tasks, with the subjects fully aware that there is a camouflage but 
uninformed ex-ante of which task is the true one (Bardsley, 2000). More 
specifically, in the selection of the public official, each subject was 
presented with 7 randomly ordered situations: one real and six fictional. In 
the real situation, each subject was informed about the actual competence 
and trustworthiness of the other participants within his or her group. In the 
fictional situations, each subject was instead presented with fictitious 
information about the competence and trustworthiness of the other two 
participants. In particular, to make the camouflage credible and realistic, the 
information used in the fictional situations came from situations occurred in 
past sessions of this experiment (the first six Baseline sessions) and chosen 
at random by the computer (subjects were fully informed of this). More 
specifically, to generate the fictional situations, the computer randomly 
picked situations from past sessions using a stratification procedure which 
followed approximately the distribution of the cases observed until then. 
Two fictional situations were randomly selected from the past situations 
where one candidate strictly or weakly dominated the other candidate in 
both characteristics (competence and trustworthiness). All the other four 
fictional situations corresponded to cases where the characteristics of the 
two candidates were orthogonal and differed in the extent to which the two 
candidates were different in terms of expected payoffs generated for the 
voter. In particular, one situation was randomly selected from cases where 
the difference in expected payoffs between the two candidates lay in the 
interval [0, 5] experimental points; a second situation from cases where the 
difference lay in the interval (5, 10] experimental points; a third situation 
from cases where the difference lay in the interval (10, 20] experimental 
points; and a fourth situation from cases where the difference lay in the 
interval (20, 50] experimental points. This stratified randomization allowed 
us to provide to the subjects enough decoys to prevent them from spotting 
the true situation, and, at the same time, to collect more information on the 
electoral choices of subjects for different level of expected payoffs of the 
candidates. The order of the seven situations was randomized. For each 
situation, each subject was asked to choose which of the two participants he 
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or she wanted to appoint as the public official, knowing that only the 
decision of one participant selected at random in the real situation was 
implemented if the stage was chosen for payment. All the other aspects of 
the experiment were identical to the Baseline treatment.  
As Bardsley (2000) pointed out, the CIL procedure might induce 
“cold” decisions because of the hypothetical nature of the task. This might 
actually be desirable in our experiment as voters do usually make their 
electoral choices in a “cold” state, since they are typically asked to vote in 
polling places, anytime over a span of one or two days and after the political 
campaign of the candidates. The CIL procedure may also dilute the 
incentives of the experiment, and increase the misunderstanding of the 
experimental procedures. To minimize these drawbacks, we limited the 
fictional situations to only 6 and made sure that subjects fully understood 
the instructions.125 It was also important that subjects did not spot the true 
situation. As we have already mentioned earlier, we adopted a procedure of 
stratified randomization to select the fictional situations from real situations 
occurred in past sessions of the experiment, making very difficult, if not 
impossible, for the subjects to identify the true situation. Most significantly, 
we can use the Baseline treatment as a control to check whether any biases 
were produced from using the CIL procedure. 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
In this section, we set the theoretical background and present the 
hypotheses to be tested. Let us call      the expected earnings of the generic 
voter n if the candidate j is appointed in stage 3.  This can be defined as: 
             
where A is the constant multiplier of voter n’s profit function (equal 
to 4/3 in our experiment, where 3 is the group size, and 4 is the value of one 
table correctly solved by the candidate on top of the first 40 correct tables 
and reported to the voter);     captures the trustworthiness of the candidate 
                                                          
125
 As we have already mentioned early, subjects filled in a control questionnaire, followed 
by clarifications, to check their understanding of the instructions, with key questions 
regarding, for instance, the meaning of the fictional situations.  
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and is measured as the proportion of points returned by the candidate in the 
trust game stage;     captures the competence of the candidate and is 
measured as the number of tables correctly solved on top of the first 40 
tables correctly solved in the real effort task stage. The profit function is a 
Cobb-Douglas with profit elasticities of competence and trustworthiness 
equal to 1. Each elasticity measures the responsiveness of the profit to a 
change in competence or trustworthiness, ceteris paribus. In particular, a 1% 
increase in competence would lead to a 1% increase in profit. Similarly, a 
1% increase in trustworthiness would lead to a 1% increase in profit. 
The voter n must choose among two candidates (J =2). The voter 
obtains a certain utility if a certain candidate is elected. In particular, the 
utility that voter n gets if candidate j is appointed is     , j = 1, 2. Each 
candidate possesses two attributes (competence and trustworthiness) which 
are known by the voter. If the voter is rational and profit maximizing, she 
should choose the candidate that gives the highest utility, and her utility 
should be an increasing function of the expected earnings. For simplicity, let 
the utility be a standard Cobb-Douglas function
126
 which can be defined as 
follows:  
         
     
        
where    and    are the weights (elasticities) of the trustworthiness and the 
competence respectively of the candidate j in the utility function of voter n. 
    
     
   is the known component of the utility function, whereas       
is the stochastic component (unknown component).127  
                                                          
126
 The Cobb-Douglas function has been widely used in economics to identify the 
production function of a firm or the utility function of an economic agent (see, e.g., Mas-
Colell et al., 1995). In our context, it is particularly useful as it allows us to estimate the 
weights that a voter places on the trustworthiness and competence of the candidates in a 
directly comparable way. In particular, the weights are expressed in terms of elasticities, 
that is how much the utility varies (in percentage) if trustworthiness or competence 
increases by 1%. In addition, it is logically consistent with the essential elements of our 
experiment. In particular, it is directly linked to the profit function used in our experiment. 
More precisely, it can be reduced to a function of the profit if the weights of trustworthiness 
and competence are identical. 
127
 For simplicity, we assume that the stochastic component is non-additive. 
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If the two attributes have the same weight in the utility (      
 ), the voter cares only about his or her profit. We can rewrite the utility as 
a function of the profit: 
         
       
Hypothesis 1. If voters are rational and profit maximizing,    
    , with    0.  
If   is equal to 0, the utility does not depend on the profit. If   is less 
than 0, it negatively depends on the profit. If       (     ), it means 
that the voter weight more the trustworthiness (competence) of the 
candidate over the competence (trustworthiness), and over what would be 
predicted by profit maximization. 
Hypothesis 2. If trustworthiness matters more than competence,    
will be greater than   . 
Hypothesis 3. If competence matters more than trustworthiness,    
will be greater than   . 
To test the Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, we can take the natural logarithm 
of the utility to obtain a linear function in parameters: 
  (    )         ( )                   
Knowing that the probability that voter n chooses candidate i over j is: 
         (         )      (           ) 
We can derive the logit choice probability assuming that the error 
term (    ) is iid with a Type-I extreme value distribution. The equation for 
the logit choice probability is: 
         (         )  
    (    (   )      (   ))
∑     (    (   )       (   )
 
   )
 
161 
 
The estimation of    and    is relatively straightforward through 
maximum likelihood estimation as we observe the choices of the voters and 
we have measures of the trustworthiness and competence of the candidates. 
4. Experimental results 
A. Descriptives 
Table 1 shows the average measures of competence and 
trustworthiness for each treatment, from the first two stages of the 
experiemnt.
128
 In the table, competence is the number of tables correctly 
solved on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved in the real effort task; 
trustworthiness is measured by the return rate, that is the proportion of 
points returned to the truster in the trust game. Since the Baseline and CIL 
treatments were equivalent in the first two stages of the experiment (i.e. the 
treatment manipulation involved only stage 3), we can pool their data 
together. There are only weakly significant differences in competence 
between the sessions where the real effort task stage took place first and the 
sessions where the trust game stage was played first (Mann-Whitney test, p 
=  0.094).
129
 We do not detect any statistically significant differences in the 
return rate between having first played the Real Effort Task and the Trust 
Game (p = 0.419).130 The coefficient of variation for competence, measured 
as the standard deviation over the mean, is 0.466. The coefficient of 
variation for trustworthiness is 0.518. The normalized measure of 
dispersion, captured by the coefficient of variation, is similar between 
competence and trustworthiness. This means that the voting decision of the 
subjects may not be affected by a different degree of dispersion between the 
two variables. Also, both the competence measured in the real effort task 
                                                          
128
 The focus of this chapter is on the voting choice and the information that subjects had to 
make this choice. As a result, we do not focus on the public official’s behavior in the 
official dilemma game, once selected. The online appendix contains an analysis of the 
public official’s choices in the official dilemma game, as well as more analysis of stages 1 
and 2.   
129
 A possible interpretation of why subjects performed slightly better in the sessions where 
the real effort task was played first than in the sessions where the trust game was played 
first is that they were cognitively less tired when the real effort task was played in the first 
stage rather than in the second stage. All p values reported in this chapter are two-sided. 
130
 We also ran an OLS regression (for competence) and Tobit regression (for 
trustworthiness) where we control for the socio-demographic and psychological 
characteristics of the subjects (see the online appendix). 
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stage and the trustworthiness measured in the trust game stage were 
positively correlated with the public officials’ competence and 
trustworthiness respectively in stage 3 (Spearman’s ρ = 0.89 and 0.28, and p 
< 0.001 and = 0.011, respectively).131 This indicates that both measures were 
valid proxies of the public officials’ behavior in stage 3.   
Table 1: Competence and Trustworthiness 
 
Competence Trustworthiness 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Real effort task stage first 39.49 17.75 0.36 0.19 
Trust game stage first 35.43 16.97 0.34 0.17 
Total 37.46 17.44 0.35 0.18 
To analyze the electoral choices of subjects, we first consider the 
number of times subjects voted for a candidate for each possible electoral 
situations that occurred in the experiment (Table 2). If we look at the 
interesting situations where there was a trade-off between trustworthiness 
and competence, subjects seemed to vote more often for the trustworthy 
candidate as opposed to the more competent one. We can test more formally 
whether the proportion of situations where subjects chose the more 
trustworthy candidate significantly differs from 50%. The result of a 
binomial test indicates that the proportion of situations where people voted 
for the more trustworthy subject (about 59%) is significantly different from 
50% (p < 0.001).132 It is however possible that subjects voted more often for 
the more trustworthy candidate simply because the latter was more often 
associated to higher expected payoffs. In other words, people did not vote 
for the more trustworthy candidate because of his/her trustworthiness, but 
because the combination of his/her levels of competence and trustworthiness 
entailed higher expected payoffs compared to the other candidate. This 
                                                          
131
 In stage 3, competence is measured as the number of tables correctly solved on top of 
the first 40 tables correctly solved, while trustworthiness is measured as the proportion of 
tables reported. 
132
 In the overall sample, p < 0.001. However, in CIL sessions, since we have multiple 
observations for each subject, there may be correlation between the observations and so the 
test may not be valid. That said, if we restrict the test to only the observations that are 
totally independent (Baseline sessions), we obtain exactly the same result, that is the 
proportion of situations where people voted for the more trustworthiness subject (about 
61% in the baseline sessions) is significantly different from 50% (p = 0.024).  
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means that we will need to take into account the expected payoffs of the two 
candidates if we want to correctly study the electoral preferences of the 
voters.  
Table 2: Voting choices 
Situation Trustworthiness Competence 
Votes 
for i 
Votes 
for j 
Tot. 
Strict 
dominance 
Ti > Tj Ci > Cj 160 10 170 
Trade-off Ti > Tj Ci < Cj 238 163 401 
Weak 
dominance 
Ti = Tj Ci ≥ Cj 86 4 90 
Weak 
dominance 
Ti ≥ Tj Ci = Cj 8 2 10 
Equality Ti = Tj Ci = Cj 0 1 1 
Total . . 492 180 672 
If we look at the other situations where there is no trade-off between 
trustworthiness and competence, in a very small proportion of cases 
(5.56%),133 subjects displayed what we refer as an inconsistent voting 
behavior, that is they voted for the candidate who was strictly or weakly 
dominated in both characteristics (trustworthiness and competence) by the 
other candidate. The behavior of these subjects (from now on, we will label 
them as inconsistent subjects) is difficult to characterize and interpret. It is 
likely that they made random choices during the experiment or did not take 
the experiment seriously. Hence, we will control for their behavior in the 
remaining of the analysis. 
We can also look at how the probability that a candidate i is elected 
evolves as a function of the difference in competence and trustworthiness 
between candidate i and her rival, candidate j (Figure 1). To make 
competence and trustworthiness graphically comparable, we standardized 
them, that is we subtract the mean from each value and divide the result by 
the standard deviation. The graph suggests first that subjects seemed to 
behave quite rationally as the probability of being elected was close to 1 
when the candidate was superior in both characteristics compared to the 
contender (upper corner of the graph), and was close to 0 when the 
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 More precisely, 14 subjects (5 in the baseline, 9 in CIL) out of 240 displayed this 
behavior (5.83% of subjects).  
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candidate was inferior in both characteristics (bottom corner of the graph). 
Second, the subjects seemed to slightly prefer more a trustworthy candidate 
to a competent one since the probability of being elected increases more 
steeply when the difference in trustworthiness between two candidates 
increases than when the difference in competence increases. We will 
investigate this in more detail in the regression analysis. 
We now consider the expected payoffs that each candidate provided 
to the voters. We begin by assuming that subjects had adaptive expectations, 
that is they took the measures of trustworthiness and competence from the 
earlier stages to estimate what expected payoffs would be had by each 
candidate if elected public official. We shall relax this assumption later. 
First, we look at the probability of electing the more trustworthy candidate 
as a function of the difference in expected payoffs Δπ between the more and 
less trustworthy candidate (Figure 2), restricting the analysis to the 
observations where there was a trade-off between trustworthiness and 
competence. The probability is obtained by computing the weighted running 
means of a dichotomous variable taking value 1 when the trustworthy 
candidate is elected and 0 otherwise. For Δπ < 0 (i.e. the more trustworthy 
candidate is also the less profitable), profit-maximizing subjects should vote 
for the less trustworthy candidate as he or she is associated with higher 
expected payoffs.  Hence, the area below the smoothed means measures the 
extent to which subjects voted for the more trustworthy candidate when this 
was not the more profitable candidate. For Δπ > 0 (i.e., the more trustworthy 
candidate is also the more profitable), profit-maximizing subjects should 
vote for the more trustworthy candidate as he or she is associated with 
higher expected payoffs.  Hence, the area above the smoothed means 
measures the extent to which subjects voted for the more competent 
candidate when this was not the more profitable candidate. Note that the 
theoretical predicted probability under rational self-interest would follow a 
step function where the voter never chooses the more trustworthy candidate 
in the region where Δπ < 0, and always chooses him or her when Δπ > 0. 
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Figure 1: Probability that a candidate i is elected 
 
Notes: P(i) is the probability of electing a candidate i in election k. This is computed using a locally weighted linear regression on the dichotomous 
variable taking value 1 when the candidate i is elected and 0 otherwise. ΔC is the difference in standardized competence between candidate i and 
candidate j in the situation (election) k. ΔT is the difference in standardized trustworthiness between candidate i and candidate j in the situation (election) 
k. The standardized values are obtained by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Each smoothed value of the locally weighted 
surface is computed using neighboring data points defined within the span of 0.6 (60% of the data). 
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As Figure 2 shows, choices follow fairly closely the rational self-
interested prediction, in preliminary support of Hypothesis 1. That said, the 
area below the weighted running means for Δπ < 0 is bigger than the area 
above the weighted running means for Δπ > 0. This is particularly 
remarkable for small differences in expected payoffs (|Δπ| ≤ 5). This 
preliminary evidence suggests some preliminary support for a qualified 
version of Hypothesis 2: subjects seemed more likely to vote for the less 
profitable candidate when this was the more trustworthy one, particularly 
when the two candidates did not differ too much in terms of their 
contribution to the expected payoffs of the voter.  
Figure 2: Probability of electing the more trustworthy candidate 
 
 Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more trustworthy candidate. Δπ is the 
difference in expected payoffs between the more and less trustworthy candidate. The 
running means are weighted to give more importance to near points than far, and computed 
using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). The data correspond to cases where there was a 
trade-off between trustworthiness and competence. 
To look at this further, we consider how often subjects voted for the 
more trustworthy candidate when the latter was the less profitable one, and 
how often subjects voted for the more competent candidate when the latter 
was the less profitable one. Figure 3 reports the proportion of cases where 
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the voters selected the less profitable candidate for each interval of absolute 
deviation in expected payoffs between the two candidates.134This proportion 
identifies the rate of counterintuitive voting behavior and measures the 
proportion of cases where subjects are willing to sacrifice their expected 
monetary payoffs in order to select the more trustworthy or competent 
candidate. In aggregate but particularly when the difference in expected 
payoffs between the two candidates was small (between 0 and 5 
experimental points), the proportion of cases where subjects voted for the 
unprofitable and more trustworthy candidate was signficaintly larger than 
the proportion of cases where subjects voted for the unprofitable and more 
competenent candidate.135 
Figure 3: Proportion of cases where the less profitable candidate was voted 
 
Notes: The red bar identifies the proportion of cases where the voters elected the more 
trustworthy candidate when the latter was the less profitable one. The blue bar identifies the 
proportion of cases where the voters elected the more competent candidate when the latter 
was the less profitable one. The intervals in the x-axis are in experimental points. The data 
correspond to cases where there was a trade-off between trustworthiness and competence. 
This is preliminary evidence of the fact that voters weighed 
trustworthiness more than competence, particularly when the candidates 
contributed a similar amount to the expected payoffs of the voters. In terms 
                                                          
134
 These were the same intervals that were used in the design phase of the experiment to 
generate the fictitious situations for the CIL treatment. 
135
 If we restrict ourselves only the observations that are totally independent (Baseline 
sessions), we obtain χ2 test, p = 0.070 in aggregate and 0.003 for the [0,5) interval. If we 
exclude the inconsistent subjects, we obtain  χ2 test, p = 0.012 in aggregate and 0.023 for 
the [0,5) interval. The results are if anything slightly stronger if we include the CIL 
treatment observations, though the validity of the tests are then questionable because of 
lack of independence among different observations by the same subject in the CIL 
treatment.   
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of the theoretical hypotheses presented earlier, this suggests that    is 
greater than   , especially when the difference in expected payoffs between 
the two candidates is small enough.  
B. Regression analysis 
We now make our analysis more rigorous using regression analysis. 
We identify the candidate chosen by each voter with a dummy variable 
‘Vote’ (= 1 if the candidate is chosen, 0 otherwise). For each situation faced 
by a generic voter i, we have two observations and for only one of the two 
the variable ‘Vote’ is equal to 1. Based on the theoretical background 
presented in a previous section, we estimate the probability that a subject 
votes for a certain candidate based on the characteristics of the alternative 
candidates. In particular, we estimate an alternative-specific conditional 
choice model. Since in the CIL sessions we have multiple observations per 
individual, we employ robust standard errors clustered at individual level. 
The dependent variable is the dummy ‘Vote’. In Regression 1, the 
independent variables include the logs of measured trustworthiness and 
competence of the candidate, log(trustworthiness) and log(competence).
136
 
In Regression 2, we also add interaction terms of these variables with a 
dummy variable | | > 5, which takes value 1 when the absolute deviation in 
expected payoffs between the two candidates is larger than 5 experimental 
points. In Regression 3, we also control for the demographic, psychological 
and behavioral characteristics of the voters and treatment effects by 
interacting them with log(trustworthiness) and log(competence).137 In 
particular, we control for the nationality of the subjects (UK and China), 
                                                          
136
 We cannot compute the log of the competence in 12 electoral situations – where one 
candidate (real or fictional) did not solve more than 40 tables – out of the 401 situations 
characterized by a trade-off between trustworthiness and competence. This is equivalent to 
only the 2.99% of the relevant electoral situations. The value of competence (tables 
correctly solved above 40 correct tables) for these few situations is in fact zero. We thus 
drop these few observations from the regression analysis. Note that these 12 electoral 
situations come from two subjects that did not solve more than 40 tables in the Baseline 
sessions and that were also randomly selected as fictional candidates by the computer in 
few other situations of the CIL sessions. 
137
 Note that since our model is alternative-specific, the characteristics of the voters do not 
vary over the choices of the voters, and, therefore, they would be dropped out from the 
model. The only way to get around this problem and account for the individual 
characteristics of the voter is to add interaction terms between the alternative-specific 
variables and the voter-specific variables as we do in our regressions. 
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their gender, their age, whether they study economics or not, and whether 
they are undergraduate students or not. In addition, we control for the risk 
attitude of the subjects, and their scores in the SDS17 and MACH 
questionnaires. We also control for the sessions where the order of the real 
effort task and the trust game was counterbalanced, and the CIL sessions. 
Finally, we control for the behavior of the voters in the real effort task stage 
and the trust game stage by interacting the log of competence and 
trustworthiness of each voter with the log of the trustworthiness and 
competence respectively of the candidates.
138
 In Regressions 4-6, we control 
for the behavior of the inconsistent subjects by including an interaction of 
whether a subject was categorized as inconsistent with log(trustworthiness) 
and log(competence) respectively. Table 3 displays the results of the 
regressions. 
In Regressions 1 and 4, both the coefficients of the log of 
trustworthiness (  ) and the log of competence (  ) are positive and 
significant. The coefficient of log(trustworthiness) is slightly larger than the 
coefficient of log(competence) but the difference is not statiscally 
significant (χ2 test, p = 0.975 in Regression 1, and 0.532 in Regression 4). In 
Regression 4, both the interaction terms of log(trustworthiness) and 
log(competence) with Inconsistency are negative and statistically 
significant. Also, the size of the coefficients is such as to largely offset the 
coefficients for log(trustworthiness) and log(competence) for inconsistent 
subjects. We can present the first and second result. 
Result 1. In line with Hypothesis 1 but in contrast to both 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, subjects generally displayed a rational and profit-
maximizing behavior by voting for the candidate who provided the highest 
expected profits, irrespectvely of his or her trustworthiness and competence.  
Result 2. Inconsistent subjects tended to rely less on measured 
competence and trustworthiness. 
 
                                                          
138
 By doing that, we lose two additional observations corresponding to the two voters that 
did not solve more than 40 tables in the Baseline sessions, and for which we cannot 
compute the log of competence. 
170 
 
Table 3: Alternative-specific conditional logit regressions 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 
b se b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 1.47*** 0.25 3.69*** 1.11 4.38*** 1.31 
log(Competence) 1.46*** 0.23 2.82*** 0.82 2.76** 1.2 
log(Trustworthiness) × |π|>5 
  
-2.29** 1.03 -2.49** 1.08 
log(Competence) × |π|>5 
  
-1.24 0.79 -1.61** 0.81 
Interactions with 
demographic, behavioral, 
psychological and treatment 
variables 
No No Yes 
Obs 778 
 
778 
 
776 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.25 
 
0.26 
 
0.31 
 
Df 2 
 
4 
 
30 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
 b se b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 1.90*** 0.29 3.88*** 1.12 5.20*** 1.59 
log(Competence) 1.76*** 0.27 2.91*** 0.82 2.98** 1.21 
log(Trustworthiness) × 
Inconsistency 
-1.94*** 0.46 -1.87*** 0.45 -2.89*** 0.56 
log(Competence) × 
Inconsistency 
-1.17* 0.61 -1.13 0.69 -1.49** 0.68 
log(Trustworthiness) × |π|>5   -2.06* 1.06 -2.37** 1.18 
log(Competence) × |π|>5   -1.02 0.81 -1.46* 0.86 
Interactions with 
demographic, behavioral, 
psychological and treatment 
variables 
No No Yes 
Obs 778  778  776  
Pseudo R
2
 0.3  0.32  0.38  
Df 4  6  32  
Prob > F 0  0  0  
Notes: Alternative-specific logit regression with robust standard errors clustered at 
individual level. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. The 
demographic variables are age, gender (= 1  for men), economics background (= 1 if 
applicable), nationality (UK = 1 for UK subjects, and China = 1 for Chinese subjects), and 
University status (= 1 for undergraduate students). The behavioral variables are the 
competence and trustworthiness of the voter. The psychological variables are the risk 
attitude, the SDS17 score and MACH score. The treatment variables are the CIL sessions, 
and the sessions where the trust game stage took place before the real effort task stage. The 
psychological and behavioral variables and age are centered at the mean in order to control 
for high correlation between the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). ‘China’ 
identifies subjects from China, Taiwan or Hong Kong. The data correspond to cases where 
there was a trade-off between trustworthiness and competence. The full regressions are in 
the online appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Once we control for small and large differences in expected payoffs 
between the two candidates (Regressions 2 and 5), the coefficient for 
log(trustworthiness) becomes significantly larger than the coefficient for 
log(competence) for small differences (χ2 test, p = 0.079 for Regression 2, 
and 0.055 for Regression 5). In other words, for small differences in 
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expected payoffs, we observe      , and, thus, we reject Hypothesis 3 in 
favor of some qualified support for Hypothesis 2. 
Result 3. Subjects tended to weigh trustworthiness more than 
competence when the difference in expected profits between the two 
candidates was small enough, as predicted by Hypothesis 3, but, as the 
difference increased, people cared only about their expeted payoffs, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
This result also holds in Regressions 3 and 6 where we control for 
the demographic, psychological and behavioral characteristics of the 
subjects, and treatment effects from using the CIL method. In particular, for 
small differences in expected payoffs, the coefficient for 
log(trustworthiness) is almost twice as large as the coefficient for 
log(competence) and the difference is statistically significant (χ2 test, p = 
0.070 for Regression 3, and 0.041 for Regression 6).
139
  
So far we have assumed that subjects displayed adaptive 
expectations, that is they formed their expectations about how the potential 
public official will behave in the future based on the information provided 
to them regarding the past competence and trustworthiness of the 
candidates. It is possible that subjects displayed rational expectations. This 
means that the subjects’ expectations about the future trustworthiness and 
competence of the public official matched exactly the true expected values 
of future trustworthiness and competence of the public official. In the online 
appendix, we replicate the analysis conducted so far by assuming that 
subjects display rational expectations. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those presented in the chapter, if anything with stronger evidence of a 
trustworthiness bias. It might also be possible that our results are driven by 
extreme cases, that is situations where the difference in expected profits 
between the two candidates is very large. Hence, we replicate the analysis 
by dropping those cases. The results are reported in the online appendix and 
replicate those presented in the chapter.  
                                                          
139
 Among the controls, the only coefficient (weakly) statistically significant is the 
interaction term between the CIL treatment and the log of trustworthiness (p-value = 0.070 
in Regression 6). In particular, subjects in the CIL sessions put a larger weight on 
trustworthiness compared to Baseline subjects. 
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C. Types classification 
We now classify the subjects of the CIL sessions based on their 
pattern of voting behavior. We can do so in the CIL sessions (and only in 
the CIL sessions) since in this treatment we collected multiple observations 
of voting behavior for each subject. We identify 6 categories of subjects, 
and Table 4 summarizes the results of this classification. 
Table 4: Subjects’ classification based on their voting behavior 
Type Utility % (ω) % (ω) 
Unconditional competence 
     
     
6.94% (5) 2.78% (2) 
Unconditional trustworthiness 
     
     
8.33% (6) 8.33% (6) 
Conditional competence 
      
       
8.33% (6) 2.78% (2) 
Conditional trustworthiness 
      
       
18.06% (13) 18.06% (13) 
Profit maximizing (adaptive expectations) 
      
       
44.44% (32) 34.72% (25) 
Profit maximizing (rational expectations) 
      
       
. 19.44% (14) 
Profit minimizing and Inconsistent        13.89% (10) 13.89% (10) 
Total  100% (72) 100% (72) 
 ‘Profit-maximizing’ voters. These subjects always selected the more 
profitable candidate irrespectively of his or her competence and 
trustworthiness. In terms of our theoretical specification, the utility of the 
‘profit-maximizing’ voters is characterized by        . In a first 
classification, we only consider those subjects who were profit-maximizing 
based on adaptive expectations. In a second classification, we also consider 
those subjects who were profit-maximizing based on rational 
expectations.
140
 Subjects that do not fall in the ‘Profit-maximizing’ subjects 
category are classified as follow.   
‘Unconditional competence’ voters. These subjects always selected 
the more competent candidate irrespectively of the expected profits. The 
utility function of these subjects is characterized by      and     . 
                                                          
140
 50% of the subjects who are classified as profit-maximizing based on rational 
expectations, also fit in the category of the subjects who are profit-maximizing based on 
adaptive expectations. 
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‘Unconditional trustworthiness’ voters. These subjects always 
selected the more trustworthy candidate irrespectively of the expected 
profits. Their utility function is represented by      and     . 
‘Conditional competence’ voters. These subjects selected more often 
the competent candidate than the trustworthy candidate.141 The behavior of 
these subjects is captured by an utility function characterized by       
 . 
‘Conditional trustworthiness’ voters. These subjects selected more 
often the trustworthy candidate than the competent candidate. The behavior 
of these subjects is captured by an utility function characterized by    
    . 
 ‘Profit-minimizing and Inconsistent’ voters. These subjects tended 
to select the less profitable candidates or displayed a random voting 
behavior. This category includes the inconsistent subjects (i.e. subjects who 
selected the less profitable subjects when the latter was strictly or weakly 
dominated in both characteristics by the other candidate) and subjects who 
displayed a negative Spearman rank correlation coefficient between their 
voting decision and the difference in expected profits between the more and 
less profitable candidate (in other words, they display qualitatively the 
opposite pattern of the theoretical prediction of Figure 2). In terms of the 
parameters of the utility functions, the behavior of the profit-minimizing 
subjects is captured by        . 
Table 4 shows that the majority of voters displayed a profit-
maximizing behavior. About a quarter of voters had a preference for the 
trustworthy candidate (‘Unconditional and Conditional trustworthiness’ 
voters), and possibly as little as 6% preferred a competent candidate 
                                                          
141
 To identify these subjects, we computed, for each subject, the average vote for the 
trustworthy candidates when these were the least profitable, and compared it with the 
average vote for the competent candidates when these were the least profitable. If the 
difference was positive (i.e. the subject more often voted for the less profitable and 
trustworthy candidate than the less profitable and competent candidate), the subject was 
categorized as ‘Conditional trustworthiness’ subject. If the difference was negative (i.e. the 
subject more often voted for the less profitable and competent candidate than the less 
profitable and trustworthy candidate), the subject was categorized as ‘Conditional 
competence’ subject.  
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(‘Unconditional and Conditional competence’ voters).142 This evidence 
provides additional support on what we presented earlier, that is most 
people tend to select the candidate rationally, based on who provides the 
highest expected profit irrespectively of trustworthiness and competence, 
but there is also a proportion of people who have a bias towards caring 
about trustworthiness. In terms of our theoretical specification, this means 
that the majority of the subjects present either a utility function 
characterized by         or        . Obviously, this 
classification should be considered with caution and only as complement of 
the previous analysis as it is based on very few electoral situations per 
subject. 
In this section the focus has been on the analysis of the subjects’ 
voting behavior since this was the main objective of this chapter. In the 
online appendix, we also analyze the behavior of the public officials in the 
third stage of the experiment.  
5. Discussion 
We investigated how voters weigh the competence and the 
trustworthiness of the candidates in public elections. We did so in a 
controlled environment which enabled us to rule out all the other influences 
that may affect the electoral choices of voters. In particular, since, in our 
experiment, candidates differ only on their level of trustworthiness and 
competence, we are able to study the pure preferences of voters for 
trustworthiness and competence, and the extent to which they only care 
about what they expect to go in their pockets. By and large, we find that 
voters care about their expected payoffs and little else. In 84.4% of the 
cases, voters behaved rationally by selecting the candidate who was more 
expected to be profitable, based on their ex-ante trustworthiness and 
competence; the percentage becomes even higher (87.9%) if we also include 
the cases described by rational expectations. A majority of subjects always 
unfalteringly goes for the candidate that is expected to yield a higher payoff. 
                                                          
142
 Note that this does not mean that these voters did not care about expected payoffs. As 
shown by Table 3, sacrifices of payoffs often need to be small enough in order for the bias 
towards trustworthiness or competence to emerge.  
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That said, around 25% of voters tend to be biased towards 
trustworthiness, and our regression analysis confirms a bias towards 
trustworthy candidates when the difference in expected profits between the 
two candidates is small enough. This holds irrespectively of whether we 
assume that voters display adaptive or rational expectations. 
One could argue that the bias of the voters towards caring about 
trustworthiness that we observe in our experiment may not be the result of 
their preferences but of their misunderstanding of the instructions or 
systematic mistakes.
143
 This interpretation is not plausible for several 
reasons. First, we made sure that subjects understood the instructions by 
asking them to complete a computerized questionnaire before starting each 
task, where subjects had to solve some exercises and calculate the effects, in 
terms of payoffs, of their actions. Before the start of each task, subjects were 
invited to ask questions if something was not clear and clarifications were 
offered aloud to them if they had any doubts about the procedures and the 
calculation of the earnings. Second, our results show that subjects selected 
the more trustworthy but unprofitable candidate only under certain 
circumstances, that is when the difference in expected payoffs between the 
two candidates were small enough. If people failed to understand the 
instructions or the payoffs function, the bias would have characterized more 
generally all our data.
144
 Third, a lack of understanding or incentives would 
have resulted in random mistakes in both directions. This however was not 
the case as the bias occurred systematically in one direction. Fourth, in the 
data analysis, we controlled for the behavior of those (few) inconsistent 
subjects who displayed a more random behavior and could have failed to 
understand the instructions or taken the experiment less seriously. 
Another possible explanation of why subjects displayed a bias 
towards caring about trustworthiness may be related to the partially different 
nature of the trust game compared to the official’s dilemma game. In 
                                                          
143
 Subjects may have voted more often for the more trustworthy candidate either because 
they did not understand well the implications, in terms of payoffs, of their actions or 
because they committed more systematic mistakes when the difference in expected profits 
between the two candidates was small enough and the incentives to select the profitable 
candidate smaller. 
144
 That, is we would have also observed the bias when the difference between the expected 
payoffs of the candidates was larger. 
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particular, in the trust game, the trustee received an endowment from the 
truster as ‘manna from heaven’, whereas in the official’s dilemma game the 
public official had to produce the endowment by counting 1s in tables. As a 
result, the measure of trustworthiness obtained in the trust game may have 
been different from the measure of trustworthiness obtained in the official’s 
dilemma game. In particular, the trust game might have provided an inflated 
measure of trustworthiness compared to the official’s dilemma game since, 
in the latter, voters might have felt more entitled to keep money for 
themselves as they had to work hard to produce the endowment.145 The data 
analysis however showed that the two measures were highly correlated, with 
the measure obtained in the trust game actually lower than the measure 
obtained in the official’s dilemma game. And, as previously noted, the 
trustworthiness bias is replicated (if anything, it is slightly stronger) if we 
assume that voters held rational expectations rather than on adaptive 
expectations. 
Another potential relevant confound concerns the state under which 
the decisions in the trust game and official’s dilemma game respectively 
were taken. In particular, in the trust game, subjects decided ‘in a cold state’ 
as they did not know yet which role the computer assigned to them and 
under the presumption that the truster was going to trust them. In the 
official’s dilemma game, the decision was more in a hot state as the public 
officials knew that trust was placed on them. As a result, the subjects may 
have been more sensitive to certain psychological pressures, such as trust 
responsiveness (Guerra and Zizzo, 2004) and reciprocity (Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006), in the official’s dilemma game than in the trust game, 
and, therefore, they may have fulfilled trust more in the official’s dilemma 
game. If subjects anticipated that, they might have believed that the measure 
of trustworthiness provided to them was understated. As a result, they might 
have scaled up the information about the trustworthiness of the candidates 
provided to them. This however does not change our results, since the 
                                                          
145
 Similar implications arise if subjects learned how to be untrustworthy in the trust game, 
and, in turn, displayed lower trustworthiness in the official’s dilemma game. Note however 
that this type of learning could have also worked in the opposite direction: subjects learned 
how to be trustworthy in trust game, and, in turn, repaid trust more in the official’s dilemma 
game.  
177 
 
voting choice that brings the highest utility is the same irrespectively of how 
utility is scaled (or the attributes are scaled).146 
Another possible criticism of our experiment is that subjects were 
provided only with ex-ante measures of competence and trustworthiness 
which, from the standpoint of the subjects, may not necessarily capture the 
ex-post behavior of the public official. As a result, people may have formed 
certain beliefs about the ex-post competence and trustworthiness of the 
public official which could have not reflected the information provided to 
them during the voting phase. This is not however a problem as we found a 
very high correlation between early and later measures of trustworthiness 
and competence which would not justify such behavior unless subjects were 
extremely naïve. Second, and as previously discussed, we also analyzed the 
data assuming that the subjects had correct beliefs and predictions of the 
future behavior of the public official (rational expectations).
147
 
Our experiment was conducted in the United Kingdom with subjects 
with a variety of different backgrounds. We do not find any differences, in 
our data, on how voters weigh the trustworthiness and competence of the 
candidates across the different nationalities of our subjects. This study is 
however not specifically designed to investigate cross-national differences. 
In particular, the number of observations that we collected for each country 
is relatively small, and, therefore, any definite conclusion would be too 
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 To illustrate this, suppose that a voter n believe that a unit of ex-ante trustworthiness is 
equivalent to τ units of ex-post trustworthiness. As long as this belief is the same for all the 
candidates (which is reasonable in our case since voters are only informed about the 
trustworthiness and competence of the candidates and nothing else), the voting choice of 
the voter does not change. More formally, the probability that voter n chooses candidate i is 
the same irrespectively of how the attributes are scaled:  
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In terms of our regression analysis, it means that the beliefs that change the scale of the 
attributes (trustworthiness and competence), do not change the estimation of the parameters 
   and   . 
147
 Also, as we have already mentioned earlier, the voting choice that brings the highest 
utility is the same irrespectively of how utility is scaled (or the attributes are scaled). This 
means that, as long as the beliefs of the voters change only the scale of the attributes of the 
candidates, our results do not change. 
178 
 
premature. Future research may wish to explore the extent to which our 
findings hold across different countries. 
6. Conclusions 
Our results show that voters tend mostly to care only about their 
final expected payoffs, irrespectively of the trustworthiness and competence 
of the candidates. These findings are useful to understand how voters decide 
in public elections. In particular, they support, in most of the cases, the idea 
that what ultimately matters for the voters is what they get in their pocket. 
Quoting James Carville’s famous slogan, “[it is] the economy [that matters], 
stupid”. As a result of this, voters may be willing to support untrustworthy 
candidates if the latter are perceived to contribute more to the overall 
welfare of the voters. This could explain why democracies may at times 
suffer from dishonesty and corruption at the public level.  
We did identify a bias towards caring about trustworthiness, 
particularly when the candidates are similar in terms of their contribution to 
the financial welfare of the voters (that is, the difference in expected payoffs 
between the candidates is small enough). In these occasions, the information 
about the trustworthiness of the candidates can become crucial to determine 
which candidate will be elected, and so it is not just “the economy, stupid”. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Competence versus Trustworthiness: What do 
Voters Care About? 
 
K. Experimental instructions 
L. Final questionnaire 
M. Background information on participants 
N. Full regressions of Table 4 
O. Analysis with rational expectations 
P. Analysis without outliers 
Q. Analysis of the public officials’ behavior 
R. Additional analysis of behavior in stages 1 and 2 
 
A. Experimental instructions 
 
 Baseline (in half of the sessions, the order of stage 1 and stage 2 was 
inverted) 
 
 
Instructions 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on decision making. The instructions are the same for 
all participants. During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate 
with other participants. Please raise your hand if you have any questions at 
any point during the experiment. If you have any questions, the 
experimenter will come to you and answer your questions privately. If the 
question is relevant to everyone, the experimenter will repeat the answer 
aloud. 
The experiment consists of three stages. In addition to these three stages, 
you will be asked some individual questions at the end of the experiment. At 
the beginning of each stage you will receive the corresponding instructions. 
The information you provide in each stage of the experiment may be 
reported to other participants at later stages of the experiment. However, all 
of your decisions and answers will remain anonymous. 
During this experiment, your earnings depend on your decisions and the 
decisions of the other participants. It is therefore important that you read the 
instructions with care. Your earnings from the experiment will be computed 
in “points”.  
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At the end of the experiment one stage will be chosen at random, and you 
will be paid the points that you earned in that stage. The points that you earn 
in that stage will be converted into pounds at an exchange rate of 1 point = 
20 pence. In addition to this, you will also be paid a show-up fee of 2 
pounds and any additional earnings that you may obtain by answering the 
questions at the end of the experiment. You will be paid individually and in 
cash in a separate room by a person who is not present during the 
experiment and who is not aware of the content of this experiment. 
First stage 
In this stage of the experiment your task will be to count the number of 1s in 
a series of tables containing 0s and 1s. The figure shows the kind of screen 
you will see later: 
 
You will have to enter the number of 1s into the box below the table and 
click the Submit button. After you have submitted your answer, a new table 
will be generated.  
You will only earn money after correctly solving 40 tables. Specifically, you 
will receive 1 point for each table you correctly solve on top of the first 40 
correctly solved tables. The greater the number of tables you solve correctly 
over and above the first 40 correctly solved tables, the more points you will 
earn. 
You will have 10 minutes to complete the first stage of the experiment. 
Your remaining time will be displayed in the upper right hand corner of the 
screen. 
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Second stage 
In this stage of the experiment, you will be matched at random with another 
participant. You will never interact with this person again in the remainder 
of the experiment. One of the two will be randomly assigned the role of 
participant A, and the other the role of participant B.  
Participant A will receive an endowment of 30 points. He or she will decide 
whether or not to transfer all the 30 points to participant B. There are two 
scenarios: 
1. If participant A decides not to transfer the 30 points to participant 
B, participant A will earn 30 points and participant B 0 points. 
 
2. If participant A decides to transfer the 30 points to participant B, 
these points get multiplied by 3 before they are received by 
participant B. Hence, participant B will receive 90 points overall. 
Participant B then will decide how many points to keep and how 
many points to return to participant A. Specifically, he/she can 
return to participant A any amount between a minimum of 9 points 
to a maximum of 90 points. 
You will be informed about your role (participant A or B) only at the end of 
the experiment. Hence, at this stage, you will have to make decisions in the 
roles of both participant A and participant B: 
 As participant A, you will have to decide if you want to transfer the 
30 points or not to participant B.  
 As participant B, you will make a decision without knowing if 
participant A has chosen to transfer or not the 30 points to you. 
Specifically, you will have to decide how many points you would 
wish to return to participant A if participant A were to transfer his or 
her 30 points to you.  
At the end of this stage, if participant A has chosen not to transfer the 30 
points, participant B’s decision will be ignored and earnings will be 30 
points for participant A and 0 for participant B. If participant A has chosen 
to transfer the 30 points, participant B’s decision will determine the 
earnings of both participants. 
The results and earnings for this stage will be communicated to you at the 
end of the experiment and will depend on the role that you have been 
assigned to.  
Third stage 
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The task in this stage of the experiment is to count 1s in a series of tables as 
in the first stage of the experiment. However, new rules are now in effect, 
which did not apply in the first stage. 
Specifically, you will be randomly matched with two other participants you 
have never been matched with before. You and these two participants will 
now be referred to as co-participants. The three of you will have a common 
fund. At the beginning of the task, the value of the common fund will be set 
to 0 points. Every co-participant will individually work on the task for 10 
minutes (the remaining time will be displayed in the upper right hand corner 
of the work screen). However, only one co-participant’s work will count for 
the earnings of this stage of the experiment. This co-participant will be 
referred to as the appointed co-participant. After the appointed co-
participant correctly solves 40 tables, each additional correct answer of the 
appointed co-participant will increase the value of the common fund by 4 
points.  
At the end of the task, the common fund will have accumulated a certain 
number of points equal to four times the number of tables that the appointed 
co-participant correctly solved on top of the first 40 correctly solved tables. 
Only the appointed co-participant will know the number of tables that he or 
she correctly solved (and so the value of the common fund). He or she will 
be asked to report the value of the common fund to the other co-participants. 
He or she can report any number between 0 and the true value of the 
common fund. This number corresponds to the reported value of the 
common fund. The reported value of the common fund will be split equally 
between the co-participants. That is, each co-participant (including the 
appointed co-participant) will receive 1/3 of the reported value of the 
common fund. If applicable, the appointed co-participant will also earn the 
whole of the non-reported value of the common fund, that is the value of 
the common fund not reported. Note that the appointed co-participant will 
be free to report or not the true value of the common fund. Moreover, the 
other co-participants will only be informed of the reported value of the 
common fund. 
Example: Suppose the appointed co-participant solves 52 tables correctly 
(hence 12 tables over and above 40 correctly solved tables); the value of the 
common fund is 12 × 4 = 48. The appointed co-participant however reports 
a value of 33. The non-reported value of the common fund is 48 – 33 = 15. 
The earnings are therefore: 
 33 / 3 = 11 for each non-appointed co-participant; 
 33 / 3 + 15 = 26 for the appointed co-participant. 
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How is the appointed co-participant selected? Before starting the task, 
each co-participant will be informed of: 
 the number of tables correctly solved by each other co-participant in 
the first stage of the experiment where the task was to count 1s in 
tables;  
 
 the proportion of points that each other co-participant in the role of 
participant B returned to participant A in the second stage of the 
experiment.  
Each co-participant will then be asked to choose which of the two other co-
participants he or she would like to select as the appointed co-participant. 
The decision of one randomly selected co-participant will be implemented. 
Hence, it is in your best interest to choose the co-participant that you really 
want as the appointed co-participant.  
Afterwards, the computer will inform each co-participant whether or not he 
or she is the appointed co-participant. Then the task of counting 1s in a 
series of tables will start. 
In summary 
 You will be randomly matched with two other participants you have 
never been matched with before. You and these two participants will 
be referred to as co-participants. The three of you will have a 
common fund with an initial value of 0 points. 
 Each co-participant will choose whom he or she wants to select as 
appointed co-participant between the other two co-participants. The 
decision of one co-participant selected at random will be 
implemented. 
 Everyone will work for 10 minutes on the task which consists in 
counting 1s in a series of tables containing 0s and 1s. However, only 
the work of the appointed co-participant will count for the earnings. 
Specifically, for each table that the appointed co-participant 
correctly solves on top of the first 40 correctly solved tables, the 
value of the common fund increases by 4 points. 
 At the end of the task the appointed co-participant can report any 
number between 0 and the true value of the common fund to the 
other co-participants. This number constitutes the reported value of 
the common fund. The other co-participants will be informed only 
about the reported value of the common fund. 
 The reported value of the common fund will be divided in equal 
parts (each worth 1/3 of the reported value) between the co-
participants (including the appointed co-participant). If applicable, 
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the appointed co-participant will also earn the whole of the non-
reported value of the common fund, that is the value of common 
fund not reported. 
 
 
 Stage 3 of CIL treatment 
 
Third stage 
The task in this stage of the experiment is to count 1s in a series of tables as 
in the first stage of the experiment. However, new rules are now in effect, 
which did not apply in the first stage. 
Specifically, you will be randomly matched with two other participants you 
have never been matched with before. You and these two participants will 
now be referred to as co-participants. The three of you will have a common 
fund. At the beginning of the task, the value of the common fund will be set 
to 0 points. Every co-participant will individually work on the task for 10 
minutes (the remaining time will be displayed in the upper right hand corner 
of the work screen). However, only one co-participant’s work will count for 
the earnings of this stage of the experiment. This co-participant will be 
referred to as the appointed co-participant. After the appointed co-
participant correctly solves 40 tables, each additional correct answer of the 
appointed co-participant will increase the value of the common fund by 4 
points.  
At the end of the task, the common fund will have accumulated a certain 
number of points equal to four times the number of tables that the appointed 
co-participant correctly solved on top of the first 40 correctly solved tables. 
Only the appointed co-participant will know the number of tables that he or 
she correctly solved (and so the value of the common fund). He or she will 
be asked to report the value of the common fund to the other co-participants. 
He or she can report any number between 0 and the true value of the 
common fund. This number corresponds to the reported value of the 
common fund. The reported value of the common fund will be split equally 
between the co-participants. That is, each co-participant (including the 
appointed co-participant) will receive 1/3 of the reported value of the 
common fund. If applicable, the appointed co-participant will also earn the 
whole of the non-reported value of the common fund, that is the value of 
the common fund not reported. Note that the appointed co-participant will 
be free to report or not the true value of the common fund. Moreover, the 
other co-participants will only be informed of the reported value of the 
common fund. 
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Example: Suppose the appointed co-participant solves 52 tables correctly 
(hence 12 tables over and above 40 correctly solved tables); the value of the 
common fund is 12 × 4 = 48. The appointed co-participant however reports 
a value of 33. The non-reported value of the common fund is 48 – 33 = 15. 
The earnings are therefore: 
 33 / 3 = 11 for each non-appointed co-participant; 
 33 / 3 + 15 = 26 for the appointed co-participant. 
How is the appointed co-participant selected? Before starting the task, 
each co-participant will be placed in 7 situations. Only one of these will be 
real, the others will be fictional. 
In each situation, each co-participant will be informed of: 
 the number of tables correctly solved by each other co-participant in 
the first stage of the experiment where the task was to count 1s in 
tables;  
 the proportion of points that each other co-participant in the role of 
participant B returned to participant A in the second stage of the 
experiment.  
However, only in the real situation, the information provided is about your 
actual current co-participants. In the fictional situations, the information 
provided is about people who participated in past sessions of this 
experiment. 
For each situation, each co-participant will be asked to choose which of the 
two other co-participants he or she would like to select as the appointed co-
participant. Only the decision of one randomly selected co-participant in the 
real situation will be implemented and count towards your earnings of this 
stage. Note that, for all you know, each situation could be the real one, in 
which case ALL information you are given about it is true, and only the real 
one may have any effect on who is going to be the appointed co-participant. 
Hence, it is in your best interest to treat each situation as if it is real and to 
choose, for each situation, the co-participant that you really want as the 
appointed co-participant.  
Afterwards, the computer will inform each co-participant whether or not he 
or she is the appointed co-participant based on the outcome of the real 
situation. Then the task of counting 1s in a series of tables will start. 
In summary 
 You will be randomly matched with two other participants you have 
never been matched with before. You and these two participants will 
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be referred to as co-participants. The three of you will have a 
common fund with an initial value of 0 points. 
 Each co-participant will choose whom he or she wants to select as 
appointed co-participant between the other two co-participants in 
different situations. Only one of these situations is the real one. The 
decision of one co-participant selected at random in the real situation 
will be implemented. 
 Everyone will work for 10 minutes on the task which consists in 
counting 1s in a series of tables containing 0s and 1s. However, only 
the work of the appointed co-participant will count for the earnings. 
Specifically, for each table that the appointed co-participant 
correctly solves on top of the first 40 correctly solved tables, the 
value of the common fund increases by 4 points. 
 At the end of the task the appointed co-participant can report any 
number between 0 and the true value of the common fund to the 
other co-participants. This number constitutes the reported value of 
the common fund. The other co-participants will be informed only 
about the reported value of the common fund. 
 The reported value of the common fund will be divided in equal 
parts (each worth 1/3 of the reported value) between the co-
participants (including the appointed co-participant). If applicable, 
the appointed co-participant will also earn the whole of the non-
reported value of the common fund, that is the value of common 
fund not reported. 
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B. Final questionnaire 
 
Note: In the Part 1 of the questionnaire, appointed and non-appointed co-
participants were asked different questions (see below). 
 
Part 1 (only for non-appointed co-participants) 
 
In this part of the questionnaire, we would like you to answer the following 
questions regarding your predictions about stage 3. You will be paid an 
extra point for each correct prediction. 
 
1) Do you think the appointed co-participant underreported the 
value of the common fund?  
Yes or No 
2) Do you think the other co-participant who was not selected as the 
appointed co-participant voted for the same co-participant as 
you?  
Yes or No 
3) How do you feel the appointed co-participant was ranked among 
the three co-participants in terms of number of tables correctly 
solved in stage 1?  
He/she was ranked first (i.e. he/she correctly solved the largest 
number of tables) 
He/she was ranked second 
He/she was ranked third (i.e. he/she correctly solved the smallest 
number of tables) 
4) How do you feel the appointed co-participant was ranked among 
the three co-participants in terms of number of points returned to 
participant A in stage 2 
He/she was ranked first (i.e. he/she returned the largest number of 
points) 
He/she was ranked second 
He/she was ranked third (i.e. he/she returned the smallest number of 
points) 
- - - - - - - - 
Part 1 (only for appointed co-participants) 
1) Do you think both the other two co-participants voted for you as 
the appointed co-participant? 
 
Yes or No 
 
194 
 
2) Do you think that the co-participant, selected at random, who 
voted for you thought that you were going to underreport the 
value of the common fund? 
 
Yes or No 
 
3) How do you feel you were ranked among the three co-
participants in terms of number of tables correctly solved in 
stage 1? 
I was ranked first (i.e. I correctly solved the largest number of 
tables)  
I was ranked second 
I was ranked third (i.e. I correctly solved the smallest number of 
tables) 
4) How do you feel you were ranked among the three co-
participants in terms of number of points returned to participant 
A in stage 2? 
I was ranked first (i.e. I returned the largest number of points) 
I was ranked second 
I was ranked third (i.e. I returned the smallest number of points) 
 
- - - - - - - - 
 
Part 2 
You will now be asked to select from among six different gambles the one 
gamble you would like to take. The figure shows the kind of screen you will 
use to select the gamble.  
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Each circle represents a different gamble. Each circle is divided in two 
parts. Each part is a possible outcome of the gamble. For every gamble, 
each outcome is equally likely, that is it has a 50% chance of happening. 
The number of points that the gamble will give for each possible outcome is 
written inside the circle.  
At the end of the experiment, you will roll a six-sided die to determine 
which outcome of your selected gamble will occur: 
 If you roll a 1, 2, or 3, you will receive the points on the left part of 
the circle.  
 If you roll a 4, 5, or 6, you will receive the points on the right side of 
the circle.  
Note that, no matter which gamble you pick, each outcome has a 50% 
chance of occurring. 
To select a gamble you have to click on it with the mouse. You can revise 
your choice as many times as you want. When you are happy with your 
choice, click the “Confirm your choice” button to confirm.  
Example:  Suppose you select gamble 4 and later you roll a 1, 2, or 3, your 
earnings will be 4 points. If you roll 4, 5, or 6, you will earn 13 points. 
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- - - - - - - - 
Part 3 
A list of statements will be displayed. Please read each statement carefully 
and decide if that statement describes you or not. If it describes you click the 
word true if not, choose the word false. After each response a new statement 
will appear. There are sixteen statements. 
1. I sometimes litter. 
2. I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative 
consequences.  
3. In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others.  
4. I have tried illegal drugs (for example, marijuana, cocaine, etc.).  
5. I always accept others' opinions, even when they don't agree with my 
own.  
6. I take out my bad moods on others now and then.  
7. There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else.  
8. In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their 
sentences.  
9. I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency.  
10. When I have made a promise, I keep it--no ifs, ands or buts.  
11. I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back.  
12. I would never live off other people.  
13. I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am 
stressed out.  
14. During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact.  
15. There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that 
I borrowed.  
16. I always eat a healthy diet.  
17. Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return 
For each statement, subjects were asked to select True or False. 
- - - - - - - - 
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Part 4 
A list of attitude statements will be displayed. Each represents a commonly 
held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. Read each statement 
carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. First 
impressions are usually best in such matters. After each response a new 
statement will appear. There are twenty statements.  
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to 
do so. 
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.  
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
4. Most people are basically good and kind. 
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come 
out when they are given a chance. 
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
8. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so. 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and 
dishonest. 
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the 
real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons that carry more weight. 
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that 
criminals are stupid enough to get caught. 
14. Most men are brave. 
15. It is wise to flatter important people. 
16. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
17. Barnum was very wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every 
minute. 
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
198 
 
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of 
being put painlessly to death. 
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of 
their property. 
For each statement, subjects were asked to select one of the following 
options: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, no 
opinion, slightly agree, somewhat agree, strongly agree. 
- - - - - - - - 
Part 5 
In this part of the questionnaire, we would like you to provide some 
personal information if so you wish.  
What is your gender? (Female or Male) 
What is your country of origin? 
Are you a native English speaker? (Yes or No) 
Your age? 
Which course are you registered on? 
Did you attend a course in Economics during your studies? (Yes or No) 
Level of current degree? (INTO, Undergraduate (e.g.BSc, BA, LLB, MBBS), 
Postgraduate Taught (e.g.MA, MSc), Postgraduate Research (e.g. MPhil, 
PhD) or Other) 
*If you ticked the "Other" in the question above please specify if you wish 
What is your religion or belief? (No Religion, Buddhist, Christian, Sikh, 
Muslim, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Atheist, Other or Prefer not to say) 
*If you ticked the "Other" in the question above please specify if you wish 
What is your relationship status? (Single, Engaged, In a relationship, 
Married, Civil Partnership, Widowed, Seperated/ Divorced or Prefer not to 
say) 
How many times have you participated in previous experiments? (0, 1, 2, 3 
or More than 3) 
Have you ever participated before in an experiment where the task was to 
count 1s in a series of table containing 0s and 1s like in this experiment?  
(Yes or No) 
What do you think this experiment is about?  
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C. Background information on participants 
 
Characteristics n = 240 
Gender 
 
Female 150 (62.50%) 
Male 90 (37.50%) 
Age 
 
Mean 23.30 
St. dev. 4.43 
Min. 18 
Max. 65 
Level of current degree 
 
INTO 3 (1.25%) 
Erasmus 1 (0.42%) 
Postgraduate Research (e.g. MPhil, PhD) 19 (7.92%) 
Postgraduate Taught (e.g.MA, MSc) 95 (39.58%) 
Undergraduate (e.g.BSc, BA, LLB, MBBS) 122 (50.83%) 
Background in economics
148
 
 
No 130 (54.17%) 
Yes 110 (45.83%) 
Country of origin 
 
Bahrain 1 (0.42%) 
Bangladesh 1 (0.42%) 
Brazil 1 (0.42%) 
Bulgaria 1 (0.42%) 
China, Taiwan or Hong Kong 98 (40.83%) 
Egypt 1 (0.42%) 
Germany 4 (1.67%) 
Greece 2 (0.83%) 
Hungary 1 (0.42%) 
India 2 (0.83%) 
Indonesia 1 (0.42%) 
Iran 2 (0.83%) 
Ireland 2 (0.83%) 
Italy 1 (0.42%) 
Japan 1 (0.42%) 
Jordan 1 (0.42%) 
Kazakhstan 2 (0.83%) 
Latvia 1 (0.42%) 
Lithuania 3 (1.25%) 
Malaysia 4 (1.67%) 
Maldives 1 (0.42%) 
Mauritius 4 (1.67%) 
Netherlands 1 (0.42%) 
Nigeria 4 (1.67%) 
Norway 1 (0.42%) 
                                                          
148
 The question was: “Did you attend a course in Economics during your studies?” Yes or 
No. 
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Palestine 1 (0.42%) 
Philippines 1 (0.42%) 
Poland 5 (2.08%) 
Portugal 1 (0.42%) 
Romania 1 (0.42%) 
Russia 2 (0.83%) 
Somalia 1 (0.42%) 
Sri Lanka 1 (0.42%) 
Tanzania 1 (0.42%) 
Thailand 2 (0.83%) 
UK 67 (27.92%) 
USA 4 (1.67%) 
Vietnam 12 (5%) 
Native English speaker 
 
No 160 (66.67%) 
Yes 80 (33.33%) 
Relationship Status 
 
Engaged 3 (1.25%) 
In a relationship 81 (33.75%) 
Married 9 (3.75%) 
Prefer not to say 7 (2.92%) 
Separated/ Divorced 1 (0.42%) 
Single 139 (57.92%) 
Religion or belief 
 
Atheist 20 (8.33%) 
Agnostic 1 (0.42%) 
Buddhist 16 (6.67%) 
Christian 43 (17.92%) 
Christian and Sikh 1 (0.42%) 
Daoism 1 (0.42%) 
Muslim 18 (7.5%) 
No Religion 123 (51.25%) 
Other 4 (1.67%) 
Prefer not to say 13 (5.42%) 
Participation in previous experiments (n.) 
 
Never 8 (3.33%) 
1 25 (10.42%) 
2 16 (6.67%) 
3 15 (6.25%) 
4 or more 176 (73.33%) 
Participation in a similar real-effort task 
 
No 146 (60.83%) 
Yes 94 (39.17%) 
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D. Full regressions of Table 4 
Table D1: Conditional Logit Regressions 
 
Regression 3 Regression 6 
 
b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 4.38*** 1.31 5.20*** 1.59 
log(Competence) 2.76** 1.2 2.98** 1.21 
log(Trustworthiness)×Inconsistency . . -2.89*** 0.56 
log(Competence)×Inconsistency . . -1.49** 0.68 
log(Trustworthiness)×|p|>5 -2.49** 1.08 -2.37** 1.18 
log(Competence)×|p|>5 -1.61** 0.81 -1.46* 0.86 
log(Trustworthiness)×UK 1.86 1.66 1.45 1.65 
log(Competence)×UK 2.1 2.13 1.65 2.1 
log(Trustworthiness)×China -0.06 0.62 -0.35 0.69 
log(Competence)×China 0.14 0.66 -0.13 0.65 
log(Trustworthiness)×Male -0.19 0.65 -0.61 0.84 
log(Competence)×Male 0.99 0.63 0.88 0.8 
log(Trustworthiness)×Economics -0.14 0.56 0.24 0.57 
log(Competence)×Economics -0.17 0.5 0.2 0.54 
log(Trustworthiness)×Age 0.02 0.15 -0.02 0.14 
log(Competence)×Age 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.16 
log(Trustworthiness)×Undergraduate 0.1 0.71 -0.17 0.72 
log(Competence)×Undergraduate 0.03 0.92 -0.2 0.89 
log(Trustworthiness)×Trust Game first -0.45 0.57 -0.23 0.58 
log(Competence)×Trust Game first -0.37 0.58 -0.01 0.6 
log(Trustworthiness)×CIL 0.4 0.5 0.96* 0.53 
log(Competence)×CIL 0.46 0.61 1 0.66 
log(Trustworthiness)×Risk choice -0.12 0.17 -0.31 0.21 
log(Competence)×Risk choice -0.02 0.18 -0.15 0.21 
log(Trustworthiness)×SDS17 Score 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 
log(Competence)×SDS17 Score 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.09 
log(Trustworthiness)×MACH Score -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 
log(Competence)×MACH Score 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
log(Trustworthiness)×Voter's Return rate -0.14 0.41 0.13 0.39 
log(Competence)×Voter's Return rate 0 0.51 0.17 0.55 
log(Trustworthiness)×Voter's Competence -0.31 0.36 0.13 0.42 
log(Competence)×Voter's Competence 0.26 0.41 0.59 0.44 
Obs 776 
 
776  
Pseudo R
2
 0.31 
 
0.38  
Df 30 
 
32  
Prob > F 0 
 
0  
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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E. Analysis with rational expectations 
In this section, we replicate the analysis of the chapter assuming that 
subjects have rational expectations. If subjects display rational expectations, 
they are on average able to predict the candidate that ex post will generate 
more profit. We can construct a measure of the expected ex post payoffs 
generated to the voters by the candidates by looking at how much ex ante 
trustworthiness and ex ante competence of the public officials explain the ex 
post payoffs generated to the voters by the public officials. In particular, we 
can estimate an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the ex post 
voter’s payoffs generated by the public officials,149 while the independent 
variables are the ex ante trustworthiness (measured as the return rate from 
the earlier stage) and ex ante competence (measured as number of tables 
correctly solved on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved in the earlier 
stage) of the public officials. We can then multiply the estimated 
coefficients with the ex ante trustworthiness and the ex ante competence 
respectively of all the candidates (both appointed and non-appointed 
participants) to obtain a statistical expected measure of the expected ex post 
payoffs generated to the voters by the candidates. Table E1 presents the 
result of this estimation. 
Table E1: OLS regression on ex post voter’s payoffs 
 
Ex-post voter’s payoffs 
 
b se 
Ex-ante Trustworthiness 34.24** 14.86 
Ex-ante Competence 0.74*** 0.12 
Obs 80 
 
Adj. R
2
 0.317 
 
Df 2 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
Notes: OLS regression. The table reports the beta coefficients 
and the standard errors. Observations are from the public 
officials. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The coefficients 
are not normalized. 
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 These payoffs are calculated as:     
        
 
 
    
           
       
, where i identifies the 
voter, k the triad,     
       
 the ex-post rate of honesty of the public official, and     
       
the 
ex-post competence of the public official.  
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The expected values of the ex post profits are calculated using the 
following formula: 
    
                  
                 
        
where     
        and     
        are the ex ante trustworthiness and ex 
ante competence respectively of the candidate j. Having now a measure of 
the ex post voter’s payoffs generated by the candidates, we can study 
whether subjects displayed rational expectations. In particular, we can look 
at how the probability of voting for the more (ex post) profitable candidate 
evolves as the difference in ex post payoffs between the more and less 
profitable candidates increases (Figure E1).
150
 If subjects have rational 
expectations, they should always select the more (ex post) profitable 
candidate (graphically, we should observe a straight line at P(max(π)) = 1). 
This seems to be the tendency when the difference in ex post payoffs 
between the more and less profitable candidates is large. When the 
difference is small, decisions are noisier.  
Figure E1: Probability of electing the ex post more profitable candidate 
 
Notes: P(max(π)) is the probability of electing the ex post more profitable candidate. Δπ is 
the difference in expected payoffs between the more and less ex post profitable candidate. 
The running means are weighted to give more importance to near points than far, and 
computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). 
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We can also study whether the voters favor the ex post trustworthy 
or competent candidate. To do so, we need to obtain a measure of ex post 
trustworthiness and ex post competence for all the candidates. We can 
estimate two OLS regressions, one for trustworthiness and one for 
competence, where the dependent variable is the ex post trustworthiness 
(competence) of the public officials, while the independent variable is the ex 
ante trustworthiness (competence) of the public officials. We can then 
multiply the estimated coefficients with the ex ante trustworthiness and the 
ex ante competence respectively of all the candidates (both appointed and 
non-appointed participants) to obtain a statistical expected measure of the ex 
post trustworthiness and ex post competence respectively. Table E2 presents 
the result of these estimations. 
 Table E2: OLS regressions on ex post trustworthiness and 
competence 
 
Ex-post trustworthiness Ex-post competence 
 
b se b se 
Ex-ante Trustworthiness 0.50** 0.19 . . 
Ex-ante Competence . . 0.89*** 0.05 
Obs 80 
 
80  
Adj. R
2
 0.069 
 
0.795  
Df 1 
 
1  
Prob > F 0.010 
 
0  
Notes: OLS regression. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. 
Observations are from the public officials. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The 
coefficients are not normalized. 
 Focusing on cases where there is a trade-off between ex post 
trustworthiness and ex post competence, we can look at how the probability 
of voting for the more ex post trustworthy candidate evolves if the 
difference in ex post payoffs Δπ between the more and less trustworthy 
candidates increases (Figure E2). For Δπ < 0 (i.e. the ex post more 
trustworthy candidate is also the ex post less profitable), profit-maximizing 
subjects with rational expectations should vote for the ex post less 
trustworthy subjects as he or she is associated with higher ex post payoffs.  
For Δπ > 0 (i.e. the ex post more trustworthy candidate is also the ex post 
more profitable), profit-maximizing subjects with rational expectations 
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should vote for the ex post more trustworthy subjects as he or she is 
associated with higher ex post payoffs. The figure shows that subjects did 
not seem to vote for the ex post more profitable candidate, as rational 
expectations would predict, but the candidate who is ex post more 
trustworthy, especially when the difference in ex post payoffs between the 
candidates is small. This pattern is similar to the one observed for adaptive 
expectations (see main chapter), and, perhaps, even more marked. 
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Figure E2: Probability of electing the ex post more trustworthy candidate 
 
Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more ex post trustworthy candidate. Δπ is the 
difference in expected payoffs between the more and less ex post trustworthy candidate. 
The running means are weighted to give more importance to near points than far, and 
computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). The data corresponds to cases where 
there is a trade-off between ex post trustworthiness and competence. 
We can also conduct a regression analysis like the one in the chapter 
but using the ex post measures of trustworthiness and competence. The 
dependent variable is the dummy ‘Vote’. In regression 1, the independent 
variables include the log of ex post trustworthiness and ex post competence 
of the candidate. In regression 2, we also add interaction terms of log(ex 
post trustworthiness) and log(ex post competence) with a dummy variable 
|π|>5 which takes value 1 when the absolute deviation in ex post expected 
payoffs between the two candidates is bigger than 5 experimental points. In 
regression 3, we control as well for the demographic, psychological and 
behavioral characteristics of the voters and treatment effects by interacting 
them with log(ex post trustworthiness) and log(ex post competence).
151
 In 
regressions 4-6, we also control for the behavior of the inconsistent subjects 
by including an interaction of whether a subject was categorized as 
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 As we already explained in the chapter, since the characteristics of the voters do not vary 
over the choices of the voters, in the regression we can only have interaction terms between 
the alternative-specific variables and the voter-specific variables. 
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inconsistent with log(ex post trustworthiness) and log(ex post competence) 
respectively. Table E3 displays the results of the regressions.
152
 
Table E3: Alternative-specific conditional logit regressions  
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 
b se b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 1.37*** 0.24 1.56*** 0.47 1.78** 0.81 
log(Competence) 0.98*** 0.22 0.49* 0.27 -0.47 0.92 
log(Trustworthiness) × |π|>5 
  
-0.24 0.47 -0.17 0.53 
log(Competence) × |π|>5 
  
0.52 0.36 0.9 0.61 
Interactions with demographic, 
behavioral, psychological and 
treatment variables 
No No Yes 
Obs 774 
 
774 
 
772 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.23 
 
0.24 
 
0.3 
 
Df 2 
 
4 
 
30 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
 b se b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 1.75*** 0.28 1.81*** 0.47 2.40*** 0.92 
log(Competence) 1.16*** 0.26 0.52* 0.28 -0.59 0.96 
log(Trustworthiness)×Inconsistency -1.78*** 0.45 -1.78*** 0.46 -2.84*** 0.58 
log(Competence)×Inconsistency -0.63 0.5 -0.64 0.53 -1.12** 0.52 
log(Trustworthiness) × |π|>5   -0.11 0.5 0.12 0.57 
log(Competence) × |π|>5   0.69* 0.39 1.25* 0.7 
Interactions with demographic, 
behavioral, psychological and 
treatment variables 
No No Yes 
Obs 774  774  772  
Pseudo R
2
 0.28  0.29  0.37  
Df 4  6  32  
Prob > F 0  0  0  
Notes: Alternative-specific logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. The table 
reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. The demographic variables are age, 
gender (= 1  for men), economics background (= 1 if applicable), nationality (UK = 1 for 
UK subjects, and China = 1 for Chinese subjects), and University status (= 1 for 
undergraduate students). The behavioral variables are the competence and trustworthiness 
of the voter. The psychological variables are the risk attitude, the SDS17 score and MACH 
score. The treatment variables are the CIL sessions, and the sessions where the trust game 
stage took place before the real effort task stage. The psychological and behavioral 
variables and age are centered at the mean in order to control for high correlation between 
the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). ‘China’ identifies subjects from China, 
Taiwan or Hong Kong. The data correspond to cases where there was a trade-off between 
trustworthiness and competence. The full regressions are available from the authors upon 
request. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
 
In Regressions 1 and 4, both the coefficients of log(trustworthiness) 
and log(competence) are positive and strongly significantly. The coefficient 
of log(trustworthiness) is also significantly larger than the coefficient of 
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 The full regressions are available upon request. 
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log(competence) (χ2 test, p = 0.056 in Regression 1, and 0.010 in Regression 
4). This indicates that, if we assume that voters have rational expectations, 
the bias towards caring about trustworthiness carries through and is perhaps 
even stronger. If we focus on small differences in ex post expected payoffs 
between the two candidates (Regressions 2-3 and 5-6), the coefficient for 
log(trustworthiness) becomes even larger than the coefficient for 
log(competence). Alltogher these results support the key finding of the 
chapter that people care about the trustworthiness of the candidates. 
Finally, we can compare how many electoral choices were consistent 
with rational expectations and how many electoral choices were consistent 
with adaptive expectations. This information is summarized in Tables E4 
and E5. Both tables show that a significant proportion of choices were 
consistent with either adaptive or rational expectations. In addition, they 
suggest that more choices display adaptive (84.38% for all the subjects, 
88.08% if we exclude the inconsistent subjects) rather than rational (75.30% 
for all the subjects, 78.31% if we exclude the inconsistent subjects) 
expectations (χ2 test, p < 0.001). 
Table E4: Electoral choices consistent with adaptive or rational 
expectations 
 All subjects No inconsistent subjects 
Adaptive 
expectations 
Baseline CIL Total Baseline CIL Total 
NO 
31 
(18.45%) 
74 
(14.68%) 
105 
(15.63%) 
26 
(15.95%) 
46 
(10.43%) 
72 
(11.92%) 
YES 
137 
(81.55%) 
430 
(85.32%) 
567 
(84.38%) 
137 
(84.05%) 
395 
(89.57%) 
532 
(88.08%) 
Total 
168 
(100%) 
504 
(100%) 
672 
(100%) 
163 
(100%) 
441 
(100%) 
604 
(100%) 
Rational 
expectations 
Baseline CIL Total Baseline CIL Total 
NO 
44 
(26.19%) 
122 
(24.21%) 
166 
(24.7%) 
39 
(23.93%) 
92 
(20.86%) 
131 
(21.69%) 
YES 
124 
(73.81%) 
382 
(75.79%) 
506 
(75.3%) 
124 
(76.07%) 
349 
(79.14%) 
473 
(78.31%) 
Total 
168 
(100%) 
504 
(100%) 
672 
(100%) 
163 
(100%) 
441 
(100%) 
604 
(100%) 
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Table E5: Electoral choices consistent with adaptive and/or rational 
expectations 
Baseline Rational expectations 
 
Adaptive expectations NO YES Total 
NO 23 (4.56%) 8 (1.59%) 31 (6.15%) 
YES 21 (4.17%) 116 (23.02%) 137 (27.18%) 
Total 44 (8.73%) 124 (24.6%) 168 (33.33%) 
CIL Rational expectations 
 
Adaptive expectations NO YES Total 
NO 58 (11.51%) 16 (3.17%) 74 (14.68%) 
YES 64 (12.7%) 366 (72.62%) 430 (85.32%) 
Total 122 (24.21%) 382 (75.79%) 504 (100%) 
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F. Analysis without outliers 
In this section, we test whether the results of the chapter are driven 
by those cases where the difference in expected profits between the two 
candidates was very large. We  do so by replicating the analysis of the 
chapter with the exclusion of the extreme observations. Outliers are detected 
using the Carling’s (2000) median rule.153 In particular, we drop the 
observations where the difference in expected profits between the the more 
trustworthy candidate and the more competent candidate was larger than 41 
experimental points and smaller than -30 experimental points (see Figure 
F1).
154
 
Figure F1: Histogram of the difference in expected profits 
 
Notes: The data correspond to cases where there was a trade-off between comeptence and 
trustworthiness. The difference in expected profits is between the profit of the more 
trustworthy candidate and the profit of the more competent candidate. Outliers are located 
on the left and on the right of the first and second vertical line respectively. 
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 According to the Median Rule, outliers are the observations above an upper cut-off point 
   and below an lower cut-off point   . These points are calculated as: 
        (     ) 
        (     ) 
where   ,   , and    are the first, second, and third quartile respectively, while    is a 
constant based on a pre-specified outside rate, and it is usually equal to about 2 (Carling, 
2000).   
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 Similar cut-off points are obtained if we use the Tuckey’s Rule (Tuckey, 1977). 
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Figure F2 shows the probability of electing the more trustworthy 
candidate as a function of the difference in expected payoffs between the 
more and less trustworthy candidate (as in Figure 2 of the chapter). Even 
once we exclude the extreme cases, the area below the weighted running 
means for Δπ < 0 is bigger than the area above the weighted running means 
for Δπ > 0, particularly for small differences in expected payoffs (|Δπ| ≤ 5). 
We also replicate the regression analysis of the chapter (Table F1). With the 
removal of the outliers, the results do not change. If anything, the point 
estimates slightly increase both for trustworthiness and competence, and 
their difference acquires more significance. In particular, the coefficient of 
log(trustworthiness) is significantly larger than the coefficient of 
log(competence) in Regression 2 (χ2 test, p = 0.079), Regression 3 (p = 
0.028), Regression 5 (p = 0.030) and Regression 6 (p = 0.024).   
Figure F2: Probability of electing the more trustworthy candidate 
 
 Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more trustowrthy candidate. Δπ is the 
difference in expected payoffs between the more and less trustworthy candidate. The 
running means are weighted to give more importance to near points than far, and computed 
using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data).  
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Table F1: Alternative-specific conditional logit regressions  
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 
b se b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 1.60*** 0.25 3.69*** 1.11 4.27*** 1.37 
log(Competence) 1.56*** 0.27 2.82*** 0.82 2.27* 1.36 
log(Trustworthiness) × |π|>5 
  
-2.13** 1.03 -2.39** 1.11 
log(Competence) × |π|>5 
  
-1.07 0.82 -1.54* 0.89 
Interactions with demographic, 
behavioral, psychological and 
treatment variables 
No No Yes 
Obs 692 
 
692 
 
690 
 
Pseudo R2 0.24 
 
0.25 
 
0.30 
 
Df 2 
 
4 
 
30 
 
Prob > F 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
 b se b se b se 
log(Trustworthiness) 1.81*** 0.3 3.94*** 1.18 4.86*** 1.63 
log(Competence) 1.61*** 0.3 2.86*** 0.84 2.28* 1.34 
log(Trustworthiness)×Inconsistency -1.38*** 0.53 -1.25** 0.51 -2.38*** 0.66 
log(Competence)×Inconsistency 0.04 0.73 0.29 0.86 -0.26 0.89 
log(Trustworthiness) × |π|>5   -2.20** 1.11 -2.45* 1.26 
log(Competence) × |π|>5   -1.1 0.85 -1.53 0.93 
Interactions with demographic, 
behavioral, psychological and 
treatment variables 
No No Yes 
Obs 692  692  690  
Pseudo R
2
 0.27  0.28  0.35  
Df 4  6  32  
Prob > F 0  0  0  
Notes: Alternative-specific logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. The table 
reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. The demographic variables are age, 
gender (= 1  for men), economics background (= 1 if applicable), nationality (UK = 1 for 
UK subjects, and China = 1 for Chinese subjects), and University status (= 1 for 
undergraduate students). The behavioral variables are the competence and trustworthiness 
of the voter. The psychological variables are the risk attitude, the SDS17 score and MACH 
score. The treatment variables are the CIL sessions, and the sessions where the trust game 
stage took place before the real effort task stage. The psychological and behavioral 
variables and age are centered at the mean in order to control for high correlation between 
the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). ‘China’ identifies subjects from China, 
Taiwan or Hong Kong. The data correspond to cases where there was a trade-off between 
trustworthiness and competence. The full regressions are available from the authors upon 
request. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
References Not in Chapter 
Carling, K. 2000. “Resistant Outlier Rules and the Non-Gaussian Case”, 
Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 33 (3): 249-258. 
Tukey, J.W. 1977. Exploratory Data Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
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G. Analysis of the public officials’ behavior 
We now look at the behavior of subjects in the third stage of the 
expeirment (the Official’s Dilemma Game). Table G1 reports the average 
competence in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 real-effort task for each treatment. In the 2
nd
 
real effort task, we do not detect any statistically significant differences in 
competence across treatments both in bivariate tests (Mann-Whitney test, p 
> 0.1) and in aggregate (Kruskal-Wallis test, p > 0.1).
155
 
Table G1: Competence in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 real effort task 
1
st
 real effort task 
  Real effort Task first Trust Game first Total 
Non-appointed
a
 38.14 (16.42) 33.66 (15.71) 35.9 (16.17) 
Appointed
a
 42.2 (20.09) 38.98 (18.95) 40.59 (19.47) 
2
nd
 real effort task 
  Real effort Task first Trust Game first Total 
Non-appointed 
Baseline 41.27 (21.61) 40.13 (17.68) 40.7 (19.66) 
CIL 38.42 (20.86) 39.42 (19.75) 38.92 (20.11) 
Total 40.41 (21.3) 39.91 (18.21) 40.16 (19.75) 
Appointed 
Baseline 52.96 (21.07) 47.11 (19.87) 50.04 (20.51) 
CIL 49.92 (17.65) 46.5 (16.87) 48.21 (16.98) 
Total 52.05 (19.93) 46.93 (18.81) 49.49 (19.43) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
a
 For the 1
st
 real effort task, we only report 
the total average of the Baseline and CIL treatments pooled together, since the two 
treatments were equivalent in the first two stages of the experiment (i.e. the treatment 
manipulation involved only stage 3). 
If we compare the performance of subjects in the 1
st
 real-effort task 
(the one in stage 1 or 2) with the performance in the 2
nd
 real-effort task (the 
one in the Official’s Dilemma Game), we observe, not surprisingly, that, 
because of learning, subjects performed better in the 2
nd
 real-effort task 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). This result is robust across 
treatments and for appointed and non-appointed participants respectively. 
Comparing the behavior of appointed and non-appointed participants, 
appointed participants performed better than non-appointed participants in 
the second real-effort task (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.004) but not in the 
first one (p = 0.198). This is not surprising since the performance of the 
non-appointed participants in stage 3 was not incentivized. 
                                                          
155
 Tests were performed for the entire sample, only for non-appointed participants, and 
only for appointed participants. 
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 Appointed members had returned significantly more points in the 
earlier trust game than non-appointed participants (p = 0.001). This is 
unsurprising as trustworthy candidates were more likely to be appointed 
public official. Table G2 summarizes these statistics. 
Table G2: Trustworthiness in the 2
nd
 trust game  
 Non-appointed participants Appointed participants 
Variable n. Mean St. dev. n. Mean St. dev. 
Return rate 160 0.32 0.18 80 0.41 0.16 
Notes: ‘Return rate’ is equal to the amount returned by the trustee divided by 90. 
We can also study what explains the decision of the appointed 
participants to truthfully report the value of the common fund. Let the 
honesty rate be the proportion of the common fund reported by the public 
official to the other subjects. Table G3 shows average honesty rates for each 
experimental treatment. The honesty rate was significantly smaller in the 
sessions where the Trust Game was played first, both in aggregate (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.001) and separately for each treatment (p = 0.026 in the 
Baseline, and 0.011 in the CIL). A possible explanation of this finding is 
that, in those sessions, subjects required a higher return from the effort since 
the two real-effort tasks occurred one after the other, without any break or 
alternative task between them. In particular, subjects might have struggled 
more to complete the two tasks and believed to have exerted a higher effort. 
This potential explanation is supported by the fact that, looking at the data 
from the incetivized part of the final questionnaire, a higher proportion of 
subjects in the sessions where the trust game stage took place first felt they 
were ranked first among the three participants in terms of number of tables 
correctly solved in the first real effort task, compared to subjects who 
participated in the sessions where the real effort task stage took place first 
(χ2 test, p = 0.020).156  
We can regress the honesty rate against the socio-demographic, 
psychological and behavioral characteristics of the appointed co-participant, 
                                                          
156
 Specifically, in the sessions where the trust game (real-effort task) was played first, 60% 
(32.50%) of the subjects felt they were rank first, 37.50% (52.50%) second and 2.50% 
(15%) third. 
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and the treatments dummies.
157
 Table G4 reports the results of this 
regression. Subjects who were more trustworthy in the trust game displayed 
a higher honesty rate. Subjects with higher scores in the Machiavellianism 
scale were more dishonest. Participants in the sessions where the trust game 
was played first were also generally more dishonest than other subjects.  
Table G3: Rate of honesty  
 
Real-Effort Task first  
(n = 42) 
Trust Game first  
(n = 42) 
Baseline (n = 56) 0.67 (0.28) 0.49 (0.30) 
CIL (n = 24) 0.70 (0.18) 0.47 (0.21) 
Notes: Average honesty rate. Standard deviation is in parenthesis.  
Table G4: Tobit regression (Rate of honesty) 
 
Rate of honesty 
 
b se 
Return rate 0.463** 0.199 
Male -0.117* 0.07 
China -0.075 0.076 
Economics -0.031 0.069 
UK 0.005 0.101 
Trust Game first -0.159** 0.063 
CIL 0.011 0.07 
Undergraduate 0.06 0.082 
Age 0.005 0.006 
Risk choice 0 0.021 
MACH Score -0.007** 0.003 
SDS17 Score -0.006 0.011 
Competence (2
nd
 real-effort task) -0.002 0.002 
Constant 0.617*** 0.167 
Obs 80 
 
R
2
 0.506 
 
Df 13 
 
Prob > F 0.003 
 
Notes: Tobit regression. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. 4 
observations are left-censored, and 6 are right-censored. The psychological variables (i.e. 
SDS17 Score, MACH Score) are centered at the mean in order to control for high 
correlation between the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). ‘Return rate’ is equal 
to the amount returned by the trustee divided by 90.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
We can also look at how the honesty rate correlates with the beliefs 
of the subjects that we elicited in the first part of the incentivized final 
                                                          
157
 Given the exploratory nature of this and later analysis, we only focus on p < 0.05 (or 
better) significance levels in the text. 
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questionnaire and how these beliefs correlated each other.
158
 Table G5 
shows the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of these measures. The 
only two statistically significant correlations at conservative significance 
levels are a positive one between actual honesty rate and considering oneself 
more competent than the others; and a somewhat paradoxical one by which 
public officials who perceive themeselves as having been relatively more 
trustworthy in the earlier stage are less likely to be trustworthy in the official 
reporting game, perhaps as a result of feeling that they already gave their 
share of contribution to the others early on and/or that the others had not 
been trustworthy enough.
159
 
Table G5: Spearman’s ρ (beliefs and honesty rate) 
 
Honesty 
rate 
All 
vote 
Underreportin
g 
Rank 
competence 
Rate of honesty 1 
   
All vote
a
 0.04 1 
  
Underreporting
b
 -0.18 -0.17 1 
 
Rank competence
c
 0.36*** -0.19* -0.11 1 
Rank 
trustworthiness
d
 
-0.20* -0.15 0.34*** -0.20* 
Notes: 
a
 “Do you think both the other two co-participants voted for you as the appointed 
co-participant?” YES = 1, NO = 0; b “Do you think that the co-participant, selected at 
random, who voted for you thought that you were going to underreport the value of the 
common fund?” YES = 1, NO = 0; c “How do you feel you were ranked among the three 
co-participants in terms of number of tables correctly solved in stage 1/2?” 1, 2, 3; d “How 
do you feel you were ranked among the three co-participants in terms of number of points 
returned to participant A in stage 1/2?” 1, 2, 3. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  
                                                          
158
 We can only look at correlations as the answers to the questionnaire could have been 
affected by the decision to truthfully report or underreport the value of the common fund. 
159
 As noted in the main chapter, there was actually a positive relationship between actual 
trustworthiness in the early stage and actual trustworthiness in the official dilemma stage 
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.28, p = 0.011).  
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H. Additional analysis of behavior in stages 1 and 2 
Table H1 reports the results of an OLS regression where the 
dependent variable is the measured competence in the 1
st
 real-effort task 
stage, and the results of a Tobit regression where the dependent variable is 
the measure of trustworthiness, that is the return rate, in the 1
st
 trust game. 
Independent variables include the socio-demographic and psychological 
characteristics of the subjects, and the treatment dummies. 
Table H1: Regressions on Competence (1
st
 real-effort task) and 
Trustworthiness 
 
Competence
a
 Trustworthiness
b
 
 
b se b se 
Male 2.766 2.376 -0.102*** 0.031 
China 1.85 2.651 0.007 0.034 
Economics 1.94 2.351 -0.053* 0.029 
UK 4.104 3.118 0.034 0.041 
Trust Game first -4.074* 2.203 -0.011 0.027 
Undergraduate -0.19 2.63 -0.070** 0.035 
Age -0.26 0.277 0.004 0.004 
Risk choice 1.204 0.744 -0.020** 0.009 
MACH Score -0.252** 0.112 -0.001 0.001 
SDS17 Score -0.741* 0.417 0.005 0.005 
Experience with grid 3.535 2.373 . . 
Constant 66.807*** 15.914 0.395*** 0.107 
Obs 240 
 
240  
R
2
 0.090 
 
0.492
c
  
Df 11 
 
10  
Prob > F 0.03 
 
0 
 
Notes: 
a
 OLS regression with robust standard errors; 
b
 Tobit regression with 
51 left-censored and 2 right-censored observations. 
c
 This is the McFadden's 
pseudo R
2
. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. The 
psychological variables (i.e. SDS17 Score, MACH Score) and Age are 
centered at the mean. ‘Experience with grid’ is a dummy taking value 1 if a 
subject previously participated in a similar real-effort task. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
We find that competence was smaller in the sessions where the trust 
game stage took place first, and for participants who scored high in the 
MACH questionnaire. We also find that male subjects, undergraduate 
students, and less risk averse subjects returned less in the trust game. 
If we look at the proportion of subjects who trusted the counterpart 
(Table H2), we do not detect any statistically significant diffferences across 
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the  sessions where the real effort task was played first and those where the 
trust game stage took place first (χ2 test, p > 0.1). 
Table H2: Trust 
 
Real effort task stage first  
(n = 120) 
Trust game stage first  
(n = 120) 
Total 
Trust 0.63 (0.48) 0.7 (0.46) 0.67 (0.47) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
This is also confirmed in a logit regression where the dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable which takes value 1 if a subject trusts the 
counterpart and 0 if does not trust, and where we control for the socio-
demographic and psychological characteristics and treatment dummies 
(Table H3). Male participants were less likely to trust the counterpart, 
whereas UK participants were more likely to trust. 
Table H3: Logit Regression on Trust 
 
Trust 
 
b se 
Male -0.790** 0.318 
China 0.423 0.373 
Economics -0.362 0.31 
UK 0.884** 0.434 
Trust Game first 0.419 0.302 
Undergraduate -0.522 0.389 
Age 0.088* 0.046 
Risk choice -0.062 0.089 
MACH Score -0.026* 0.014 
SDS17 Score 0.002 0.052 
Constant -0.948 1.345 
Obs 240 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.095 
 
Df 10 
 
Prob > F 0.005 
 
Notes: Logit regression with robust 
standard errors. The table reports the beta 
coefficients and the standard errors. The 
psychological variables (i.e. SDS17 Score, 
MACH Score) and Age are centered at the 
mean. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
